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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about the common law rule against perpetuities, a rule
that has been misunderstood, misapplied and too often ignored in actual
practice) Although the common law rule against perpetuities has been
1. See, eg., J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES Xi (4th ed. 1942) ("few lawyers...
have not at some time... fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary .... ); Fetters,
The Perpetuities Period in Gross and the Child En Ventre Sa Mere in Relation to the Deternination of
Common-Law and Wait-And-See Measuring Lives: A Minor Heresy Stated and Defended, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 309, 334-35 (1976) ("If it takes over eight hundred pages to explain a one-sentence, twenty-
seven word rule, and that explanation was written by a legal scholar who devoted a lifetime of study
to it, then maybe the rest of us should not be held accountable for knowing little, if anything about
it.... There is no question that the reports are full of lawyer errors, compounded by judicial blun.
ders, in the field of perpetuities law."); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1954) ("The Rule... is a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of
most members of the bar."). See also Becker, Estate Planning and the Reality of Perpetuities
Problems Today: Reliance Upon Statutory Reform and Saving Clauses Is Not Enough, 64 WAStl.
U.L.Q. 287 (1986).
Many scholars have tried to understand and explain why students and lawyers have great diffi-
culty with the common law rule against perpetuities and, accordingly, why it has created a reign of
terror. The best discussion and analysis, perhaps, is the most recent one. See Finan and Leyerle,
The Perp Rule Program: Computerizing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 JURIMETRIcS J. 317, 318-
23 (1988). The authors conclude:
The only explanation left for the Rule's reign of terror is its complexity. Complexity baffles
the intellect, but does not baffle the computer or calculator. For example, a computer has
no more trouble multiplying 512 by 873 than it does multiplying 2 by 2. A human would
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criticized soundly, decisional and statutory restrictions upon limitations
that extend in perpetuity continue to exist. 2  Commentators generally
agree that some kind of restriction is needed; nevertheless, most advocate
reformation of the common law rule. They attack the rule because it is
too complex; because it is grounded upon possibilities for vesting that
often reflect events beyond human experience; because it frequently in-
validates interests that actually or probably will vest within the allowed
time; and because it produces very harsh consequences whenever a viola-
tion occurs.3 Central to most proposals for pervasive reform has been a
shift from a rule predicated upon possibilities to one focused upon actual-
ities.4 As a result, recent statutes allow for a waiting period to determine
whether actual violations occur. Sometimes this "wait and see" period is
measured by a life in being plus twenty-one years-a period related to
the one that governs the common law rule-and sometimes it is mea-
sured by a gross period of time-for example, ninety years.' Whatever
never use a calculator to multiply 2 by 2, but would use it for the other calculation. The
same may be true with the Rule Against Perpetuities; it involves calculations whose com-
plexity is such that a computer is helpful. The amount of complexity a student can intuit
seems in large part to explain the difference between superior and average students. For
the exceptional student who has no trouble intuiting the structure of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, a tree diagram, flowchart or computer representation may be of little need.
However, most students find that the complexity of the Rule exceeds their threshold of
effective intuition. For them the computer may be helpful.
Id. at 322.
2. For a summary of existing perpetuities law, see 5A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 761, 808-27, 827A-H (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1982).
3 For the article which touched off a wave of criticism and commentary, see Leach, Perpetu-
itic tn Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952). See also
Dukeminicr, Kentuck' Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L. J. 3, 53-59 (1960); Maud-
sle, Perpctuities: Reforming the Common Law Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
355 (1075), and articles cited herein supra note 1. '
4 For a discussion of the "arious reformations of the common law rule, and in particular
those that shift the test from possibilities to actualities, see Becker, supra note 1, at 356-65.
5, Some of these "'walt and see" statutes delay a determination of validity or invalidity no later
than the deaths of lives in being plus twent-one years to see whether contingent interests actually
vest or fail. For an example of full "wait and see" legislation, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ II 08.130-50 (1967). Other statutes delay a determination no later than the deaths of certain
livcs in being to see what possibilities then exist for remote vesting beyond the time period allowed
hy the common-law rule. For an example of a limited "wait and see" statute, see MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. I 4A, § I (Law Co-op. 1977). For classification of and reference to various kinds of "wait and
see" statutes (both full and limited), see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE
TR.\NsI-t S) k 1.4 statutory notes lb. Ic (1983). Additionally, there is a "wait and see" proposal
that attempts to ameliorate the rule's complexity and obviate its unfairness by substituting a gross
numrbir of cars (ninety) to measure the period in which one can delay a determination of whether
interests have actually vested. The proposal, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, has
been approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. For a thor-
1989]
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the base rule, reform statutes frequently attempt to avoid the harsh con-
sequences of perpetuities violations by empowering a court to recast inva-
lid interests in a manner that best approximates the estate owner's intent
and satisfies the requirements of the rule.6 Despite these reforms and the
strong support among commentators for them, the common law rule re-
mains, at least for the moment, the most prevalent restriction against
perpetuities.7
Where the common law rule has been reformed, especially if trans-
formed into an actualities test that allows for a "wait and see" period,
many lawyers are tempted to disregard perpetuities problems and espe-
cially the common law rule itself. Presumably they do so because
whatever potential exists for remote vesting, actual vesting will seldom
occur beyond the period sanctioned by the rule.8 Yet even in those juris-
dictions where the common law rule remains intact, lawyers typically
ignore it. Some do so because they firmly believe lawyers create interests
that do not cause perpetuities violations, especially those interests drawn
from standard forms.9 Most do so, however, because even if they are
wrong about the interests created, they include convenient saving clauses
found in these same forms as safeguards. A saving clause prevents a
violation or overcomes it by redirecting the subject matter in a manner
that satisfies the rule and presumably achieves the estate owner's disposi-
tive objectives.1" As a result, lawyers tend to draft specific dispositive
provisions without regard for the common law rule against perpetuities.
Beyond the salutary effects of perpetuities reform and saving clauses,
there is another reason why lawyers tend to overlook the common law
rule when designing and drafting specific dispositive provisions. Proba-
ough discussion of this proposal, see Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuitles, 21
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986). It should also be observed that one jurisdiction has moder-
ated the common law rule's complexity even though it retains a possibilities test. More specifically,
it provides a gross number of years as an alternative to the life in being to fix the allowed period of
time in which an interest must vest or fail. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 715.2, 715.6 (Deering 1971).
6. For classification of and reference to the various kinds of perpetuities statutes that offer
discretionary remedial action through cy pres principles, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) 1.5 statutory note (1983).
7. See 5A R. POWELL, supra note 2, at 761. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
(DONATIVE TRANSFERS) introduction to Part I at 11 (1983).
8. For a discussion of the salutary effects of perpetuities reform and of the problems it creates
for planners who rely exclusively upon it, see Becker, supra note 1, at 362-78.
9. For a review of dispositive provisions derived from standard forms that, in the absence of
an effective saving clause, cause perpetuities problems, see id. at 307-54.
10. For a discussion of saving clauses, including how they function and what problems they
create, see id. at 378-416.
[Vol. 67:949
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bly more than any other rule of law, the common law rule against perpe-
tuities is shrouded with confusion and mystery. 1 For generations, it has
been the nemesis of students, practitioners, judges and perhaps even
teachers. The rule presents a problem for teachers because it is difficult
to teach and for students because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
learn. t2 As for those practitioners and judges able to master it, that un-
derstanding frequently diminishes or even evaporates as they lose touch
with the rule. And even for those who develop expertise in the area of
law in which the rule is relevant, there is always the possibility-perhaps
even predilection-for miscalculation in its application.' 3 Indeed, be-
cause so many lawyers misunderstand the common law rule, one state
supreme court found that an attorney who drafted a dispositive instru-
ment that violated the rule did not fail "to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise."' 4
Despite this confession of widespread misunderstanding, ignorance of the
common law rule is seldom an acknowledged reason for ignoring it and is
never a justification for doing so.
Although lawyers tend to ignore the common law rule in planning and
drafting specific dispositive provisions, it is difficult to justify this practice
even if they use saving clauses and even if the common law rule has been
modified or replaced by new perpetuities legislation.' 5 First, a lawyer
cannot always guarantee that the "wait and see" test of his jurisdiction
11 For example, generations of law students have been confounded by the presumed fertility of
octogenarians, by the assumption that probate may never occur and, if it does, that it can be com-
pleted more than twenty-one years after the estate owner's death, and by the assumption that a gift
to a named adult's unnamed surviving spouse may include someone born after the estate owner's
death For a discussion of these applications of the common law rule against perpetuities, see Leach,
Pcrp, uil's in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 643-46 (1938). Nevertheless, most students can,
albeit grudgingly, grasp these assumptions and integrate them into their understanding and applica-
tion of the common law rule. Students' greatest difficulty and confusion, however, lies in the life in
being concept and the requirement of absolute certainty for the time limits for vesting. For a discus-
"ion of the life in being concept and of the confusion and uncertainty it has engendered, see infra
Part Two.
12, See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
13 That I have done all my sums correctly, I do not venture to hope. There is something
in the subject which seems to facilitate error. Perhaps it is because the mode of reasoning is
unlike that with which lawyers are most familiar. The study and practice of the Rule
against Perpetuities is indeed a constant school of modesty. A long list might be formed of
the demonstrable blunders with regard to its questions made by eminent men, blunders
uhich they themselves have been sometimes the first to acknowledge; ....
J Gv,%., vupra note 1, at xi.
14 Lucas v. Hamm. 56 Cal.2d 583, 592, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 826 (1961).
15 For a review of the perpetuities problems caused by standard dispositive provisions con-
tained vithin form books and a discussion of why one should not rely exclusively upon perpetuities
1989]
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will govern the interests created by the dispositive instruments he
drafts 6 : a lawyer cannot control either the client's place of residence or
the situs of real property that comprises the client's estate.
In addition, both "wait and see" rules and saving clauses make actuali-
ties critical, rather than possibilities.' 7 "Wait and see" rules accomplish
this directly, while saving clauses achieve this indirectly by setting an
absolute time limit for vesting, or for a trust's duration, that falls within
the common law rule.'" Both delay ultimate dispositive determina-
reform and saving clauses to avert these problems, see Becker, supra note 1. See also Lynn, Perpetu.
ities Literacy for the 21st Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 219 (1989). Professor Lynn observes:
[A]lthough reform versions of the Rule facilitate saving gifts that violate the Rule in ortho-
dox form, as drafters of legal documents, we should make certain that the documents we
draft conform to the requirements of the Rule in orthodox form. If those requirements are
met, there is no need to resort to either "wait and see" or cypres, and if a dispute arises and
litigation ensues, a declaration of validity is appropriate. The existence of a reform version
of the Rule in a jurisdiction might tempt the drafter to be less cautious than he or she
otherwise would be. That temptation should be resisted. Persons owning property and
executing documents change domiciles with great regularity. They own property in states
other than that where they are domiciled. A document drafted in one jurisdiction might be
construed and applied years later in another jurisdiction. Drafting should conform to the
requirements of the Rule in its most stringent form, and careful drafting should be comple-
mented by inclusion of a perpetuities savings clause in the document.
We do not know whether lawyers and judges will accept the listing of measuring lives as
persuasive, or whether legislatures in significant numbers will enact the Uniform Statute.
What we do know as we move into the twenty-first century is that any version of the Rule
that we encounter presupposes mastery of the Rule in orthodox form, and that no version
of the Rule that we encounter frees us from our obligaiton to draft documents that con-
form to the Rule in orthodox form. Documents that clearly conform to the Rule in ortho-
dox form reduce the likelihood of the dispute and litigation that disrupt families and
reduce the donor's gifts by costs and fees. Promoting family harmony and keeping the
donor's gifts intact are clearly in the public interest.
Id. at 239, 241.
16. For a discussion of what perpetuities law governs, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24.5A (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
17. For a discussion and comparison of "wait and see" perpetuities reforms and saving clauses,
see Becker, supra note 1, at 356-407.
18. "Wait and see" rules and most saving clauses are fundamentally similar. Both set time
periods beyond which interests cannot vest. The "wait and see" period either is vaguely referable to
a life in being and twenty-one years or is fixed more specifically by a statutory list or formula. The
saving 'lause period is determined by the clause itself, and the period formulated is one that satisfies
the common law rule. Because "wait and see" rules expressly allow for actualities and because
saving clauses insure that no interest can vest beyond the period of the common law rule, both
legitimize a waiting period during which it can be seen whether interests actually vest or fail. Specifi-
cally, saving clauses create delay so that one can ascertain whether the subject matter passes to those
entitled to take if the interest vests within the specified period, whether it passes to those entitled to
take if it fails to vest within the specified period, or whether it passes to those who take if it neither
vests nor fails within the specified period.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between "wait and see" rules and saving clauses.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
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tions.'0 If vesting or a failure to vest, or instead the distribution and
possession of principal itself, does not actually occur within the permit-
ted period of time, then either the interest fails or remedial action is di-
rected.2' Therefore, both "wait and see" rules and saving clauses invite
initial uncertainty about the ultimate validity or efficacy of the provision.
Consequently, they also exacerbate uncertainty about the ultimate dispo-
sition of the subject matter.2 ' More important, they invite disputes, and
Saving clauses nearly always provide for those who are to take if the interest neither vests nor fails
wvithin the designated time period that satisfies the common law rule. "Wait-and-see" rules often
allow for a cv pres reformation of interests that in reality do not vest or fail within the allowed time
period. Furthermore, although the waiting periods under "wait and see" rules and saving clauses
both fall within a life in being and twenty-one years, they are not usually the same waiting period.
For example, the waiting period allowed by saving clauses can be more restrictive than statutory
formula or lists, yet there are clauses that sometimes make it more extensive. Additionally, the
waiting period usually is clearly delineated under both, but sometimes it is not. Finally, "wait and
see" rules require that interests vest or fail within the allowed time period. Interests that actually
vest within the period are valid and are preserved. Quite differently, most saving clauses today do
more than set a time limit to vesting. They terminate trusts and distribute principal when this has
not happened within the prescribed time period. They thus require that interests do more than vest
within the time period; they require distribution and ultimate possession of principal within a time
frame that satisfies the common law rule's requirement for vesting. For further discussion and com-
parison of "wait and see" rules and saving clauses, see Becker, supra note I, at 356-65, 383-90.
1) "Wait and see" rules and saving clauses permit interests to vest or fail at any time within
the time period allowed by the rule or prescribed by the saving clause. They create delay for a period
of time to see what actually happens. Therefore, they delay the dispositive determination to see
whether the subject matter will belong to those who take if the condition is fulfilled or belong to
those who take if it is breached. However, if the condition is neither breached nor fulfilled within the
time period allowed, these clauses and rules also delay the dispositive determination to see who
should ultimately take pursuant to the direction of the rule or the saving clause. For a discussion and
analysis of the problems caused by this delay, see Becker, supra note 1, at 365-78, 391-407.
20 Under many saving clauses currently in use, trusts created within the instrument must
terminate within a specified period of time. Stated differently, if final distribution and possession of
principal does not occur within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of specified lives in
being, the trust is terminated and principal is then distributed, usually to those currently entitled to
income. Se, Becker, supra note 1, at 384-85 n.219. Additionally, some "wait and see" statutes do
not provide for remedial action If the interest actually neither vests nor fails within the permitted
period of time, it violates the rule and is void. In the event of a violation, other "wait and see"
statutes gi'e the court a c' pres power to reform the limitation, within the limits of the rule, in a
manner that effectuates the estate owner's dispositive design. See id. at 358-62.
Saving clauses, however, necessarily incorporate remedial action. By definition a saving clause
must save, and this cannot be accomplished without explicit provision for some remedial course of
action. Accordingly, some clauses save by redirecting the time of vesting or distribution, usually by
giving principal to those then entitled to income. Other clauses save by empowering a corporate
fiduciary or a court to reform the limitation, within the limits of the common law rule, in a manner
that effectuates the estate owner's dispositive design. See id. at 383-87.
21 The common law rule, "wait and see" rules, and saving clauses have in common these
questions and, therefore, these uncertainties. Will the subject matter belong to those who take if the
condition is fulfilled, and, if so. when will this be known? Will the subject matter belong to those
Washington University Open Scholarship
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possibly litigation, about when the permitted period has elapsed and
what curative action can and should be taken.22 Compliance with the
common law rule can reduce considerably the initial uncertainty and po-
who take if the condition is breached, and, if so, when will this be known? Will the subject matter
belong to those who take if the interest presents a perpetuities violation and (sometimes), if so, when
will this be known? Finally, if a violation exists, specifically to whom will the subject matter belong?
Even under the common law rule, if an interest is valid, there is a wait, and with it uncertainty, to
see whether the interest actually vests or fails. And this delay may last for the full period of the
common law rule. See R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAV OF PERPETUITIES 82-84 (1979). Never-
theless, even though these rules and clauses always present the foregoing questions, there are differ.
ences. Presumably, the common law rule requires an immediate resolution of the last two questions.
It can be determined without delay whether a perpetuities violation exists and, if so, who is entitled
to take the subject matter. "Wait-and-see" rules, however, can delay these determinations until the
end of the permitted waiting period. Until then, it may not be known whether the subject matter
belongs to those who take in the event of a violation, and specifically who should take if an interest
actually neither vests nor fails in time. The same conclusions can be reached with respect to most
saving clauses that introduce actualities and achieve "wait and see" indirectly. It should be empha-
sized, then, that the common law rule, "wait and see" rules, and saving clauses present essentially
the same substantive questions and uncertainties. The common law rule, however, offers immediate
resolution of some of these questions, while the others do not. For further discussion of the uncer-
tainty engendered by "wait and see" rules and saving clauses, see Becker, supra note 1, at 367-71,
392-93.
22. There has been much debate about how the period under a "wait and see" test is, or should
be, measured. Most of the debate concerns the uncertainty involved in determining when the time
for waiting has elapsed. More specifically, it concerns the identity of the lives in being by which the
waiting period can be determined. See R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 21, at 87-109. See also infra Part
Two B. Many commentators maintain that, except for the statutes that include a statutory list of
measuring or waiting lives, the actual duration of the waiting period is not always self-evident. Un-
doubtedly, most would agree that the waiting period is uncertain when the statute is completely
silent on the selection of measuring lives. To be sure, if there is uncertainty, there will be litigation.
The same can be said for some saving clauses. Most saving clauses used today clearly specify the
lives which measure the period incorporated into the clause; therefore, these provisions should not
present this kind of problem. Nevertheless, this is not true for all saving clauses, particularly those
that authorize reformation by a court or corporate fiduciary under the common law ruie if an inter-
est is actually invalid or is challenged under the common law rule. In these instances, because the
existence of a violation or a challenge may be unclear, there may be litigation about whether and
when remedial action is authorized.
If a "wait and see" statute does not include discretionary powers of reformation (cypres powers),
presumably an interest that does not actually vest or fail within the permitted waiting period vio-
lates the rule. And in this situation, there should be at least the same potential for disputes and
litigation concerning the consequences of a violation as under the common law rule itself. The major
difference is, of course, that such litigation must be delayed until the end of the waiting period; only
then can it be known whether the interest actually violates the rule. For a discussion of the conse-
quences of a violation under the common law rule, see L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OIr FUTURE
INTERESTS §§ 1256-64 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1973). If, however, a "wait and see" statute includes a
cy pres power, there should be disputes about the substance of the reformation itself; more specifi-
cally, there should be disputes over what plan of disposition that complies with the rule best approxi-
mates the original estate design. As long as a court has discretion, disputes seem inevitable. This
particular potential for litigation should also exist with respect to saving clauses that give the same
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
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tential for disputes. "Wait and see" rules are satisfied by interests that
comply with the common law rule. Therefore, validity is established at
the outset, and in most instances with ease and without substantially im-
pairing dispositive objectives. Likewise, saving clauses are less likely to
take effect with a complying interest. By eliminating the inherent delay
of "wait and see" rules and saving clauses, and the possible need for re-
medial action that accompanies such delay, compliance with the com-
mon law rule affords considerable clarity and secures dispositive
objectives. 23
Finally, quite apart from increased uncertainty, saving clauses present
other problems. Many saving clauses do not always save because they do
not comprehend all interests created by the instrument in which the
clause appears. 24 Quite differently, some saving clauses can operate pre-
maturely; that is, they can cut short a dispositive provision and redirect
distribution even under circumstances in which there is no perpetuities
problem and no violation of other related rules.2 ' Furthermore, once a
curative discretion to either a corporate fiduciary or a court. However, it should not arise under
saving clauses that mandate remedial action by distributions to clearly identifiable beneficiaries.
For further discussion of uncertainties and the potential for disputes concerning when the permit-
ted waiting period has elapsed and what curative action can and should be taken, see Becker, supra
note 1. at 366-71, 392-93. 402-04.
23 Attempted compliance with the common law rule will diminish, but not erase, problems of
initial uncertainty and the potential for disputes. If the rule is in fact satisfied, there should be no
uncertainty or disputes about perpetuities violations. Nevertheless, actual compliance with the com-
mon law rule may be open to dispute and uncertainty. However, this particular uncertainty can and
should be resolved at the outset. Assuming that the common law rule is satisfied and that no interest
can vest beyond the permitted time period, there is always a measure of uncertainty about whether
these interests will actually vest or fail. In short, there is inevitably some uncertainty whether the
subject matter will belong to those who take if the condition is fulfilled or belong to those who take if
it is breached.
For illustrations and a comparative discussion of perpetuities compliance through reliance upon
"wait and see" statutes, upon saving clauses, and upon tailor made satisfaction of the rule for each
provision, see Becker, supra note I, at 371-78, 408-16.
24 There are numerous problems that arise concerning the scope of saving clauses. For exam-
pie, many saving clauses extend the coverage of their safety-net waiting period to trusts directly
created by the donative instrument in which the saving clause appears, but they do not do so with
respect to trusts created by the exercise of powers of appointment given in the same donative instru-
ment. If the saving clause does not comprehend trusts created by exercise of powers donated in the
dispositive instrument, the estate owner always suffers the risk that the donee will lose sight of the
time the perpetuities period begins and thereby appoint interests that are invalid because of a perpe-
tuities violation. Additionally, because most saving clauses fashion a protective waiting period that
applies only to trusts created by the instrument in which the clause appears, they will have no saving
effect on interests created by the same dispositive instrument that are not placed in trust. For further
discussion of these and other problems concerning the coverage of saving clauses, see id. at 393-97.
25. Clearly, saving clauses must avoid perpetuities violations, but a saving clause that adopts a
Washington University Open Scholarship
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saving clause is actuated other problems can arise concerning the distri-
bution of principal redirected by the saving clause. Discretionary meth-
ods of redirection invite disputes over the exercise of such discretion,
while mandatory methods-especially when adopted from standardized
forms-can redistribute the subject matter to recipients who, on the basis
of the dispositive provision itself, were never intended to share in the
principal.26
safety-net approach (one that uses a protective waiting period after which redirection is required as
to all interests that have not vested or become possessory) must also select measuring lives that allow
ample time for the dispositive design to unfold naturally and for the estate owner's objectives to be
fulfilled. Nevertheless, there are numerous instances in which saving clauses cut short dispositive
designs that could otherwise be implemented within the rule. Invariably, this happens when certain
lives in being critical to a trust's duration and to the fulfillment of its objective are omitted from the
group of measuring lives specified in the safety-net saving clause. Additionally, when a lawyer omits
these critical lives from the safety net's measuring period, it becomes possible for a saving clause to
terminate a trust that contains no perpetuities violation and, further, one that cannot last longer than
the period of the rule itself. For illustrations and further discussion of the premature operation of
saving clauses, see id. at 397-400.
There are other bodies of law concerned with the same policy considerations as tile rule against
perpetuities, principles generally concerned with the alienability of property and the rights of the
living to be free of the constraints of the dead. These other principles of property law involve restric-
tions on accumulations, prohibitions against direct restraints upon alienation, and restrictions upon
the duration of trusts. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1111-71, 1391-95, 1461-68.
Indeed, some of these rules use the same period of time allowed by the common law rule to control
certain aspects of donative transfers. For example, although contingent equitable interests created
by a trust may satisfy the common law rule against perpetuities if they must vest, if at all, within a
life in being and twenty-one years, they may not satisfy another rule that, for the same period of
time, imposes a time limit on the indestructibility of trusts. In short, a growing body of law disal-
lows the continuation of a trust beyond the period of time allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities when the ascertained beneficiaries of the trust wish to terminate it. If the beneficiaries
wish to do this, a trust cannot by its terms remain indestructible beyond this period of time even if its
termination defeats the material purposes of the trust. Id., § 1391. See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 2.1 reporter's note (1983).
As a result of these other related rules, and in particular the one that limits indestructibility of
trusts, some saving clauses cast a more comprehensive and restrictive safety net, one that circum-
scribes the duration of all trusts created by the dispositive instrument. For further discussion and
illustrations of saving clauses that protect against both perpetuities violations and the violation of
related rules, see Becker. supra note 1, at 383-90.
26. Perhaps the worst feature of discretionary redirection is the inevitability of litigation once
the actuating event occurs. Discretion entails choices, and with them there is always the potential
for disputes. Because these perpetuities matters are never raised initially without disagreement
among interested parties, it is unlikely that the parties will readily agree on a particular choice of
redirection. Stated otherwise, if disagreement has forced the termination of a trust, it is unlikely that
immediately thereafter the parties will reach agreement on a course of redirection. Quite differently,
the major problem associated with a mandatory redirection of principal to those entitled to income
immediately before the waiting period expires is that it may deliver principal to someone who, under
a particular provision, was never intended to take principal. More specifically, if the ultimate takers
of principal under a provision will be entitled to income at the time the actuating event is apt to
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Indeed, the common law rule against perpetuities continues to be ex-
ceedingly important. To be sure, it is a rule with which conscientious
lawyers involved in estate planning must reckon.2" Neither "wait and
see" reforms nor standard saving clauses afford the same certainty with
regard to validity or result as dispositive provisions that are separately
tailored to comply with the common law rule against perpetuities. 8 At
best, lawyers should use perpetuities reform and saving clauses only as
o cur, then the redirection of principal to them should satisfy the estate owner's objectives. If,
hoxlcxcr, the actuating event can occur at a time when income is being given to beneficiaries who
xxcre nexer intended to take principal, then the redirection of principal to them would seem to miss
the mark. For illustrations and further discussion of these problems of redirection, see Becker, supra
note 1, at 402-07.
27 The most recent proposal for perpetuities reformation, and one which, perhaps, will take
hold in the United States, is the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP). Much like
the position taken in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIvE TRANSFERS) §§ 1.1-
1 (83), it adopts a "wait and see" element and allows for reformation of interests that do not
actually vest in time. However, unlike the Restatement and unlike nearly all other "wait and see"
statutes (sc Becker, supra note 1, at 358-62), the USRAP does not use actual measuring lives to
determine the allowable waiting period. Instead, it uses a proxy to measure this time period-a flat
imnety years;: "Section 1. (a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless ... the interest either
ests or terminates within 90 years after its creation." Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule
4qamt Pcrp cuitie, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 569, 592 (1986).
One might expect that, by substituting a flat period of time and thereby simplifying perpetuities
iequirements, the USRAP will enable lawyers once and for all to disregard the common law rule
against perpetuities. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that the USRAP does not abandon the
common law rule completely. Indeed, section 1 (a)(1) validates an interest if "when the interest is
created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than 21 years after the death of an individual then
aive . " Id. The Reporter for the USRAP, Professor Waggoner, maintains that this codified
%ersion of the validating side of the common law rule "is an extremely important feature of the
Uniform Act because it means that no new learning is required of competent estate planners. The
prwtu( to l w rr' who conpetently draft trusts and other property arrangements for their clients is
andt turhd." Id. at 592.
Accordingly, the Reporter himself believes that perpetuities compliance will be practiced best by
compliance with the common law' rule Undoubtedly, there are reasons why this should be so, rea-
son heyond that of enabling competent lawyers to continue their old ways. At the very least,
comphancc with the common laxw rule by planners avoids the uncertainty engendered by all "wait
and wsc rules. Se supra note 21 Lawyers wil know immediately that there will be no perpetuities
%iolation and no need for disretionary reformation, and with this compliance the occasions for dis-
putcs and litigation should be reduced See supra note 22. See also Lynn, supra note 15, at 239, 241.
Additionally, the careful selection of lives in being to comply with the common law rule should
approximate more closely the estate owner's dispositive objectives and, when desired, should enable
him to extend control beyond the proxy itself, ninety years. For further discussion of the advantages
of comphancc with the common law rule on a provision by provision basis, see Becker. supra note 1,
at 371-78, 408-16.
2S For a discussion of the various methods for tailor-made compliance with the common law
rule against perpetuities and of the advantages of this technique in comparison to straight reliance
upon saving clauses and perpetuities reform, see Becker, supra note I, at 408-16.
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safeguards against miscalculation and not as substitutes for provision-
by-provision compliance. Accordingly, lawyers engaged in the estate
transfer process must understand, master, and satisfy the common law
rule. Nevertheless, many lawyers have not mastered this rule, and one
can imagine the number of unchallenged provisions they have drafted in
violation of it. The root of this misunderstanding and mismanagement of
the rule may be the misperception of its current vitality and importance.
More likely, this misunderstanding results from the mysteries and com-
plexities of the rule itself. Lawyers misunderstand and disregard the rule
because they never mastered it in the first place. They may not have
encountered it as students, and if they did, either they were repelled in
fear or they eventually repressed whatever understanding they were able
to muster.29
The purpose of this article is to explain the common law rule against
perpetuities in a manner that lawyers understand so that they can apply
it correctly. Typically, the rule has been taught by example. After pro-
viding a statement of the rule and a brief explanation, an instructor will
usually offer several problems and their solutions.3° He may encourage
29. Today, there is a great likelihood that a law student will not encounter the rule against
perpetuities by graduation. Indeed, the amount of time law schools devote to perpetuities instruc-
tion has been reduced significantly in recent years. This is readily confirmed by scanning law school
curricula and published course books. In earlier times, the rule against perpetuities received major
treatment in an extended first year property course and in a separate course on future interests.
Today, the emphasis of first year courses has shifted away from the law of estates, a prerequisite to
mastery of the common law rule, and the law of future interests is usually crammed into a course on
trusts and estates or into a course on estate planning. Inevitably, these courses have less time and
offer less instructional material for teaching and understanding the rule. Perhaps the views of Profes-
sor Cohen best express the prevailing attitude toward current instruction on the law of estates and
the rule against perpetuities:
In the history and tradition of teaching property the subject of estates in land has generally
been the one to which the most attention has been devoted .... Today, however, attention
has shifted to the modernization of the principles, and, far more importantly, to other
relationships than those covered by the principles .... The examples abound; the simple
fact of the matter is that the world has changed and attention has been diverted. So too in
this book. As fascinating as a thorough treatment of the estates in land in the interest of
eventual understanding of the Rule Against Perpetuities may be, there is little modern
justification in concentrating upon it in a first year property course. The simple fact is that
no longer can it truthfully be said that complete and historical understanding of estate in
land is absolutely necessary to a lawyer.
E. COHEN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN PROPERTY 114, (1978). To be sure, however, there
will always be students who study the rule against perpetuities while in law school. Nevertheless,
even these students probably will not have mastered it and their understanding likely will be, at best,
an uneasy one. See supra notes 11, 13; infra note 30.
30. For example, the original nutshell on perpetuities, upon which generations of law students
were weaned, contains propositions about the common law rule that are each followed by examples
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those who do not understand to follow along with several more problems
and their solutions. Frequently, he will tell students that in time they
will be able to solve problems for themselves. Some students accomplish
this, but seldom can these students explain to others the understanding
or method by which they consistently reach the correct result. It is as if
they master the rule by osmosis and solve problems by simple inspec-
tion.' Vague explanations coupled with intuitive techniques invariably
satisfy the needs of those who practice the rule correctly; yet, this kind of
teaching is a great frustration to the substantial number of students un-
able to master the rule. Although many instructors view the process of
application with great clarity and, therefore, can elaborate the rule's logic
with precision and care, a thorough understanding escapes far too many
students. Consequently, when these students become lawyers they shun
the rule and utilize every device to avoid it.
This article develops a methodology that attempts to overcome the
problems of misunderstanding, indifference, and mismanagement with
respect to the common law rule against perpetuities. This article as-
sumes that, for whatever reason, many lawyers will never truly under-
stand the logic and process of the rule. It is only important, however,
that they apply the rule correctly. In short, the methodology is one of
technique-it focuses on reaching the right result. It presents a series of
ordered questions one must contemplate and answer. For those who do
,ith explanations Se Leach, supra note 11. See also J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON. FAMILY
Wi %I I H TRANS\CTIONS: WI i S, TRUSTS. AND ESTATES 980-83 (2d ed. 1978); R. LYNN, THE
MODERN RLIL AGAINST PERPETUITIES 42-47 (1966); L. SuMES, SiMES ON FUTURE INTERESTS
§109 (1951).
31. When first exposed to the study of algebra, I just couldn't get the hang of it .... I
finally asked my grandfather for help. He too was very bright.... His instructions always
were the same:
"Son, you can solve these problems by inspection," which he proceeded to do. And his
answers always were correct. But his insights were not imparted to me. My reaction was a
complete mental block to algebra-
"Who needs algebra? ..
I , now devote my energies to solsing trusts, estates and future interests problems.
The heart of modern future interests law is the Rule Against Perpetuities. The very
bright people who understand this stuff are able to solve most perpetuities problems, like
my grandfather, by inspection. And, like my grandfather, they explain their solutions in
the same way. They talk and write like one teacher talks and writes to another, assuming
that everyone else who listens and reads is getting the hang of it. As they talk and write,
the rest of us build our protective barriers against the whole silly thing.
"Who needs to understand it"'
The answer, unfortunately, is. "We do"
Fetters, Te Perpetuities Period in Gro5s and the Child En Ventre Sa Mere in Relation to tie Deter-
rnination of Coinnion-Law and Wait-And-See Measuring Lives: A Minor Heresy Stated and De-
lnded, 62 low, L.Riiv. 309 (1976)
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not understand the logic of the rule and the process by which to apply it,
the methodology requires an act of faith and adherence much the same as
for those of us who had to learn the rules of arithmetic before the advent
of the "new math."
II. THE COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND ITS
REQUISITE LIFE IN BEING CONCEPT
The common law rule against perpetuities provides: "No interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest."32 This often quoted
statement is John Chipman Gray's shorthand summary of his monumen-
tal synthesis of the common law of perpetuities as it had developed over
several centuries. Stated in this fashion, the common law rule has an
appealing simplicity. Yet beneath this simplicity lies a rule that has be-
deviled generations of law students. Inevitably, students ask: "Who is
this life in being by which one determines the validity of an interest?"
They ask this question because the identity of the validating life in being
is usually the major concern of students trying to comprehend the com-
mon law rule and apply it to specific examples.33
Teachers invariably answer with some explanation and instructive
guidelines about the life in being. Soon, however, instruction focuses on
examples, solutions, and explanations relevant to these examples. Ulti-
mately, the student must "catch on." Instructive guidelines teachers
most frequently use are that the validating life in being can be anyone or
any group of people, not unreasonably large or unreasonably difficult to
trace; that the person need not be the recipient of any interest within the
limitation or within the dispositive instrument itself; and that the life in
32. J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 191.
33. See, e.g., J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, mpra note 30; L. SIM-s, HANDBOOK ON TIlE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 365 (2d ed. 1951); Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being?, 81
L.Q. REV. 106, 106-07 (1965); Note, Understanding the Measuring Life in the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 265.
Students have other concerns as well. Beyond the life in being concept they frequently preoccupy
themselves with the application of the common law rule to class gifts, powers of appointment, op-
tions, charitable gifts, revocable trusts, rights of entry, and possibilities of reverter, and also with the
assumed possibilities that the rule requires. Each of these areas of concern is discussed adequately in
articles and treatises, especially in the classic treament of the rule by Leach. See Leach, supra note
11. Although students may scoff at the presumption of fertility that the rule indulges and at the
cases of the "unborn widow" or the "administrative contingency," they have little difficulty grasping
them and integrating them into their understanding and application of the common law rule.
[Vol. 67:949
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being need not be mentioned explicitly in the dispositive instrument.3 4
Typically, students find these guidelines confusing when asked to con-
strue and interpret a given limitation and to determine its validity. They
often respond: "If the life in being can be anyone, even someone not
mentioned in the instrument, then why isn't the life in being anyone who
was actually alive and why can't anyone be used to validate the interest?"
Although the answers seem obvious to one who has mastered the com-
mon law rule, they are neither apparent nor easily understood by most
students.3 5 Consequently, any methodology designed to facilitate appli-
cation of the common law rule must, first and foremost, address the life
in being concept and the confusion it engenders.
A. The Importance of Applying the Common Law Rule Correctly in
the Interpretation of Interests Already Created or Designed-
Anyone Cannot Be the Validating Life in Being
Any attempt to diminish this confusion must begin with a distinction
between selecting the life in being in the planning and drafting of inter-
ests and finding the validating life in being for interests previously cre-
ated and currently in existence. Stated differently, in applying the
34. The rule simply is that any living person or persons may be the life or lives in being for
the purposes of any limitation; provided only that if the settlor or testator expressly selects
the life in being for the purposes of a limitation, he must not select so many nor such
unrecognizable persons as the lives in being that it is impracticable upon evidence available
to the court to ascertain the date of the death of the last one.
R. MAXtDSLEY, supra note 21, at 42.
Maudsley later qualifies this broad statement by indicating that the only lives of any use are those
in which vesting cannot possibly occur beyond twenty-one years of their deaths. Id. at 43. Never-
theless. it typifies the kind of broad and unqualified statement that students seize upon in their
attempt to understand and apply the common law rule. See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24 13 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Leach, supra note 11, at 641-42. Cf. R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE
Ac, \iNsI PERPATUITIEs 43 (1966).
35 The answer to these questions comes in two parts. First, these guidelines are misleading.
They are primarily precepts for the creation of valid interests. Virtually anyone or any group of
people can be used to create a valid interest under the common law rule. However, this statement
does not apply to interests already created which must then be tested in terms of the rule. These
pronouncements are really precepts for the creation of interests and not interpretation of existing
interests, and a student has good reason to be confused if he is attempting to apply them to an
etsting limitation for the purpose of determining its validity. See hfra Part Two A. See also
Boeker, Understanding the Rule Against Perpetuities in Relation to the Lawyer's Role-To Construe
or Contruct. 20 S\N DitcGo L. Ri-. 733 (1983). Second, because the common law rule is a pos-
sibilities test, it is absolutely clear to those who understand the rule that, when it comes to interpre-
tivc application, the validating life in being cannot be anyone and that the proof required by the
common law rule immediately limits the potential pool of lives in being that might be used to vali-
date. See infra Part Two B.
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common law rule, one must distinguish between the creation and the
interpretation of interests. To explain, the common law rule presents a
test of possibilities: an interest is valid if there is no possibility that it
might vest beyond the period of the rule-a life in being plus twenty-one
years. 36 More specifically, an interest is necessarily valid if it cannot pos-
sibly vest beyond twenty-one years of its creation. If this is not proven,
then the interest is valid only if one can identify some person in being
when the interest is created and prove that there is no possibility whatso-
ever that the interest can vest beyond twenty-one years of that person's
death.
Consider this devise of Blackacre by A: "To B in fee simple; however,
if Blackacre is ever used for any purpose other than residential, then to C
in fee simple absolute." The executory interest created in C is contingent
and it violates the common law rule. With this conclusion in mind, stu-
dents often ask: "Who is the life in being, and why aren't B and C appro-
priate lives in being?" A reply might begin that the condition of
defeasance, by its terms, allows for divestiture at any time in the future,
at any time B or his successors devotes the land to a deviant use. Fur-
ther, although C's executory interest is contingent, it is transmissible at
C's death; no requirement exists that C must survive the time of divesti-
ture.3 7 Accordingly, it is possible that the divestiture can occur genera-
36. This statement of the common law rule differs in form from the test offered by Gray, and
the one used by most exponents of the rule. See supra text accompanying note 32. Nevertheless, this
different form is used at various points within this article to avoid a mistake commonly made even by
experts. Gray's test is that an interest is valid if it must vest, ifat all, within the allowed time period.
Unfortunately, most commentaries on the rule overlook at one point or another the "if at all" re-
quirement in their descriptions of the test. For example, "The proper question to ask is: Can I point
to some person or persons now living and say that this interest will by the very terms of its creation
be vested in an identified individual within twenty-one years after that person dies?" Sparks, Perpe-
tuities Problems of the General Practitioner, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 470 (1955). This oversight is
critical because, without the "if at all" requirement, one could never prove that a contingent interest
must vest within any period and, therefore, all contingent interests would violate the rule. By defini-
tion, a contingent interest is not certain to vest. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 30,
at 980-82. The common law rule does not require that an interest must become possessory within
the allowed time period, nor does it require that the interest must vest within such period. It does,
however, forbid all interests that might possibly vest beyond twenty-one years after the deaths of all
lives in being at the creation of such interest.
37. Courts sometimes find contingent interests, especially those created in a class, to be subject
to a requirement of survivorship even in situations in which such requirement is neither expressed
nor clearly implied. See infra note 247. In this example, C has an executory interest that is expressly
contingent upon a breach of the restriction upon land use, and there is no additional condition
requiring C to survive the time for divestiture. Accordingly, C's interest violates the common law
rule. See infra Part Four B-I. Nevertheless, if a court were to infer that for C's interest to vest lie
[Vol. 67:949
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
1989] PERPETUITIES METHODOLOGY
tions beyond the deaths of both B and C; therefore, one cannot use their
lives to validate C's interest. Nor can one use any other life in being at
the death of A. One can look to the current President of the United
States or to anyone else and fall short of a proof of validity.38 Unless a
life in being has some relevance to the time for vesting, it is useless, and it
cannot support a valid proof.39 In this example, then, no validating life
in being exists because no life whatsoever limits the time for vesting.4°
By way of emphasis, in interpreting existing interests, anyone cannot be
the life in being; rather, the limitation itself governs and circumscribes
the potential pool of people in which a validating life may be found.
Although students may have a difficult time with the previous example
and explanation, they seldom have difficulty redrafting A's devise in a
manner that avoids a violation. They readily observe, as planners and
draftsmen, that they have choices when asked to construct a limitation
that does not violate the common law rule. They understand that the
validating lives in being can be any reasonable number of people, even
those not included as beneficiaries in the limitation, so long as one explic-
itly requires that vesting must occur, if at all, by the time these people die
must survive the time in which the land is used for a purpose other than residential, then there would
be no violation of the common law rule against perpetuities. For further discussion, see infra note
436
38 For example, if one uses the President of the United States to test the validity of C's contin-
gent executory interest, one must conclude that George Bush's life will not establish a valid proof.
In applying the critical test embodied in the common law rule, it is necessary to ask: Must C's
intcrcst vest, if at all, in C or C's successors within twenty-one years of the death of George Bush?
In light of all possibilities for vesting. the answer is, of course, NO. For example, George Bush
might die immediately after the death of A. the time when the devise is made to B. It is also possible
that B wvill continue to use Blackacre exclusively for residential purposes for the next thirty years
and, thereafter, that he will use the land for industrial purposes. When this happens, the condition
itttchcd to B's interest is violated and B's interest is thereby immediately divested in favor of C.
Accordingly. because of this possibility for vesting more than twenty-one years after the President's
death, George Bush's life fails to validate the interest of C.
3). See infra notes 59-89 and accompanying text.
40 After having concluded that there is no life in being that validates C's contingent interest,
one next determines whether the divestiture must happen, if at all, within twenty-one years of A's
death the time when the devise takes effect and the interests of B and C are created. Obviously, it
can occur beyond twenty-one years of A's death. Surely, B or his successors might continue using
Blackacrc exclusively for residential purposes for the next thirty years following the death of A.
Thereafter. B or his successors might divert the use of Blackacre to industrial purposes. This would
hrcah the condition of defeasance and, thereby, divest B's interest in favor of C or his successors.
Giscii this possibility for div'estiture. one must conclude that C's interest can vest beyond twenty-one
yeats of A's death and beyond t\menty-one years of the death of all lives in being at A's death.
Accordingly. C's interest violates the common law rule against perpetuities.
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or within twenty-one years after their deaths.4" Even if students do not
understand fully why C's executory interest violates the common law
rule, they usually can rewrite the limitation and make C's interest valid.
For example, they seldom have difficulty curing the violation by relating
the condition of divestment to the life of B or C, or both.42 Further,
students readily observe that by using specially selected lives in being
that are extraneous to the particular gifts, they can extend even further
the probable period of years in which the condition operates. A lawyer
can accomplish this merely by using these specially selected lives to gov-
ern the latest time for vesting.43 Accordingly, although it is inaccurate to
say that the validating life in being can be anyone or any group of people
with respect to specific interests already created, it is quite accurate to
say that a lawyer can select virtually anyone as the life in being needed to
create a valid interest. This pronouncement about anyone becoming the
life in being makes little sense when interpreting or construing an existing
limitation, but it is easily understood and applied when constructing a
limitation.
41. The common law rule does contain an obvious limitation on the validating lives in being
used to govern the time of vesting. The number of lives cannot be unreasonably large or unreasona-
bly difficult to trace for purposes of determining the time of their respective deaths. See L. SIMES &
A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1223.
42. This can be accomplished by either of these revisions: '.. however, if Blackacre is ever
used during the life of B or within twenty-one years after his death (is ever used during the life of C
or within twenty-one years after his death) (is ever used during the life of the survivor of B and C or
within twenty-one years after the survivor's death) for any purpose other than residential ......
None of these variations violates the common law rule. In the first variation, B's interest cannot be
divested beyond twenty-one years of the death of a life in being-B; if the condition is not breached
within that period of time, B's interest becomes absolute in his successors. In the second variation,
B's interest cannot be divested beyond twenty-one years of the death of a life in being-C; if the
condition is not breached within that period of time, B's interest becomes absolute in B or his succes-
sors. In the third variation, B's interest cannot be divested beyond twenty-one years of the death of
the survivor of two lives in being-B and C; if the condition is not breached within that time period,
B's interest becomes absolute in his successors.
43. For example, consider this revision: ". . . however, if Blackacre is ever used during the life
of the survivor of B, C, M, N, or 0 or within twenty-one years after the survivor's death for... ."
For an illustration of this technique, see W. SCHWARTZ, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLAN-
NING § 6.32 (1965 & Supp. 1972). Assuming that M, N, and 0 are three healthy babies born just
before A executes his will, the period of the condition is, in all probability, extended several decades
without violating the common law rule. At least one of the specially selected lives, each of whom is
necessarily younger than B and C, likely will live longer than both B and C. Nevertheless, this
revision does not violate the common law rule. Presumably, this group of validating lives in being is
not unreasonably large or unreasonably difficult to trace for purposes of determining the time of
their respective deaths. Therefore, B's interest cannot be divested beyond twenty-one years of the
death of the survivor of five acceptable lives in being-B, C, M, N, and 0. If the condition is not
breached within that period of time, B's interest becomes absolute in his successors.
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Because the common law rule and its life in being concept cause little
difficulty for lawyers who plan and draft dispositive instruments, and be-
cause this creative function is the most important one in the estate trans-
fer process' and the most frequent occasion in which lawyers encounter
the rule, one might assume that any methodology for coping with the
rule ought to focus on the selection of a life in being in the creation of
interests. Further, one might assume that the formulation of this meth-
odology ought to be an easy task and, perhaps, even unnecessary. How-
ever, estate owners do not normally conceive and elaborate future
interests and their attendant conditions in terms of the common law
rule's constraints.45 Whatever underlying dispositive objectives estate
owners may have,46 these goals do not naturally lend themselves to time
44 This creative function, planning for the disposition of estates and drafting instruments that
fulfill such plans, is the most important one in the estate transfer process because it sets the frame-
work by which dispositive goals are to be achieved, assets are to be conserved, and disputes are to be
avoided.
45. There are, as well, other more obvious replies to this conclusion which suggest that a meth-
odology for applying the rule to interpret existing interests is unnecessary in the actual practice of
law. First, something can always be said on behalf of learning a whole rule and not just a portion of
it. Something seems inherently wrong in concluding that lawyers need not master the entire fabric of
the common law rule either because of its complexity or because of its comparative disuse in certain
aspects of the practice. Second, even if the creative function of planning and drafting is the prevail-
ing context for applying-and, therefore, understanding-the common law rule, lawyers cannot al-
way,, control the situations in which they encounter the rule. In every interpretive dispute there are
at least two sides. Usually one side is represented by lawyers who participated in drafting the dispos-
itive instrument-those who first faced the common law rule in performing this creative function
and could limit the conditions in accordance with the rule's requirements. Yet the other side is
usually new to the instrument and enters the case only at the stage of interpretation and dispute
resolution. Lawyers frequently decline future interest litigation. It does not behoove the profession
for these interpretive causes to go begging to the few who revel in the common law rule or to pass by
default to those who lack the integrity or the wisdom to forgo what is beyond them. In short,
something seems radically wrong with predicating the breadth of one's understanding upon expecta-
tions of selective practice and representation.
40 Future interests and trusts are used for a variety of reasons. They are used, for example, to
provide intermediate benefits for particular beneficiaries; to facilitate the management and retention
of the estate generally, or with respect to specific beneficiaries; to encumber alienability: to assure
appropriate division among family members or units within the family; and to extend dead hand
control indefinitely. For example. suppose that A, an estate owner, wanted to make certain that his
estate was first used to meet the needs of his wife and children, and that he expected the needs of
some might be negligible, while the needs of others might be substantial. Suppose, further, that his
estate wsas sizable and that he was concerned with the ability of some te manage and conserve any
immediate distributions of principal Finally, assume that because of these concerns with need, con-
servation, and management, he wanted to defer ultimate distribution of shares of principal for a
considerable period of time-at least until his wife and children had died. With respect to this
distribution of principal, further assume that he wanted it to belong to his descendants without
regard to family unit. With these objectives in mind, A's lawyer might then devise a plan that
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limitations upon vesting other than those needed to fulfill the objective
that underlies the use of a particular future interest.47 Accordingly, most
planning and drafting exercises initially require the formulation of a de-
sign that incorporates those conditions and time factors that best imple-
ment the estate owner's particular dispositive goals. If estate owners
naturally think first in terms of these factors and criteria, so should the
lawyers who plan their estates. Because the common law rule may re-
quire some moderation of objectives, lawyers should only consider it af-
ter formulation of a design that fully accomplishes dispositive goals.
Intelligent and effective alteration of the design-and if necessary its un-
derlying objectives-cannot, and should not, be done until one deter-
mines which parts of the design violate the common law rule. This
technique requires interpretive use and application of the common law
rule and the life in being concept. Obviously, it makes no sense to mod-
ify a dispositive design until it is clear that such modification is needed.
Further, it is just as senseless to attempt rectification without a firm grasp
of the precise problem and reason for the violation.48
In short, although the common law rule and its life in being concept
are easily mastered by a planner and draftsman, the creative function
itself seldom should proceed to a final product without prior interpretive
use and application of the rule. The common law rule should not come
into play in the planning process until some preliminary design has been
sketched. Then the rule is applied within an interpretive context in
which the validating life in being cannot be anyone. Thereafter, when
necessary, it is applied within a creative context in which anyone may be
involved a trust and future interests. More specifically, he might create a testamentary trust that
would provide income, and principal if necessary, to A's wife and children. The trustee might be
given limited discretion with respect to the income and principal to satisfy any special needs of these
beneficiaries. And at the deaths of A's wife and children, the trust might then provide for distribu-
tion of principal in equal shares to living descendants per capita. This kind of dispositive scheme
would serve A's objective generally. Elaboration of other priorities, such as saving death taxes,
would require an adjustment of these priorities and of the plan itself.
47. For example, estate owners who wish to defer control of principal until respective recipients
are capable of enjoying and managing it naturally think in terms of the criteria and conditiots rele-
vant to those objectives. These future interests themselves are not ordinarily designed and developed
with the time frame of the common law rule squarely in mind. If time is a factor at all in determin-
ing capacity for enjoyment and management, the foremost planning consideration should be the time
when particular beneficiaries are most apt to demonstrate these attributes. This time period may or
may not fall within the period of the common law rule.
48. For further discussion and illustration of the importance of interpretive application of the
common law rule against perpetuities and the life in being concept in the planning process, see
Becker, supra note 35, at 746-54.
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made a validating life in being. Therefore, lawyers, even when they func-
tion as planners, must master the interpretive application of the common
law rule.4 9 Accordingly, a methodology designed to facilitate correct use
of the rule must focus primarily upon its interpretive application.
B. Interpretive Application of the Common Law Rule and
Identification of Testing and Validating Lives in Being-Some
Explanations
Who is the life in being? Once again, this is the question students al-
ways ask and the one teachers have difficulty answering. Surprisingly,
until recently, commentators on the common law rule have not focused
their explanations of the rule on this question.5" Indeed, even W. Barton
Leach, in his famous article Perpetuities in a Nutshell, did not address
49 For a full discussion of the use and application of the common law rule against perpetuities
in the planning process, see id. at 733.
50. For recent explanations and discussions of the life in being concept, see Becker, supra note
35 at 736-54; Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1868-76 (1986);
Dukemmier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUNI. L. REV. 1648, 1649-54 (1985); Feather-
ingill, Understanding the Rule Against Perpetuities: A Step-By-Step Approach, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 161
(1982); Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective On Wait-And-See, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1714-17
(1985).
Quite differently, other scholars, especially in earlier commentaries, have given less attention to
and detailed explanation of the life in being concept. Although they frequently acknowledge that
application of the common law rule involves the use of lives in being that are relevant to vesting, they
believe that the only lives that ultimately matter are those that validate. See, e.g., R. MAUDSLEY,
vipra note 21, at 94-100; Allan, supra note 33, at 107-12. And according to Professor Maudsley.
these validating lives in being somehow select or evidence themselves. See R. MAUDSLEY. supra, at
4-5, 100-01. Indeed, Lewis M. Simes, the eminent scholar on future interests, has reached a similar
conclusion:
Then what is the test of determining who are the lives in being? In my opinion there is no
satisfactory test other than to keep trying different lives until you find one which was in
being at the inception of the instrument and which is bound to be in being also when the
contingency happens or twenty-one years before the contingency happens. In other words,
a life in being is one that can be used to show that the limitation is good. If the limitation is
bad under the Rule, that i because no lives in being can be found.
Simes, Reforn of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Western Australia, 6 U. WESTERN AUSTL. L.
REV. 21, 23-24 (1963) (emphasis in original).
In his famous hornbook on future interests, Simes offers little more in terms of a definitive meth-
odology for determining whether there are lives in being that will sustain a valid proof. He does
observe where validating lives are apt to be found, stating that they are commonly mentioned in the
dispositive instrument, that they are often donees, and that sometimes they can be determined by
implication. See L. SiMES, supra note 30, at 370-71. Nevertheless, this is insufficient guidance if one
is to search efficiently and exhaustively for a validating life in being. "[P]ointing out what lives
ought to be tested, not exhorting the searcher to keep looking, is what is needed for this search."
Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1650 (1985).
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this question in a significant manner.5 Explanations of the rule have
mostly concentrated on its application to class gifts, powers of appoint-
ment, options, charitable gifts, revocable trusts, rights of reentry and pos-
sibilities of reverter, and with the cases of the "administrative
contingency," the "unborn widow," and the "fertile octogenarian."52
With respect to the life in being concept, students have had to fend for
themselves with various explanations and examples. Teachers explain
that the common law rule involves a test of possibilities. For an interest
to be valid, one must find a life in being about whom one can say that
such interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of his death;
failing that, one must be able to say that such interest must vest, if at all,
within twenty-one years of the time of its creation. Yet, even with such
brief explanation and additional examples of its application, seldom has
this been enough for students to solve and master the common law rule.
Strangely, the impetus for further elaboration of the life in being con-
cept eventually derived from discussions concerned with reformation of
the common law rule.53 Most prominent among these reforms have been
the various "wait and see" rules.54 These reforms dispense with the com-
mon law rule's test of possibilities; validity is, therefore, determined on
the basis of actual events. In essence, they all derive from a slight varia-
tion of Gray's summary of the common law rule: "No interest ... is
valid unless it vests, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."55 It should be clear, there-
51. See Leach, supra note 11. Yet Leach was not the only perpetuities scholar who failed to
give adequate explanation to the process by which one could understand and apply the concept of
the common law life in being. Professor Lewis Simes was another. See supra note 50.
52. See, e.g., Leach, supra note 11. See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.17, 24.22-
.23, 24.26-.42, 24.56-57, 24.59, 24.62 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); R. LYNN, supra note 34, at 57-131; L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1229, 1238-39, 1243-45, 1251-52, 1265-87.
53. See, e.g., Allan, supra note 33, at 106-12; Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 12-14, 62-63;
Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1649-54 (1985) Maud-
sley, supra note 3, at 373-78; Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REV. 486, 495-
501 (1964); Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1714-17; Note, supra note 33 at 285-86; Note, Measuring
Lives Under Wait-And-See Versions of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1982 WASH. U.L.Q. 577, 579-80
(1982).
54. See, e.g., FI.A. STAT. ANN. § 689.22 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ci.
184A, § I (Law. Co-op. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.98.130-50 (1967); Perpetuties and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55 (England).
For classification of and reference to various kinds of "wait and see" statutes, see RESTATI-MENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIvE TRANSFERS) § 1.4 statutory note lb, lc: § 1.5 statutory note
(1983).
55. R. LYNN, supra note 34, at 203.
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fore, that under this kind of rule-one that relies upon actual and not
possible vesting-a precise definition of the life in being is imperative
because it governs the duration of the waiting period that is needed to
apply the rule. Once a perpetuities rule requires that determinations of
validity be delayed for a period of time, the precise contours of this pe-
riod of time become absolutely essential to the application of the new
rule. For most commentators and legislatures, neither everyone alive nor
only those that validate under the common law rule makes sense as the
new waiting period lives. 6 The former does too much by way of refor-
mation, while the latter does nothing at all. For many, however, a com-
promise waiting period exists. For some it lies in a statutory list
comprised of lives similar to those found in saving clauses.57 For others,
it lies in the lives in being said to be found in the antecedent common law
rule itself-namely, that group of lives "causally connected" or "rele-
vant" to vesting.58
The debate that has been waged in defense of both of these "wait and
see" positions has, therefore, required complete understanding of the
common law rule and, of necessity, the process by which it is applied and
by which the life in being is determined. Those who support a "wait and
see" rule measured by "causal lives" invariably select terminology with
great care to explain their process of understanding and applying the
common law rule. Generally, they decry the indiscriminate use of the
phrase "life in being" or "measuring life." They observe that, factually
5o See, e.g., R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 21, at 100-03; Simes, Is The Rule Against Perpetuities
Doomed? The "'Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 187 (1953); Note, supra note 53, at
586-89
57 See, e.g., Iowa, IowA Cori ANN. § 558.68(2) (West Supp. 1986); Alberta, ALTA. REV.
S vix ch. P-4 (1980); British Columbia, B.C. REX'. STAT. ch. 321 (1979); England, Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act. 1964, ch. 55. § 3(4)-(5), New Zealand, Perpetuities Act, 1964, N.Z. STAT. chs.
205-21; Northern Ireland, Perpetuities Act, 1966. See also the position taken by the American Law
Institute, RLSTArEIEN-I (SILCOND) O1 PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) §§ 1.3-1.4 (1983).
Many commentators have argued in favor of "wait and see" reform accomplished with a statutory
list of measuring hves. Ronald Maudsley was. perhaps, the foremost of these proponents. See R.
M xuI)si E', supra note 21, at 107-08. 123-39. 259-61- Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Coin-
mon-Law Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNEI-ii L. REV. 355, 366-78 (1975).
58. S ', e;g. Alaska. Ai ASK% SI %1. § 34.27.010 (Supp. 1984); Kentucky. Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN ,k 381.216 (Baldwin 1979): Nevada, NEV. REV'. STAT. § 111.103 (1983); New Mexico, N.M.
Si xi ANN. § 47-1-17.1 (Supp. 1983), Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1984); Washing-
ton. W \st Ri.V CoI, ANN. § 11.98.010 (1967); Ontario, Ontario Perpetuities Act, 1966, [1970]
ONI Ri.\'. Si,\i ch. 374. Many commentators have argued in favor of "'wait and see" reform
accomplished with this kind of formula, one that is based upon relevance to vesting. See. e.g..
Dukcnincr, ttpra note 3. at 62-64; Dukemimer, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, supra note 50. at
1654-74, Morris & Wade. upra note 53. at 496-501.
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speaking, all persons alive when the interest under consideration is cre-
ated are lives in being. Further, they note that to avoid a violation one
must make a proof with one of these people, often referred to as a "vali-
dating life in being."59 How does one discover whether such a validating
life exists? Is this accomplished by attempting the proof with all known
lives in being? Professor Jesse Dukeminier, the foremost proponent of
the causal life process of application,60 would reply that the common law
rule implicitly acknowledges the existence of another limited group of
lives in being, a pool of relevant lives from which a proof might be made
and a validating life possibly discovered.6 All lives that .do not in some
manner affect vesting are irrelevant and consideration of them is, there-
fore, a wasteful effort and an uneconomical use of time.62
As a result, application of the common law rule involves a three-step
process.63 First, one assembles a group of relevant lives in being, namely,
59. See, e.g., J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 785 (3rd ed.
1984); Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV., 1648 (1985). Even
among those who do not support a "wait and see" rule measured by causal lives, there are some who
believe that "validating life" is a better term to describe the life by which a positive proof can be
made under the common law rule. See, e.g., Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1718,
1722 (1983); Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1715.
60. Professor Dukeminier has drafted the perpetuities statutes adopted in Kentucky, Alaska,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. See supra note 58. Each of these statutes adopts a "wait
and see" test that expressly incorporates the causal relationship principle into the allowed waiting
period. Professor Dukeminier's advocacy on behalf of this particular form of "wait and see" has
been highly intelligent, articulate and frequent. Early on, it was marked by his article that explained
and defended the Kentucky statute. See Dukeminier, supra note 3. And it continues in full measure
to this day. See Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1880-87
(1986); Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. Rev. 1648 (1985);
Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1023, (1987). Nevertheless, in the end, a sense of resignation and realism may have forced
him to accept cy pres alone as the most acceptable reform. See Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 1077-80 (1987).
61. For an elaboration of Dukeminier's views about causal lives under the common law rule
and their application to "wait and see" reform, see Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1649-54, 1659-74;
Dukeminier, A Response By Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1730 (1985); Dukeminier, A
Final Comment By Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1742 (1985).
62. See Dukeminier, A Response By Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L, REV. 1730, 1730-32
(1985).
63. Professor Dukeminier views application of the common law rule as a two-step process.
These two steps focus on the selection of a pool of lives in being and the testing of members within
this group. Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1650. These are the first two steps of the three-step
process described in the text herein. Dukeminier, however, adds the test contained within the third
step, but he does not classify it as a separate step:
If we find a person in the pool by whom the necessary proof can be made, we have found
the validating life. If, on the other hand, we cannot make the required proof by reference
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only those who have some causal connection to the vesting of the interest
under consideration. Second, with each member of this group, one deter-
mines whether such contingent interest cannot vest beyond twenty-one
years of the respective member's death. If a single member exists for
whom this proof can be made, the interest is valid and one need proceed
no further. Third, if this proof cannot be made as to all members within
the group, one determines whether such contingent interest cannot vest
beyond twenty-one years of the time of its creation. If this proof can be
made, the interest is valid; if not, then it violates the common law rule.
Some commentators may rearrange or constitute this process differ-
ently. 4 Nevertheless, central to the thesis of all who invoke the causal
life approach is the recognition of a body of relevant lives who affect or
postpone vesting and, therefore, are absolutely critical to any proof of
validity."5 These lives in being are an inherent part of the common law
rule's process of application; thus, proponents argue that one can easily
make them a formal component of "wait and see" reformation.66
Some of the opponents of this "causal life wait and see" approach
maintain that the only lives formally a part of the common law rule are
those that demonstrate the validity of an interest. All others are totally
irrelevant to the process of applying the common law rule.67 In short,
whenever an interest violates the common law rule, it is because there is
no life in being to be found. Consequently, other than the lives that vali-
date interests, the common law rule does not offer a group of lives which
can be incorporated into a waiting period in order to make a perpetuities
determination predicated upon actualities.68 In answer to the question of
how a perpetuities determination is to be made under the common law
to any person in the pool. there is no life that validates the gift; the gift is void unless it
must vest or fail within twenty-one years.
Id
h4. Scv, eg, Featheringil, supra note 50.
65 I would place mxself among this group who understand the common law rule in terms of
causil ives or relevant lives, and I have used this process in explaining and teaching the rule. Never-
thelcss, after twenty-fise year% of experience. I am firmly convinced that it does not work for the
mainstream of students and law.yers In short, they do not "catch on."
66 See. e.g., Dukeminier, vupra note 3. at 63: Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1654-74, 1708-13;
Moris & Wade, %upra note 53, at 497-98 For the citations of statutes that expressly or impliedly
usc cau-al livcs to measure the period for waiting under "wait and see," see Dukeminier, supra note
59, at 1658 n.29
67 Se. e.g. R, I LtS1 'L, supra note 21, at 94-100; Allan, supra note 33, at 107-08. 111-12.
ox See. ecg.. R. NIAUDSi I N. vupra note 21, at 4-5, 94-101. In addition to announcing and
cxpliing a principle of self-selection of validating lives, these commentators typically offer exam-
pI s of seclf-sclcection in action Id
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rule, this group of opponents might reply that whenever a validating life
in being exists, somehow it evidences itself.69  Somehow, one accom-
plishes this by mere inspection of the interests created. Critics of this
argument observe, however, that this method requires a conclusion
which is achieved with one quantum leap and that it rests upon the "fal-
lacy of clairvoyance."70 The critics maintain that, whether or not courts
have formally recognized "causal lives," these lives are an inherent part
of the rule's process and no one really applies the rule without resort to
them.7
Others who object to a strict causal life process of application prefer
different ways of understanding the common law rule and solving
problems under it. Although these commentators may decry those meth-
ods that rely upon mere inspection or clairvoyance, at least one scholar
observes that any description of the general process of application is idio-
syncratic; all that is important is a description that promotes understand-
ing.72 For example, Professor Samuel Fetters prefers to focus on the
condition imposed and to ask whether it might happen more than
twenty-one years after the deaths of all lives in being.73 And to do this,
he presupposes the unlikely deaths of everyone around, especially ances-
tors of those who are given interests after time enough for these ancestors
to have another child.74 To be sure, this approach is sound; because it
comprehends everyone, it cannot overlook potential validating lives.
Nevertheless, students generally want more direction; in a sense, they
might view these broad suppositions, concerning all lives in being and
momentary turnovers in world population, as no direction at all.75
Professor Lawrence Waggoner has also criticized the strict causal life
69. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1651.
70. See id. at 1652.
71. See, e.g., id. at 1649-54.
72. See Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1716.
73. See Fetters, Perpetuities: The Wait-And-See Disaster-A Brief Reply to Professor Maudsley,
With a Few Asides to Professors Leach, Simnes, Wade. Dr. Morris, et al., 60 CORNELL L. REV. 380,
390-94 (1975).
74. Id.
75. Students might view this direction (in the light of the condition, can vesting occur more
than twenty-one years after the death of all lives in being) as inadequate because they want, wherever
possible, guidelines that afford them a finite group of people with whom they can test. Generally. if a
validating life in being exists, they can find such person and they will then know that the process of
application has ended. Quite differently, they become perplexed if they do not immediately locate a
validating life and, therefore, suspect that the interest may cause a perpetuities violation. "Is there a
potential validating life somewhere in the world that I have overlooked? 1ow do I know when to
conclude my search, and when am I prepared to conclude that a violation exists?" These are the
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methodology.76 He rejects the notion that there is only one realistic sys-
tem for solving perpetuities problems." To begin with, he acknowledges
the need to assemble a group of lives in being that is fewer in number
than the world at large.78 Additionally, he recognizes that, once a man-
ageable group is assembled, a key or real test must be applied to each of
them: "Is there among this group a person who has the requisite causal
connection between the person's death and the vesting or termination of
the interest no later than twenty-one years thereafter? ' 79 He even agrees
that the manageable group to which one applies this test must have some
connection to the transaction. Nevertheless, Professor Waggoner be-
lieves that the common law process does not require a precise formula,
one which is predicated upon causation and one which limits the objects
of the key test to a finite group of lives in being.8" Although he rejects a
precise formula for assembling the lives in being to be tested, he insists
that they must have some connection to the transaction and that invaria-
bly they include people such as the beneficiaries of the disposition and
persons related to them."' He believes the group can be flexible and that
in cases of doubt potential members of the testing group should be in-
cluded.82 He concludes that all that needs to be said about the common
law process is that it involves "eliminating people from the world at
large, focusing attention on persons connected in some way to the trans-
action, and asking whether there is any person in this group who satisfies
the real test .... " 3
At first blush, it would appear that the difference between the descrip-
tions of Dukeminier and Waggoner is negligible, perhaps one only of se-
mantics. Both believe in a key or real test that should be applied to a
kinds of questions students ask whenever they are offered an open ended pool of testing lives in
heing For further discussion, see infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
76 Professor Waggoner criticizes the strict use of a causal life approach in solving perpetuities
under the common law rule. and he also opposes its use in determining the allowable period under a
"-uait and see rule. See Waggoner, supra note 50. at 1714-26; Waggoner, A Rejoinder By Professor
tld ,qiolr, 85 Cot Ui. L Ri s 1739 (1985).
77 See Waggoner. wtpra note 50.
7, Sc, id. at 1716-17.
71) Sce id. Waggoner's "real test" is, of course, essentially the same as Dukeminier's second
,tcp in his two-step process: -Secontd. with respect to each person in the pool, we ask whether the
inteircst will necessarily vest or fail wvithin the life of such person or upon, or within twenty-one years
after, such person's death "" Id. See Dukeminier, supra note 50, at 1650.
X Sec Waggoner. oipra note 50. at 1717.
81 See id. at 1716-17
S2 S'" id. at 1717 n.13.
,83 S,, id. at 1717
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special group of lives in being. 4 Dukeminier uses a principle of causa-
tion to define the group. 5 Waggoner, however, prefers a guideline that
must connect people to the transaction.16 Dukeminier insists upon preci-
sion and economy, but Waggoner does not.8 7 Nevertheless, in most cases
their principles of causation and connection are going to produce identi-
cal groups of lives in being to which one will apply the real test. In terms
of the application of the common law rule, both principles of causation
and connection must comprehend all potential validating lives. Because
the ultimate test that Waggoner applies to the group of selected lives
requires a proof explicitly dependent upon a causal connection to vesting,
it is conceivable that the nonvalidating lives within their groups of lives
to be tested will also be the same.88 The principle of connection may,
however, introduce additional lives for testing which, according to
Dukeminier, cannot possibly validate. 9 At worst, this would require ad-
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 61-63, 66 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
87. See Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 1730-32; Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1716-17.
88. Although Professor Waggoner is more idiosyncratic in his approach to the selection of
testing lives and although he finds ambiguities in Professor Dukeminier's principle of causation and
disagrees with him about its application, Waggoner's view of lives "connected to the transaction"
cannot be too far removed from Dukeminier's notion of lives that are "causally" related or "rele-
vant" to vesting. Validity under Waggoner's ultimate test requires a causal connection between the
life or death of the testing life in being and vesting of the interest in question. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text. Waggoner must, therefore, recognize that people totally unrelated to vesting
should be disregarded. He must realize that they should not be tested because they cannot possibly
validate even though they might have some connection to the transaction but not to vesting itself.
Although he professes a principle of broad connection, in application Waggoner undoubtedly nar-
rows down the group for actual testing. And in doing so, he probably relies upon a principle very
close to Dukeminier's own principle of causation.
89. [B]ecause it lacks an organizing principle of relevance, Professor Waggoner's group is
much too broad for the task at hand. It includes persons who cannot affect vesting. I find
it hard to believe Waggoner or anyone else tests the transferor of an irrevocable transfer or
tests the mother or aunt or cousins of A in the gift to the children of A who reach twenty-
five. I feel certain he does not test the lawyer who drafted the instrument and some others
who may have any 'connection to the transaction' (whatever that means). If he does, he is
testing irrelevant lives, because these persons cannot possibly be validating lives.
Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 1731.
This observation by Dukeminier, that the principle of connection may lead to the testing of lives in
being that cannot possibly validate, is a fair one. To be sure, the principle of relevance and causality
seems to be at the heart of Waggoner's thesis of connection. And undoubtedly, Waggoner himself
would never apply the critical test to the estate owner's lawyer without other facts that make such
lawyer especially relevant to vesting. Nevertheless, Waggoner defines the manageable group of peo-
ple assembled for testing in this manner:
In my view, they would always include the transferor, if living, the beneficiaries of the
disposition, including but not restricted to the taker or takers of the questioned interest. the
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ditional time to apply the rule, especially in situations that result in a
violation.
The significant difference in their views, however, surfaces when they
transport the common law life in being concept to a "wait and see" refor-
mation of the common law rule. Both apparently agree that, if a waiting
period is to be used, it must be clearly defined. 90 Accordingly, if one
measures this time for waiting with lives in being, the group that the
statute defines must be sensible in terms of underlying policy, and its
members must be readily identifiable. Even though Waggoner does not
claim that a principle of connection ought to serve as a basis for deter-
mining the measuring period under "wait and see,"9 1 he firmly rejects
causation as a unifying and understandable principle that is inherent in
the common law process and which one can conveniently carry over to
an actualities test.92 Waggoner maintains that a causal relationship
formula can be difficult to understand and sometimes arbitrary and
ambiguous.93
Dukeminier strongly disagrees: "What is a causal relationship? First,
you determine what events can affect vesting and, second, you determine
what persons can affect those events. Such persons have a causal rela-
tionship to vesting."94 In reply to critics who have found application of
the principle of causation baffling, Dukeminier has offered an extended
explanation in which he applies the principle to many of the illustrations
that have appeared in the literature discussing "wait and see" reforma-
objects and donee of a power of appointment, persons related to the foregoing by blood or
adoption, and anyone else who has any connection to the transaction. If there is a validat-
ing life, it will be in this group.
Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1717.
Although Waggoner may economize with respect to this group, others with less of an understand-
ing for the common law process may go far afield and even test with distant relatives who have no
remote connection to the events that control vesting.
90 Apparently, both Dukeminier and Waggoner believe that the waiting period should be de-
fined clearly in terms of some intelligent principle and that such principle should be easy to apply.
See Dukeminier. supra note 59. at 1659, 1709-10; Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1719, 1724-26; Wag-
goner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 569, 575-76
(1986).
91. Indeed. Waggoner is a strong advocate for measuring the "wait and see" period with a fixed
tcrm of year,,. See Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1726-28; Waggoner, The Uniformn Statutory Rule
.1garnNt Perpetuities, 21 RI A\ PROP.. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1986).
92. Set, Waggoner, upra note 50. at 1714, 1716, 1718-24, 1728: Waggoner, supra note 76. at
1739
9 See Waggoner. mupra note 50, at 1719-24.
94. J. DuKi MINIi.R & S. JOH \NSON, supra note 30, at 994-95.
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tion.95 After explaining several subordinate rules, which he views as part
of the common law,9 6 and then applying them to these illustrations,
Dukeminier finds no current room for doubt in locating causal lives and,
therefore, in using such lives to measure the waiting period under an
actualities test.97
In a debate that carries on almost endlessly,98 Waggoner replies, while
using some of Dukeminier's illustrations, that the exact meaning of
causal lives-persons who can affect the vesting of an interest-is dis-
putable and that the explanations of Dukeminier need clarification and
codification before causation can become a viable principle.99 Without
statutory elaboration, Waggoner believes that the principle of causation
presents enough puzzles to cause litigation for years to come.100
Waggoner makes no argument for his principle of connection, but
Dukeminier does for the principle of causation. Whatever arguments
Dukeminier might muster supporting the clarity of the principle of cau-
sation, two very prominent scholars widely disagree about the meaning
and application of the principle. This disagreement, perhaps more than
anything else, evidences the weaknesses of a causal basis for measuring
the waiting period under an actualities test. A "wait and see" test re-
95. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1659-74.
96. At common law three rules prevent certain causally-related lives from being used as
measuring lives.... First, redundant lives, that is, persons who cannot affect vesting after
the death ofother measuring lives on the list, cannot be used as measuring lives. Second, if
all persons in being who can affect vesting in the same way constitute an unreasonable
number, they cannot be measuring lives even though they are ascertainable. Third, if all
persons in being who can affect vesting in the same way cannot reasonably be ascertained
within the perpetuities period, none of such persons can be measuring lives. If such per-
sons could be measuring lives, it would be impossible to say when the perpetuities period
ends. For example, at common law a gift "to A's first descendant to marry a person now
alive" is void because we cannot say that the gift has failed until there is nobody in the
world who was alive at the date of the gift. That is impossible of ascertainment ....
[U]nder the common law Rule, the time when the perpetuities period ends must be reason-
ably ascertainable.
Id. at 1661-62. See also Dukeminier, supra note 62; Dukeminier, A Modern Guide To Perpetuities,
74 COLM. L. REV. 1867, J875-76 (1986).
97. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1673-74, 1710-11.
98. The debate between Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner consists of five articles, all
within one issue of the Columbia Law Review. See Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives,
85 COLUJM. L. Ri:.v. 1648 (1985); Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective On Wait-And-See, 85
Coi.ul. L. REv. 1714 (1985); Dukeminier, A Response By Professor Dukeiniier, 85 Cot.ust. L.
Ri-v. 1730 (1985); Waggoner, A Rejoinder By Professor Waggoner, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (1985):
Dukeminier, A Final Comment By Professor Dukemninier, 85 CoLUm. L. REV. 1742 (1985).
99. See Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1719-24.
100. See id. at 1724.
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quires a waiting period that one can easily administer.' If Dukeminier
and Waggoner cannot agree in all cases about the persons that affect the
vesting of an interest, one wonders how readily personal representatives
and trustees can identify the causal lives upon which they must wait.
C. Identifying the Group of Lives That Need to Be Tested Under the
Common Law Rule-the Need for a Different and Better
Methodology
It should be clear that the certainty needed for a viable "wait and see"
rule is far less important when one attempts application of the common
law rule. All that is really necessary is that one select a pool of lives in
being to test that includes, if they exist at all, the validating lives in a
particular limitation. If one creates a pool that contains extraneous
lives,'0 2 all that is lost is excessive time in conducting the common law
process. If, then, the parameters of the pool of lives in being relevant to
the common law process have less significance, one might wonder
whether it matters at all which principle is employed-be it one of causa-
tion or connection. Both offer more than mere inspection and clairvoy-
ance, and both present pools of lives in being that suffice. However, it
does matter which kind of principle or methodology one uses to conduct
the common law process. Although the exact parameters of the group of
lives selected for testing may have less significance for the common law
process than for "wait and see," this is no consolation for the novice who
seeks and needs assurance that the group he has formulated does not
actually overlook potential validating lives.'0 3 In conducting the com-
mon law process, one must know that he is doing it correctly, and must
101 Sce id. at 1724-26: Maudsley, supra note 3, at 367-70, 375-78.
102 Extraneous lives are those lives in being who are unconnected to vesting and cannot in any
way affect vesting of the interest in question. Usually. they consist of lives that are unmentioned and
are unconnected to the dispositive instrument. For example, consider this testamentary trust created
by A "'Income to B for life: thereafter, principal to C absolutely when C attains age thirty."
Clearly, C', life is relevant to ,,atisfaction of his own age requirement, while all other lives are irrele-
vant President George Bush may be an existing life in being: nevertheless, nis life is irrelevant and
extraneous to the events that control vesting.
103. The major problem every novice has is not the determination that an interest is valid: it is,
instcad, a determination than an interest violates the common law rule against perpetuities. Most
people recognize a validating life in being once they find him. Application of the critical or key test
is not exceedingly difficult, and it should reveal clearly a valid proof with respect to such person.
The problem most student-, have, hoyever, is what to do after they have failed to make a valid proof
with obvious testing lives within the limitation under consideration. Have they overlooked any lives
in being that could possibly validate " How are they to know that they have exhausted the search for
potential validating lives and that they can now terminate the process and reach a conclusion of
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know this all of the time. Without this assurance he becomes uneasy and
is apt to avoid consideration of the rule. And, of course, if there is ambi-
guity in the selection of the pool of lives, he will not have this assurance.
Indeed, without something more that affords this assurance, both princi-
ples of causation and connection are wanting when it comes to making
the common law process workable for all.
The major problem with Waggoner's principle of connection is that it
fails to recognize a novice's need for a finite group. To say that the test-
ing group can consist of anyone connected to the transaction, 10 4 but not
the entire world itself, will surely cause uneasiness among students strug-
gling with the application of the rule. To be sure, because Waggoner's
ultimate test emphasizes a "requisite causal connection,"'' 0 5 one who
adopts his methodology is not without any guideline, and in most cases
one will produce a group that closely resembles a pool of lives based
upon causation. 10 6  Nevertheless, Waggoner does not insist upon any
invalidity? These are the questions that plague the novice and this is what makes a determination of
invalidity so difficult.
104. See supra note 81; infra note 107.
105. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
106. Beyond the guideline of causation incorporated into his real test, Waggoner offers some-
thing more specific about the people upon whom one should focus attention for purposes of testing:
Who are such people? They vary from situation to situation, but are not difficult to iden-
tify. In my view, they would always include the transferor, if living, the beneficiaries of the
disposition, including but not restricted to the taker or takers of the questioned interest, the
objects and donee of a power of appointment, persons related to the foregoing by blood or
adoption, and anyone else who has any connection to the transaction. If there is a validat-
ing life, it will be in this group.
Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1717.
Professor Dukeminier's list of potential candidates for testing is remarkably similar. With respect
to measuring lives used under a "wait and see" test that incorporates the principle of causal relation-
ship, he observed early on:
In practically all cases the measuring lives will be one or more of the following as fits the
particular facts; (a) the preceding life tenant, (b) the taker(s) of the interest, (c) a parent of
the taker(s) of the interest, (d) a person designated as a measuring life in the instrument, or
(e) some other person whose actions or death can expressly or by implication cause tile
interest to vest or fail.
Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 63. More recently, Dukeminier observed:
[T]he persons who can affect vesting in interest are: (a) The beneficiary or beneficiaries of
the contingent interest; (b) Any person who can affect the identity of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries (such as A in a gift to A's children); and (c) Any person who can affect any
condition precedent attached to the gift, or, in case of a class gift, any person who can
affect a co~idition precedent attached to the interest of any class member.
Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1875 (1986).
To be sure, the groups identified by Dukeminier and Waggoner overlap; this must be so because
both groups of testing lives are designed to reveal all lives in being with which one can actually make
a valid proof. Nevertheless, they have serious differences when it comes to defining a group for
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firm principle for circumscribing the group selected for testing. And this
is the source of uneasiness for novices who wish to use his version of the
common law process. He notes that the group connected to the
transaction
would always include the transferor, if living, the beneficiaries of the dispo-
sition, including but not restricted to the taker or takers of the questioned
interest, the objects and donee of a power of appointment, persons related
to the foregoing by blood or adoption, and anyone else who has any connec-
tion to the transaction. 107
If in doubt, Waggoner urges that particular lives in being be added to the
group and subjected to the key test.'08 To be sure, this process works
well in cases in which there is a validating life to be found. His method-
ology assures inclusion of such a life, and once a student locates it and
makes the critical proof, he knows that he need go no further-the pro-
cess of application has been concluded."19
Quite differently, a student will have difficulty in those situations in
which there is no validating life and in which there is in fact a violation
of the common law rule. How does a student know when to close the
pool of lives to be tested? How does a student know when to conclude
the process of application? Waggoner observes that persons related by
blood or adoption to beneficiaries within the entire instrument and to the
transferor, if living, would fall within the group of selected lives in be-
ing. "' After one tests unsuccessfully with the more obvious relatives,
testing that includes lives in being that cannot possibly validate. For example, Dukeminier sees no
need to include the transferor of an irrevocable lifetime gift, nor does he see any need to include
distant relatives simply because they are related to the taker by blood or to include persons simply
because they are "connected" in some way to the transaction. See Dukeminier, supra note 62. at
1731. On the other hand, even if Waggoner were applying a definition predicated strictly upon a
principle of causation, he %%ould see no need to include all beneficiaries. See infra note 273 and the
example used in the text accompanying that note.
107. Waggoner, supra note 50. at 1717.
108. See supra note 82.
10) The common law rule against perpetuities requires only one life in being about whom one
can say that, within twenty-one years of his death, the interest must vest or fail. In a given limita-
tion, one may be able to reach this conclusion about more than one life. Nevertheless, in establishing
the vahdity of an interest, one need not find all the lives; a proof with just one life is enough. For
example consider this testamentary trust by A: "Income to B for life. thereafter, principal to C
absolutely if then living." In this instance, one can say that C's contingent interest must vest or fail
wvithin his own lifetime; one can also say that C's interest must vest or fail by the time of B's death.
Both the lives of B and C can be used independently to validate the interest of C. Nevertheless. the
common law rule allows for a valid proof with either. Once a person tests successfully with B or C.
the requirements of the rule are satisfied and one need go no further with the process.
110 Se supra note 107.
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such as parents, how does one know when to conclude the search for a
validating life among more distant blood relations?II' Waggoner notes
that, beyond these relatives, the selection of lives in being for testing can
include "anyone else who has any connection to the transaction.""112
Might this include the estate owner's lawyer or the lawyer's associate or
secretary?'1 3 Once again, Waggoner's rule of thumb is to include rather
111. Of course, one who comprehends the logic of the common law rule against perpetuities will
know that if a valid proof cannot be made with parents of the beneficiaries, it cannot then be made
with other relatives simply because they are related by blood. Nevertheless, full understanding of
this is not an easy matter for most people. There are only three ways in which a beneficiary's blood
relatives (those who do not take as members of the same class of beneficiaries) can affect vesting and,
thus, qualify for possible validation of an interest. First, and foremost, relatives can affect vesting
because they affect the birth of the beneficiary. Second, relatives can affect vesting because their lives
are involved with the fulfillment or breach of express conditions attached to the interest of the benefi-
ciary. Third, especially with class gifts, relatives can affect vesting because their respective life or
death controls the time in which possession or distribution is conferred upon the beneficiaries. Con-
sequently, if the beneficiaries' parents (those relatives who affect the beneficiaries' existence most
immediately) fail to validate the interest of such beneficiaries, there is no need to consider more
remote relatives unless there is something within the provision itself that clearly connects their re-
spective life or death to a time for possession or the fulfillment or breach of express conditions. For
this reason, the only relatives for which the methodology developed hereafter requires specific con-
sideration are the parents of the beneficiaries. See infra Step Three D accompanying notes 190-95.
All other relatives are rejected for testing unless they specifically qualify as "other takers" within the
provision or as people "otherwise mentioned or separately and differently mentioned" within the
provision itself or within any directly related provision. See infra Step Three B and Step Three C
accompanying notes 179-89.
112. See supra note 107.
113. Professor Dukeminier strongly criticizes Waggoner's principle of connection to the transac-
tion. Among other things, he rejects it because:
it lacks an organizing principle of relevance. Professor Waggoner's group is much too
broad for the task at hand. It includes persons who cannot affect vesting. I find it hard to
believe Waggoner or anyone else tests the transferor of an irrevocable transfer or tests the
mother or aunt or cousins of A in the gift to the children of A who reach twenty-five. I
feel certain he does not test the lawyer who drafted the instrument and some others who
may have a "connection to the transaction" (whatever that means). Ifhe does, he is testing
irrelevant lives, because these persons cannot possibly be validating lives. Why waste time
on irrelevant lives when there is a clear test of who is relevant and should be tested?
Dukeminier, supra note 171, at 1731.
One can readily demonstrate the wisdom of Dukeminier's criticism. Suppose T creates a variation
of the testamentary trust hypothesized by Dukeminier: "Income to A for life; thereafter, principal to
the first of A's children to attain age twenty-five absolutely and forever." Assume that T is survived
by A, A-1 (who is A's child and is age ten at the death ofT), L (who is T's lawyer and the person
responsible for planning and drafting T's will) and S (who is L's secretary and the person responsible
for typing and replicating T's will). Does the gift of principal violate the common law rule against
perpetuities? Can a valid proof be made with either L or S, two people who have a "connection to
the transaction"? The answer to the second question is clearly NO. Applying the critical test to L.
one asks: Must the interest of A's first child to attain age twenty-five vest, if at all, within twenty-one
years of L's death? Looking to all eventualities at T's death, especially those that are remote, one
observes that both L and A-I might die immediately after the death of T. Further, it is possible
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than exclude." 4 How does one know when to terminate the process of
application and conclude that the interest is invalid? Indeed, those who
teach have often heard: "But how do you know the interest violates the
rule? Why didn't you test other lives as well?"
Those who understand know that their judgment rests upon an im-
plicit principle-causation-and that this principle gives them a discrete
group of selected lives and tells them when to stop the process. With this
principle, one knows that after testing with certain relatives, it is point-
less to test with others." 5  With this principle, one knows that lawyers
and secretaries, unmentioned in the dispositive instrument, are irrele-
vant. "' As Dukeminier observes, this principle affords economy in con-
ducting the common law process.' 1 7 It is, however, more than a matter
of economy. Without this knowledge of when to terminate the process,
without some assurance that there is a fairly discrete group to test, and
that one has properly tested that entire group, students are uncertain and
assuredly they will continue to flounder in their application of the com-
mon law rule.
If some discrete group for testing is needed, the question then arises
whether the causal relation test is one that students can easily understand
and apply with consistency and accuracy. Dukeminier claims that "the
aim of scholarly explanation is to describe the process of solving perpetu-
ities problems in the simplest and most economical conceptual formula-
tion, and to differentiate between the necessary and unnecessary. '
th realr for A to have a second child, A-2. who might attain age twenty-five and claim the princi-
pal more than twenty-one years after the death of L. Consequently, one cannot make a valid proof
using the life of L.
Smularl), one might apply the critical test to S by asking: Must the interest of A's first child to
ttiage tsmenty-five et, if at all, vsathin twenty-one years of S's death? Looking to the same kinds
of ccntualitics, one finds that both S and A-I might die immediately after the death of T. Further,
it is possible thereafter for A to haxe a second child, A-2, who might later attain age twenty-five and
claim the principal more than tlentN-one years after the death of S. Consequently, one cannot make
a valid proof using the life of S And one could go on with other illustrations that test with lives in
bcing connected to the transaction Yet each illustration would be doomed to fail so long as the
nonietlon ssas not predicated upon a principle of relevance or causation. Indeed, it is logically
impssiblc to proic that an event must happen, if at all, within a certain time period of a specific
person's death unles, that person's life or death is causally related to the event itself. A general
principle of conrnction will not suffice there must be more, namely, relevance to the event in
qtklstioni
114 So'e ozpra note 82
1W5 See aupru note Il1.
llt Sce supra note 113
117 See upra note 62.
11,K Dukeminer. wuipra note 62. at 1731.
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And Dukeminier is right. To be sure, given the real test that both
Dukeminier and Waggoner ultimately apply," 9 a potential validating life
will only be found among those lives that can affect vesting or are caus-
ally related to it.12° It is also clear that this method of limitation will
produce a critical or discrete group for testing, and that all other lives in
being are actually unnecessary.' 2 ' The real question, however, is
whether this process of application works, not only for scholars, teachers
and practitioners of future interests, but for the competent generalist who
quite regularly plans an estate and drafts a dispositive instrument. This
latter group draws upon the mainstream of students who later draft in-
struments that must satisfy the common law rule. The thesis of causal
relationship has been around a long time. Even though extensive discus-
sion of it has occurred only as a result of "wait and see" proposals of the
last several decades, 122 many teachers have explained the common law
process in this manner for some time. 23 And yet the success of teachers
has probably remained the same: some students master the common law
process, but too many do not.'24 The proof is in the pudding-a strict
principle of causation does not work for enough lawyers.
There are, perhaps, two reasons why so many students experience diffi-
culty in developing a group of testing lives based solely upon a causal
relation to vesting. First, there are ambiguities in the application of this
principle. However clearly Dukeminier may understand the notion of
119. See supra notes 73, 79 and accompanying text.
120. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1650; Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 1731.
121. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1650, 1652; Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 1731.
122. See supra notes 53, 58, 60-61.
123. Some scholars acknowledge their use of this process in their explanation and application of
the common law rule against perpetuities. See supra notes 58, 60. All others, whether they openly
embrace the causal relation test or not, surely must use something like it when they apply and
explain the rule. Once one admits that not every person in being should be tested, one must confront
the task of defining the limited pool of people for consideration. Thereafter, however one describes
this process, one likely is searching for and using people who are connected to vesting in some
manner. If one is truly attempting explanation of the logic of the rule, anything else would seem to
be inefficient and, perhaps, misleading.
124. It is difficult to offer hard evidence in support of this conclusion, that too many, if not most,
students never master the common law rule against perpetuities. One might infer from a decision of
the Supreme Court of California that an understanding of the common law rule is beyond the com-
petence of the average lawyer and, therefore, the average student. See supra note 14. Perhaps as
better evidence, I have been teaching the rule for twenty-five years, and I have been using the causal
relationship thesis to explain it. Although I believe that I am a good teacher, I knou that most of my
students never fully comprehend the rule and, consequently, they are unable to reach the correct
solution consistently.
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those lives that affect vesting, there are others who do not.1 25
Dukeminier observes that a person is causally related to vesting if he is a
beneficiary of the contingent interest, or if he can affect the identity of the
beneficiary or the closing of the class of beneficiaries, or if he can affect
any condition precedent.' 26 Some people, however, have a difficult time
understanding why all beneficiaries of contingent interests are viewed as
causal lives, especially those beneficiaries who, at the outset, are ascer-
tainable and have interests that are not subject to any further require-
ments of survivorship or conditions which they can directly or indirectly
affect.' 27 There may also be problems in locating those who can affect
the identity of the beneficiary. For example, if a future interest is created
in the "issue" of a named ancestor of the estate owner provided they are
alive fifty years after the estate owner's death, which people among those
who can possibly affect the identity of the beneficiaries should be used as
the lives for testing the validity of the interest? Do they include all of the
named ancestor's issue alive when the estate owner creates the future
interest? 21 Presumably, Dukeminier would answer yes. 129  If so, can
125 See, c:g., Waggoner, supra note 50. at 1719-24; Waggoner, supra note 76.
126. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1661.
127. Se ,. e.g., Waggoner, vupra note 59, at 1720-24; Waggoner, supra note 76.
12S Consider this testamentary gift of A: "To the issue of my deceased great grandparent, B,
per capita, who are living fifty years after my death." Because this gift is to "issue" and because it is
per capita, it can include any descendant of A's great grandparent no matter what generation they
might be. Apparently, then, any descendant of A's great grandparent, B, who is alive at A's death
can affect the identity of the beneficiaries. Accordingly, such descendants are causally related to
vesting and one should apply the critical test to them. Conceivably, among A's relatives this might
include a grandparent, such grandparent's siblings and their descendants, a parent, such parent's
siblings and their descendants, A's brothers and sisters and their descendants, and A's children,
grandchildren., greatgrandchildren, etc Indeed, the group of causal lives eligible for testing could be
quite large, and it may be exceedingly difficult to identify the lives and trace them until the time of
then- respective death".
Those who are skilled in the application of the common law rule would see no need to apply the
critical test to all of these causal Ies The, would know, inmediately that it is pointless to do so.
Because the ultimate class of takers i, not fixed in terms of any particular generation of descendants,
or in terms of a group established at A's death, and because the time for survivorship is fifty years
,ittei A's death, they would know that the gift to the grandparent's (B's) issue violates the common
lass rile They would Anow that seeral turnovers in descendants could occur before the time estab-
lished for making distribution to I ing issue For example, they would know hmnediately that these
causal lives (descendants alive at A's death) could bear other descendants before dying within several
.cars of A's death, that these afterborn descendants could bear other descendants before dying
witthii the fifty-ear period of time, and that the group of afterborn descendants who ultimately
sur ix c the time for distribution could do so more than twenty-one years after the death of all causal
Inc , li I iibeng
129) Case 5 T bequeaths property "to my issue living thirty years from now." This is void
at common law. The gift w Ill not necessarily vest or fail within the lives of the testator's
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one ascertain their identity without great difficulty so that the test for
validation can be conducted? And when does their number become un-
reasonable so that as a group they must be rejected? 3 ' Dukeminier has
explanations for these situations, explanations that often derive from sub-
set principles.' Although Dukeminier claims that his explanations fol-
low logically from the principle of causation,1 32 others do not share his
clarity of understanding and application.1 33  Yet strangely, perhaps,
others might not have difficulty at all with this example. They might
examine the terms of the condition and immediately observe that, be-
cause of the open ended group of beneficiaries, there is no life in being
from which a proof of validity can be made. They would reject all causal
lives and make no formal attempt to locate them and apply the critical
test to them.
134
The second reason students have difficulty with the causal relation ap-
proach is that the test ignores the novice's penchant to test with all lives
in being mentioned in the instrument. Indeed, the principle of causal
relation is a method for inclusion, but of necessity it also operates to
exclude lives in being unrelated to vesting-often lives that are promi-
nently displayed in the limitation itself.135 One who understands the
issue alive at her death or twenty-one years thereafter. Under the causal relationship prin-
ciple, the measuring lives are all of the testator's issue in being at the testator's death. By
procreating or dying, these persons can affect the identity of the beneficiaries ....
Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1666 (citations omitted). See also Case 7, id. at 1667-68.
130. In their elaboration of the common law rule against perpetuities, courts have developed a
principle that limits the causal lives that can be used to make a valid proof. Courts require that a
determination of the perpetuities period be feasible. More specifically, courts require that ascertain-
ment of validating lives in being not be impracticable and that their number not be so large as to
make it unreasonably difficult to determine when they have died. The precise limits of feasibility
with respect to ascertainment and number are, however, somewhat unclear. It is also unclear
whether a group of lives that exceeds this standard may render the interest under consideration void
because of uncertainty or because of a perpetuities violation. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS)
§ 1.3 reporter's note 3 (1983); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1223; Dukeminier, A Modern
Guide To Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1875-76 (1986).
131. See supra note 96. See also Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 1734-38.
132. See Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1660-74; Dukeminier, supra note 62, at 1732.
133. See supra note 125.
134. For a discussion of a related problem and why one might immediately dismiss certain
causal lives in being from consideration, see supra note 111.
135. There are many illustrations of how the principle of relevance or causation disqualifies for
testing lives in being that are mentioned within the instrument or even the specific limitation. For
example, consider this irrevocable living trust created by A, in which the corpus of the trust is
Blackacre, a tract of land under long term lease to an agency of the federal government: "Income to
my brother John's son, S, for life, then income to S's children for the life of the survivor. upon the
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common law process can apply the rule economically and ignore these
unrelated lives. But the method described by Dukeminier fails to recog-
nize that students are seldom satisfied with a finding of invalidity until
they have tested those lives that stare them in the face, even though the
expert would reject such lives because they are not causally related. In
short, it is exceedingly important to recognize that a method of analysis
must satisfy a student's need to exclude possible validating lives through
actual testing. Students seem more secure when they eliminate possible
validating lives by actual testing; unfortunately, mere reliance upon a
principle of causation often leaves them uneasy about the accuracy of
their exclusions.
This article proposes a somewhat different method for conducting the
common law process. In a sense, the proposal borrows from the princi-
ple of causation and the open ended principle of connection. Its purpose
is to assemble a manageable group of lives in being to which one must
apply the same critical test: Must the contingent interest vest, if at all,
within twenty-one years of the death of one of the members within the
group? 3' The proposal deviates, however, from the methods described
death of the survivor of S's children, the trust shall terminate and Blackacre shall at that time be
given over absolutely to the then living descendants of S per capita as tenants in common. If none
are ahve at such time, then to John's daughter, D, absolutely if Blackacre is still under lease to ...
(the agency of the federal government); if it is not, then to my good friend, F, absolutely." Assume
vw hen the irrevocable trust becomes effective that A, John, S, D, F, and T (the individual trustee
named by A) are all alive. Assume further that S is childless. In this instance, each of the alternative
contingent gifts of Blackacre violates the common law rule against perpetuities. However, in making
this determination about D's interest, one can observe that the limitation identifies three lives in
being (Mv A. John, and F) and that the instrument mentions another (T). Further, none of these
lives in being affects the vesting of D's interest. None of these people is a causal life in being, and all
four should be excluded under this principle in testing the validity of D's interest. D's interest is
sublect to two conditions: that S does not have descendants alive at the death of the survivor of his
children and that Blackacre is then still under lease of the federal agency. The only life in being
relevant to the vesting of D's interest is S, although Professor Dukeminier would also add the life of
D as wiell. The lives of all others in being when the trust becomes effective are irrelevant and must be
discarded for purposes of testing To be sure, however, those inexperienced with the process of the
common law rule may find it difficult to understand this; accordingly, application of the critical test
to A, John, F and T becomes irresistible.
136 S c i fra text accompanying notes 178, 183, 189, 195. Fundamentally, this is the same test
that both Dukemmier and Waggoner (and, for that matter, everyone else) apply. The difference,
however, between their application of the common law rule against perpetuities and this methodol-
ogy lies in the way one assembles the lives in being that are to be subjected to this test. Dukeminier
tests those lives in being who affect or are causally related to vesting, while Waggoner tests those
live, in being who are connected to the transaction.
This methodology assembles separate classes of potential testing lives that are drawn almost en-
tircly from the individual persons or groups of people specifically mentioned or generally described
Washington University Open Scholarship
988 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:949
by Dukeminier and Waggoner in how one assembles the group to be
tested. The proposed methodology recognizes the need for a discrete and
closed ended group of people. But it also recognizes the problems a nov-
ice might have in accomplishing this with a general formula that is sus-
ceptible to ambiguities. Accordingly, the methodology uses carefully
defined and developed classes of people from which all potential validat-
ing lives in being might be found; in some instances it might actually
dispense with certain kinds of causal lives,137 while in others it might
comprehend for testing some lives that ordinarily affect vesting but in
particular instances they may be without an actual causal relation.' 3
in the dispositive provision. Nevertheless, once assembled, not all classes qualify for testing even
though they might actually contain lives in being that affect vesting. More specifically, this method-
ology does not apply the critical test to those groups and to those individually described persons who
are not restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended at the time the period of the rule
commences. Once a class qualifies for testing, however, the critical test is then applied to that person
or group of people independently of all the other classes of potential testing lives. Each class is tested
separately. If a proof can be made with respect to any individually named or described person or
with respect to any person within a described group falling within the class that has qualified for
testing, then the interest is valid. If, however, one fails to make a valid proof with respect to all of
these classes, and with respect to the gross period of years as well (twenty-one years from the time
the period of the rule commences), then there is a perpetuities violation.
137. This methodology rejects for testing all groups of lives, whether they affect vesting or not,
unless they are restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended when the period of the rule
commences. This requirement applies to each of the classes considered within each of the steps for
applying the common law rule against perpetuities. For example, consider this testamentary trust
created by A: "Income to B for life, and at B's death, income to B's children for the life or the
survivor of them; when the last of B's children dies, principal to B's grandchildren, per capita,
absolutely and forever." Assume that B and B's only child, B-I, survive A and that B-I is childless.
Does the gift of principal to B's grandchildren violate the rule?
Their interest must satisfy the rule because each grandchild's interest is subject to the condition of
being born. Indeed, all grandchildren must join, or fail to join, the class within the period of the
rule; if not, then the entire gift of principal will fail. To be sure, B-I is a person who can affect
vesting because B-1 is a person capable of having children who can join the class of B's grand-
children. Nevertheless, under this methodology, B-I does not qualify for actual testing under Step
Three B as an other taker within the same provision because B's children are not restricted to lives in
being and to lives already ended. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81. For a full consideration
of this illustration, see infra illustration IV A-7.
138. This possiblity for the testing of lives in being that may not affect vesting, or may not have
any causal relation to vesting, can arise under several steps within the methodology. For example.
consider this testamentary trust created by A: "Income to B for life, and after the death of B.
income to C for life; upon the termination of all income interests, principal to C's children abso-
lutely." Assume that B and C survive A and that C is then childless. Does the gift or principal to
C's children violate the common law rule against perpetuities?
The children's interest is contingent upon being born. All of C's children must join the class or
fail to join within the period of the rule or the entire gift will fail. Step Three B of the methodology
covers other individual takers or groups of takers within the same provision who are restricted to
lives in being and to lives already ended when the period of the rule commences at A's death. See
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This methodology rests on the notion that students need and desire
meticulous guidance in formulating the group of lives in being to be
tested. They want precision, not ambiguity. They need to know exactly
whom to test, and they need to know when they should not test any
further. Stated differently, they want to know how and when to conclude
the process, especially when they suspect a violation of the common law
rule. The essential ingredient of this methodology is, therefore, its pre-
cise formulation of the classes of people to be tested-the entire group of
testing lives in being.
In short, the object of the methodology is to guide one carefully, step
by step, through the formation of these classes and the application of the
critical test. Once all levels of the process are completed, if one has not
previously validated the interest, he will know that it is invalid. Its pur-
pose is to provide a series of questions that enable one to apply the com-
mon law rule successfully without full understanding of all the intricacies
vltr text accompanying notes 179-83. In this illustration, B qualifies for testing under Step Three B
becausc he is an other taker within the same provision and because he is restricted to a life in being
by the descriptive language itself. Nevertheless, B's life is not causally related to vesting. C's life is
the only one that actually affects vesting. The takers of the gift of principal receive interests which
are contingent upon being born. C is the relevant parent, and it is only his life that governs their
respective births. To be sure, B's life affects the time for possession of the gift of principal because it
cannot become possessory before his death. Nevertheless, the relevant relation required by the com-
mon law rule is vesting and not possession. Control over the time of possession sometimes can affect
the time for vcsting. In this instance. however, because C has been given an intermediate income
interest for hfe. B's death will only affect possession and not vesting, namely, the time in which
membership within the class of grandchildren becomes fixed.
Also consider this testamentary trust created by A: "Income to B's daughter, B-I, for life; there-
after, principal to her children absolutely." Assume that B and B-I survive A and that B-I is
chlldles Does the gift of principal to B-i's children violate the common law rule? Indeed, the gift
of principal to B-l's children is contingent upon their being born; all must join the class or fail to
join within the period of the rule or the entire gift will fail. Step Three C of this methodology covers
people otherwise mentioned or separately and differently mentioned within the same provision or
elseN% here in other provisions directly related who are restricted to lives in being and to lives already
ended when the period of the rule commences at A's death. See infra text accompanying notes 184-
8q. In this illustration, B qualifies for testing because he is otherwise mentioned within the same
provision and because he is restricted to a life in being because of the descriptive language itself.
Ne.ertheless, B's life is not causally related to vesting. Just as before. B-I's life is the only one that
AtrCcts vesting To be sure, B-I is a child of B. but the mention of B in the limitation is superfluous.
The gift of principal is not to all of B's grandchildren; instead, it is only to the children of B-I. B-I
is specifically described and identified .ithin the limitation. B-1 is the only relevant parent, and it is
only her life that governs the respective births of potential members within the class entitled to
rcci'c' the principal. Nevertheless, the methodology calls for the testing of B's life under Step Three
C ccn though one who understands the logic of the rule will know that B's life cannot possibly
validate the gift of principal As an aside, the interest does satisfy the rule. Under Step Three B of
this methodology. B-I's life will be tested and it will validate the gift of principal to her children.
1989]
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of the process itself. In a sense, it resembles many of the rules of arith-
metic that some of us were taught to follow without comprehending the
process by which we were actually solving the problems1 3 9 And like
these rules of arithmetic, in time many who use this methodology will
develop a facility with the common law rule and a real understanding of
it-and, perhaps, their own shortcuts and improvements upon the pro-
posed methodology. 140
III. TOWARDS A BETTER METHODOLOGY
A. Some Preliminary Observations
Before the specifics of the methodology proposed by this article are
developed, several preliminary and important observations must be
made. The title to this section is "Towards a Better Methodology," and
it is stated in this way for good reason. The methodology offered has
been developed with great care, and in the course of its formulation,
many changes have been made to reflect new insights to problems that
can be discovered only through time and application. The methodology,
in its current form, works successfully on every problem this author has
been able to conceive. Nevertheless, it may not be perfect; indeed, who
knows what complex hypotheticals law professors might construct or
what convoluted gifts imaginative lawyers might contrive. This article,
therefore, does not offer a methodology that is without conceivable error
139. In arithmetic, some of us were taught to solve problems of addition and multiplication by
learning how to "carry." We also were taught to solve problems of subtraction by learning how to
"borrow." In each instance, we conducted the arithmetic process and reached the correct solution
through rigorous application of the rules for "carrying" and "borrowing." Little did we know, or
for that matter care, about the "concept of tens" and the logic that underlies these rules. The know-
ledge and skills we acquired were focused on results. A true understanding of the process was only
incidental, something that would, perhaps, evolve over time and repeated application of these rules.
So it is with this perpetuities methodology. Although the aim of all good education, especially legal
education, is to develop a thorough understanding of what we do and why we do it, somehow the
logic of the common law rule against perpetuities has escaped too many lawyers. Nevertheless,
lawyers must know when the rule has been satisfied or violated. They must know how to reach the
correct result at all times. Absent a full understanding of the rule's internal logic, one must resort to
a process that consistently and mechanically reaches correct solutions to perpetuities problems.
140. Once one comprehends the concept of causation, one might immediately observe, when
confronted with a particular limitation, that a valid proof can be made with a certain person and not
with others. And in this situation, a valid proof will be accomplished by proceeding directly to the
specific step within the methodology (see infra Part Three B (1)) by which such proof can be made.
In doing this, all other steps will be bypassed. For illustrations of the application of this advanced
understanding of the process and the methodology, see infra notes 482-85.
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and is irrevocably cast for all time. It is, instead, an effort "towards a
better methodology."
One must also reemphasize that the focus of the proposal is upon for-
mation of the group of lives in being established for the purpose of test-
ing. The methodology attempts to fashion a finite group, and after
applying the critical test to members within this group, one will know
whether there is a violation of the common law rule.1 4 ' This group will
consist primarily of lives in being causally related to vesting, but it may
exclude some of them from consideration in certain situations.14 Fur-
ther, on occasion this group will include for testing some lives that actu-
ally have no effect upon vesting in the particular limitation. 143 For these
reasons, this methodology departs somewhat from recent terminology
used to describe the common law process. It adopts the term "validating
life in being"' 44 to describe a person with whom one can make a success-
ful proof. But it rejects such terms as "causal lives," "relevant lives,"
"connected lives," "limiting lives" and "lives postponing vesting" to de-
scribe the group of lives to be tested.145 Although causation, relevancy,
connection and postponement enter into the formulation of this group,
this methodology employs another phrase to describe its members-one
that does not reflect the mixture of principles upon which the group is
actually based. Henceforth, within this article these people will be
known as "testing lives in being" (and for short, as "testing lives").'46
141 Actually, one must take an additional step before knowing whether an interest violates the
common law rule against perpetuities. If one concludes for all members within the groups estab-
fished for testing that the interest can vest beyond twenty-one years of their respective deaths, this
does not mean that such interest violates the rule. One must also determine whether the interest can
vest more than twenty-one years after the time of its creation. More specifically, in the case of a
devse or bequest, the time of creation is the testator's death. See infra Step Four, notes 196-97 and
accompanying text.
142 Scc supra note 137.
143 See supra note 138.
144 In recent )ears, with respect to application of the common law rule, several commentators
have advanced the use of this term instead of the more familiar "measuring life." See, e.g., J.
DUKLMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 59, Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 1649-50; Waggoner,
supra note 50, at 1715. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MiCi. L. REV. 1718, 1722 (1983).
145 For the use of phrases such as "li'es affecting (connected to, relevant to, causally related to)
vesting." see Dukemmier, supra note 59, at 1650-52; Dukeminier, supra note 76, at 1731. For the
usc of the phrase "lives that restrict the vesting period," see Morris & Wade, supra note 53, at 496-
97. For the use of the phrase "people connected to the transaction," see Waggoner, supra note 50, at
1716-17 For the use of the phrase "lives postponing vesting." see Featheringill, supra note 50, at
165, 167-68.
146. This methodology does not use the term "measuring life." Others reject it as well. See
%upra note 144. This term is rejected because, more than anything else, it reflects the confusion
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Additionally, although this methodology purports to systematize and
simplify the common law process, it cannot eliminate the complexities of
the law of future interests generally, or especially as this body of law may
relate to application of the rule. 147 To elaborate, the common law rule
applies only to contingent interests.148 To apply the critical test, one
must know which interests a court will construe as contingent, and
which conditions, express or implied, make the interests contingent. One
must also assess the events that govern fulfillment of the condition so
that one can determine the latest possible time for vesting. This is not an
easy matter because the distinctions between vested and contingent inter-
ests are complicated and sometimes incapable of logical explanation. 49
people have in understanding and applying the common law rule. Frequently, commentators, teach-
ers and students ask: Who is the measuring life? What they really may be intending to ask is: Who
is the person about whom one can say that such interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years
of his death? If so, then the answer will be: There is no such person whenever one concludes that a
perpetuities violation exists. What the question seeks is a determination of the life by which the
interest under consideration can be validated. Yet every time one finds a violation this means that
there is no validating life in being to be found. This would be enough for students if that is all they
intended to ask with this question. Frequently, even when one explains that there is no measuring
life because a violation exists, they will persist with the same question: Who is the measuring life?
They raise this question, again and again, because with it they are also intending to ask something
else: Who are the lives in being that one considers on the way to making a determination that a
perpetuities violation exists? In short, although in this question their teachers may be asking only
who, if there be one, is the validating life, students are also asking who are the lives tested in finding
the validating life or in determining that one does not exist. In reality, then, students are raising two
questions. To facilitate the answer to both of these questions, this methodology employs two terms
to replace "measuring life." It uses the term "validating life" to refer to the person about whom one
can say that such interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of his death. And it uses the
term "testing life" or "testing lives" to refer to the lives considered in finding a validating life or in
determining that one does not exist.
147. See J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1886). This monumental treatise by
John Chipman Gray contains 453 pages, 78 of which are devoted generally to tile law of future
interests.
148. The common law rule against perpetuities provides that: "No interest is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after sonic life in being at the creation of the
interest." J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 191. Distinguishing between contingent and vested interests can
be extremely complicated since the bases by which courts make their classifications are not always
underscored by logic. See infra notes 149, 246. These distinctions become all the more complex
with respect to the rule against perpetuities because there are circumstances in which they are made
differently from the methods used in other contexts. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
149. Decisions involving future interest problems frequently contain this statement of issue: "Is
the interest contingent or vested?" The rules of construction governing the distinctions between
contingent and vested interests are exceedingly complex and, in many respects, unclear. Conimenta-
tors devote significant portions of their treatises to these distinctions. See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY §§ 4.25-4.36, 21.5-21.32 (A. Casner ed. 1952); J. GRAY, supra note 1, at 88-113; L.
SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 131-66, 571-94. Too often, this stated issue obscures the
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When a substitute gift is used, these distinctions may affect only the de-
termination of whether the primary gift is contingent along with its sub-
stitute.1 50 Nevertheless, when a limitation does not include a substitute
question actually before the court. Indeed, to make this the apparent issue, and to resolve it, can
sometimes confuse more than it clarifies.
There are at least two reasons for this confusion, complexity and predilection to misstate issues.
First, although the words "vested" and "contingent" are used in, and are frequently critical to, legal
analysis, they are words which have more than one accepted meaning. Accordingly, intelligent anal-
sis is confounded whenever it is not made absolutely clear which meaning is being accorded this
terminology. This plurality of meaning is explained by Professors Leach and Logan in their future
interests coursebook:
The word vested is commonly used in at least four senses and contingent in at least three:
(1) To say that an interest is vested may mean that it has become possessory or vested in
possession....
(2) To say that an interest is vested may mean that, although it is still a future interest, it
has acquired that metaphysical and artificial status which under the feudal law made it an
estate rather than the possibility of becoming an estate-i.e., that it is vested in interest. A
remainder is vested in this sense when it is not subject to a condition precedent other than
the termination of the particular estate....
(3) To say that an interest is vested may mean that if the named taker dies before it
becomes possessory the interest is transmissible to his estate, and that his heirs or distribu-
tees will take the interest which he would have taken had he lived. . . . Antithetically,
contingent is used to denote that the interest is nontransmissible and that the named taker
must survive to the time of vesting in possession. It has proved easy for courts to slip from
an obvious premise that a remainder is contingent upon the occurrence of some collateral
event , . to the dubious conclusion that it is contingent in the sense here discussed and that
the remainderman must be living when the estate becomes possessory....
(4) Where the Rule against Perpetuities is involved, to say that an interest is vested means
that it has acquired the degree of certainty which under the Rule an interest must acquire
within lives in being and twenty-one years or fail. The term contingent is used to indicate
that the interest has not acquired the necessary degree of certainty. In the main these
usages are the same as those discussed in paragraph (2).
W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 253-54 (1961).
The other principal reason for these problems arises out of the illogical distinctions made in apply-
ing the definitions described in paragraph (2)-vested or contingent in interest. Leach and Logan
point out. "A remainder is vested in this sense when it is not subject to a condition precedent other
than the termination of the particular estate." Id. at 253. To be sure, if a remainder satisfies this
definition it is vested. Yet, even if it does not, it can still be vested in interest. See J. GRAY, supra
note 1, § 101-03, 108. See also infra notes 150-51, 153, 245. Although the definition described in
paragraph (2) appears founded on the presence or absence of a precedent condition to possession,
this distinction has been obscured and confused by the maze of exceptions courts have developed
over the years. Accordingly, even if a court has correctly viewed the question presented-"vested
or contingent in interest"--the solution it articulates may be neither easy nor sensible.
150. This can be illustrated with two variations of a testamentary trust created by A. First,
consider this example: "Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to B's children at age thirty; the
share of any child who fails to attain age thirty shall belong to those who do, but if none, then to C
absolutely." Second, consider this example: "Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to such of
B's children who attain age thirty; if none, then to C absolutely." In both examples, C's interest is
clearly contingent. No matter how one might characterize the interest of B's children, C's interest is
contingent and subject to the common law rule against perpetuities. Nevertheless, even though the
condition appears to be the same in both examples, some courts will find that B's children have a
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gift, these distinctions can affect the basic classification and, therefore,
whether the provision is subject to the rule at all.'' Above all, one can-
not conduct the critical test without full knowledge of these distinc-
tions, 2 including those that are obscure along with those that are
obvious.1 53
vested remainder subject to divestment in the first example and a contingent remainder in the sec-
ond. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 148-49. This difference in construction can, of
course, govern the conditions affecting the time in which B's children are entitled to benefit from the
principal. More important, it can affect the application of the common law rule against perpetuities
and the existence of a violation.
151. This can be illustrated with two variations of a testamentary trust created by A. First,
consider this example: "Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to B's children at age thirty."
Second, consider this example: "Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to B's children, payable at
age thirty." If there had been a substitute gift, B's children might have received a vested interest in
both illustrations. See supra note 150. In the absence of a gift over, however, the classification will
turn on the presence of one word--"payable." See L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 586. In
the first example, B's children have a contingent remainder that is subject to the common law rule
against perpetuities. In the second example, B's children have a remainder that is vested absolutely
with enjoyment postponed and is not subject to the rule.
152. To conduct the critical test, one must determine which interests are classified as contingent
and, therefore, subject to the rule. Additionally, one must understand fully the nature of each condi-
tion, express or implied, and the latest time in which each condition might be fulfilled. Stated other-
wise, one must isolate and focus carefully upon each conditon and then determine the latest possible
time for vesting. For further discussion, see infra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
153. Some distinctions are, of course, quite obvious. Consider this testamentary trust created by
A: "Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to B's children absolutely." Assume that B and B's
three children (B-1, B-2 and B-3) survive A, but that B-1 thereafter predeceases B. Absent other
language to the contrary, all courts should conclude that B-l's interest vested absolutely at A's
death, that B-Is share of the remainder interest in the principal passes to his successor at the time of
his death, and that possession of this share of the principal will belong to B-l's successor at the time
of B's subsequent death.
A different conclusion, however, must be reached if the gift of principal had read: "... thereafter,
principal to B's children then living absolutely and forever." B-l's interest fails, with the principal
to be divided ultimately among those children who actually survive B. The reason is obvious: the
language includes an express requirement of survivorship that renders the remainder contingent.
There is a clear condition attached to the requirements for possession of the remainder interest
beyond the expiration of B's prior income interest. This is enough to make the remainder contin-
gent. Absent this express language ofsurvivorship, there would seem to be no such requirement just
as there was none in the original example.
In the origiral example, one would assume that, upon B's death, the trustee must divide the
corpus and then pay it over to each of B's children or their successors in interest. Nevertheless, some
of the distinctions courts make are not obvious. For example, if the foregoing direction for division
and payment impliedly imposed upon the trustee had been made explicit, some courts would treat
such language the same as an express requirement of survivorship of the time of possession-B's
death. This distinction rests upon a dubious rule known as the "divide and pay over rule." For
further discussion of this rule, see Becker, Future Interests and the Myth of the Simple Will: All
Approach to Estate Planning-Part One, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 613-14 n.13. There are other
obscure distinctions between contingent and vested interests. See supra note 151.
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It should also be noted that these distinctions are not the only princi-
ples of future interests that must be mastered. For example, sometimes
one must know about the common law rule that can result in the destruc-
tion of a contingent remainder.' 54 Does the rule still apply in the juris-
diction that governs the subject matter of the dispositive instrument? 55
If so, how might it affect the latest time for vesting of legal remainders
created under a will? Indeed, knowledge of this rule may become impor-
tant because it sometimes saves contingent interests which otherwise
would be invalid if indestructible. 156
One must also know a great deal about the rules of construction that
govern the composition of class gifts because of the special features of the
common law rule as it applies to these kinds of interests. Unlike other
vested interests, members of a class whose interest must vest, if at all,
within the period of the rule-including even those members whose in-
terests vest immediately upon creation-may still be subject to the rule
and even violate it. The common law rule treats the class as a single
154 At common law, and even today in a number ofjurisdictions (see infra note 155), a freehold
contingent remainder must vest by the time all preceding possessory freehold estates terminate, and
if it does not, then such contingent remainder is destroyed. This rule derives from two feudal
precepts: seisin must be continuous, it cannot be held in abeyance; and no freehold estate can be
created to commence in the future. This rule of destructibility most commonly operates when a
supportive freehold estate terminates before the condition imposed upon a remainder is satisfied.
Consider, for example, this devise of Blackacre by A: "To B for life; thereafter, to C in fee simple
absolute if he attains age thirty." Assume that both B and C survive A and that C is age ten at the
time of A's death. Because C's remainder is subject to a precedent condition that he attain age
thirty, C's interest is classified as a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute. C cannot claim
possession until B dies and until and if he reaches age thirty. If C dies before satisfying this age
requirement, his interest will fail. Nevertheless, because of the rule of destructibility applicable to
C's contingent remainder, his interest will also fail if C has not yet reached age thirty by the time of
B's death. It will fail immediately upon B's death and be destroyed even though C subsequently
attains age thirty. The practical effect of this rule upon C's contingent remainder is to subject it to a
condition that C reach age thirty and that he do so by the time of B's death. For further discussion
of the doctrine of destructibility, see C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
LRT 133-39 (2d ed. 1988); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 191-209.
155 In England a series of statutes commencing in 1845 abolished the destructibility rule. In
the United States approximately one half of the states have enacted statutes abrogating the rule in
whole or in part. In a few jurisdictions there are decisions rejecting the rule without the aid of
legislation. Only in Florida, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee do the cases recognize that the
rule continues to exist . . . . In about twelve states there are no decisions on the point and no
legislation. The position taken by the Restatement of Property that contingent remainders are
indestructible may influence these uncommitted jurisdictions to reject the doctrine of destructibility.
C. Mo) NIH N, upra note 154, at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
156 For an illustration of how the common law rule of destruction might operate to avoid a
perpetuties violation, see infra illustration IV B-3. See also Drury v. Drury, 111 111. 336. 111 N.E.
140 (t1916),
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entity; if any potential member's interest causes a violation, then the en-
tire class gift is invalid and it must fail. The rule requires, therefore, that
full membership within the class be determined within the allowed
time. 5 7 Stated differently, if any potential member can join the class
beyond the period of the rule, then the interests of all class members
violate the rule, including those members who had vested interests from
the outset.15 8 Accordingly, to apply the common law rule correctly, one
must know exactly when the last potential member can join the class.
And to do this, one first must determine the very latest time in which a
potential member can be born. If membership is subject to further condi-
tions, one then must determine the latest time a potential member can
satisfy such conditions and join the class.' 59
Further, it should be observed that these determinations must be made
in light of other principles that circumscribe the opening and closing of
classes and, therefore, affect the latest time in which a potential member
can join the class. For example, even though the latest time in which a
potential class member can be born has not arrived, when the limitation
calls for earlier distribution of a member's share, the "rule of conven-
ience" may require that the class be closed, and that people who are born
thereafter and later satisfy the descriptive requisites and conditions of the
class be precluded from becoming members.' 60 Consequently, there are
157. See, e.g., R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 21, at 39-42; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22,
§ 1265.
158. This "all or nothing" principle-that the interests of all class members violate the rule
unless the identity of every actual member must, if at all, be determined within the period of the
rule-has been soundly criticized. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.26 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952); Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1938).
Consistent with this criticism, it has been the subject of legislative reformation. See, e.g., Perpetu-
ities and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55, §§ 4(3),(4) (England). Some courts have also rejected
the principle. See, e.g., Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962).
159. For further discussion and illustration, see infra text accompanying notes 275-78; see also
infra illustration IV A-6.
160. In the main, construction problems regarding the closing of a class arise when, at the earli-
est date distribution can be made, an increase in potential members is still physically possible. Sup-
pose, for example, that A leaves a testamentary trust that governs the residue of his estate in the
following manner: "Income to my wife, W, for life; thereafter, the principal shall be sold and the
proceeds distributed to my grandchildren in equal shares." Assume that A is survived by his wife,
W, and three young children, A-1, A-2, and A-3, but not by grandchildren. Subsequently, assume
that at W's death all three children survive along with A-i's child, G-I, who happens to be the only
grandchild A has had by that time. Finally, assume that within five years of W's death, two addi-
tional grandchildren are born, namely, G-2, the child of A-2, and G-3, the child of A-3.
Which grandchildren are entitled to share in the remainder of the residuary trust? All grandchil-
dren of A whenever they might be born, including G-I, G-2, and G-3? Perhaps this is what A
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circumstances in which class membership will be fully determined before
the possibility of afterborn people within the group description has be-
come exhausted. A precise understanding of how and when to apply this
rule of construction is important because it can operate to save a class
gift that otherwise would violate the common law rule. By forcing an
earlier closing of a class, this "rule of convenience" sometimes assures
that the vesting of all interests within the class must occur, if at all,
within the period of time allowed by the common law rule."'
Finally, before one conducts any version of the common law process,
several observations should be made about the time in which the period
of the rule commences and about the facts that can be accounted for in
projecting possibilities for remote vesting. Generally speaking, the per-
iod begins from the time the subject matter of the dispositive instrument
intended, or would have wished had his estate planner raised the issue with him. Yet, the construc-
tion given by courts in this situation is apt to compel quite a different result. Unless A adequately
directs otherwise, if a grandchild is able to take at the date distribution is called for, the maximum
class membership is fixed at that time. Relying heavily upon A's direction for distribution, courts
have fixed maximum membership to determine the minimum size of the share a grandchild is then
entitled to take. And this necessarily means that potential members of the class (herein at least G-2
and G-3) will be precluded from enjoying an interest in their grandfather's estate. Grandchildren
born after the date of first distribution (herein the death of W) take nothing.
The reasons courts give for this position are certainly open to question. Courts have, for the most
part, been unwilling to inconvenience themselves by exercising continuous supervision over a share
which has already been distributed. Accordingly, they have refrained from making distribution sub-
ject to partial recall in the event others thereafter become entitled to share in the gift, thus reducing
the size of each recipient's distributed share. Further, courts have been reluctant to ignore com-
pletely an estate owner's direction for distribution to members of a class occurring before possibility
of added membership becomes extinct. To hold the class open long enough to include all potential
members, which in this illustration would be until all of A's children died, would require either
making distributions subject to partial recall, a choice courts believe is both impractical and inconve-
nent, or withholding distribution until further membership became an impossibility, a choice courts
regard as a fiat-out repudiation of the estate owner's intent. Therefore, courts have adopted what
they consider a compromise. an accommodation of intent known as the rule of convenience. In the
foregoing example, A is regarded as having intended, and thus by implication declared: "... to my
grandchildren in equal shares who are born prior to the date set for first distribution." And if only
A-I had children by the date of W's death, then only these grandchildren would take. Surely, it is
questionable whether this reflects the probable intent of A. The rule, therefore, may be convenient
for the court and convenient for members eligible to take, but it is certainly inconvenient for those
not born in time and consequently excluded. For full discussion of the rule of convenience and of
related principles that govern determination of the maximum membership of a class, see 5 ANIERI-
(AN L .w oi PROPRt R Y §§ 22 39-46 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); L. SiNIES & A. SMITH, supra note 22,
6§ 634-51.
1 1 For illustrations of these circumstances, see infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
and notes 279-82 and accompanying text. See also L. SiNIES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1270 for
illustrations of how the rules governing determination of maximum class membership affect applica-
tion o f the common law rule against perpetuities.
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is "tied up."' 6 2 It is at this point in time that validating lives in being
must be found. Accordingly, it is among people alive at this time from
which one must assemble a pool of testing lives in being. In the case of a
will, the rule begins with the death of the testator, 163 while in the case of
an irrevocable life time transfer, it begins from the time in which such
transfer is consummated.'" In the case of a revocable lifetime transfer,
however, the period begins when the power of revocation ends-usually
at the transferor's death-even though the transfer became legally effec-
tive when the dispositive instrument was previously executed. 65
Additionally, it is at this same time that the rule requires the projec-
tion of possibilities of remote vesting. More specifically, one must make
a proof of validity in the light of only those facts known when the period
of the rule commences. Stated differently, for an interest to be valid, the
common law rule requires that one prove, on the basis of possibilities
existing when the period begins, either that there is no possibility for
vesting later than twenty-one years after the death of some life in being
or that there is no possibility for vesting later than twenty-one years after
the property is "tied up. 166
One important exception should be noted with respect to powers of
appointment. Under the common law rule, because a general power of
appointment by deed or by will does not encumber the donee's use or
162. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1226.
163. See id.
164. See id. See also R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 21, at 38.
165. See L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1226. One might observe that Gray's statement
of the common law rule against perpetuities has the period begin "at the creation of the interest." J.
GRAY, supra note 1, at 191. Nevertheless, consistent with the underlying policy of the rule, this has
been reinterpreted to mean that the period of the common law rule is measured from the time the
property is "tied up." In most instances, this occurs at the time the dispositive instrument takes
effect and the interest in question is created. However, in the case of a revocable living trust, the
period of the rule is measured from the time the settlor dies. Even though in theory interests are
created at the time the trust is validly executed, the capacity to alienate and market the subject
matter is not significantly affected until the power of revocation is suspended by the settlor's death.
166. One cannot overemphasize that the common law rule against perpetuities requires a proof
of vesting or failure to vest based upon possibilities, not actualities. What might happen is relevant to
establishing validity; what actually happens is totally irrelevant. See Dukeminier, supra note 130, at
1870-72, 1876-80. Consider this devise of Blackaere by A: "To B in fee simple; however, if Black-
acre is ever used for any purpose other than residential, then to C in fee simple absolute." In this
illustration, C's contingent executory interest violates the common law rule against perpetuities. See
infra illustration IV B-I. C's interest fails because of a perpetuities violation even if B actually
causes a land use violation within five years of A's death. A violation occurs even though the breach
actually occurs within the lifetime of a life in being (B) and, additionally, even though it actually
occurs within twenty-one years of A's death (the time when the period of the rule begins).
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alienability of the property, the period does not begin until the donee
actually exercises such power.' 67 The period of the rule, however, is dif-
ferent for a special power of appointment and for a general testamentary
power of appointment. Because the donee's discretion to alienate is sig-
nificantly limited, the period of the rule begins when the power is created
and not when it is exercised. 168  Nevertheless, unlike other applications
of the common law rule, one does not have to make a proof in light of
facts-and therefore possibilities-known when the period begins. The
common law process allows a delay in application until the donee actu-
ally exercises the power, and then it allows a proof to be made in light of
possibilities existing at that same time.169 In short, although the period
167 The period of the rule commences when the donee exercises a general power presently
exercisable by deed or will because the donee has the power at any time to make the subject matter
his own and, therefore, its alienability is not impaired after the power is created. For this reason, the
perpetuities period is deferred beyond the time the power is created. For a discussion of the rule
against perpetuities in relation to powers of appointment, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24.30-.36 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1271-77. For an elabo-
ration of the methodology regarding such general powers of appointment and an illustration of its
application, see infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text: illustration IV A-10.
168. Under general testamentary powers of appointment, the subject matter is tied up until the
power can be exercised at the donee's death. Until then, the donee cannot make the subject matter
his o% n, and then it is only for the benefit of his estate. And under special powers of appointment,
disposition of the subject matter is tied up throughout; the donee cannot make it his at any time.
Accordingly, special powers and general testamentary powers are subject to a perpetuities period
measured from the time the power is created. For a discussion of the rule against perpetuities in
relation to powers of appointment. see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.30-.36 (A. Casner ed.
1952), L. SIMiES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1271-77. For an elaboration of the methodology
regarding general testamentary and special powers of appointment and an illustration of its applica-
tion, see infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text; illustration IV A-8.
169 The mere fact that a potential appointment can cause a perpetuities violation does not make
all actual appointments invalid. Unlike other instances in which the common law rule is applied, its
application is delayed until the power is actually exercised-assuming the special or general testa-
mentary power cannot be exercised beyond the period of the rule. The exercise of a power is judged
hy the actual appointment and not by what that appointment might have been at the time the power
was created. The explanation for this deviation derives from the utility of powers. These powers do
tie up property, at least until they are exercised. This dispositive device is apparently deemed impor-
tant and useful enough to warrant such delay. If this delay is necessary to the functioning of powers,
and if such restrictions on alienability are otherwise tolerated, sufficient reason exists for delaying
application of the rule against perpetulies. Indeed, any other approach might severely undercut
the flexibility and efficacy of these powers. Further, because the rule allows for delayed application
until the actual appointment is made and until the interests created then can be judged, a "second
look" at facts and possibilities is also allowed. The explanation for this seems to be one of common
sense Once the rule allows a delay to see what appointment is made, and once a determination of
salidity (perhaps through litigation) necessarily is deferred until then, it would be foolish to disre-
gard facts and possibilities known at that later time. For a discussion of the principles which allow
one to delay until the appointment is made and then take a "second look" at facts and possibilities,
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begins when the donor creates the power, in applying the rule one can
delay until the power is exercised and can therefore account for all events
and facts that materialize between the time of creation and exercise.' 70
B. The Methodology Stated and Explained
The following methodology presents a series of questions which are
developed in a several step analysis. Once again, the basic purpose of
these questions is to isolate potential validating lives in being and to sub-
ject them to the critical test: Must the contingent interest under consid-
eration vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of the death of such
person?171 In selecting and testing these lives in being, once one is able to
make a proof-once one establishes that vesting cannot occur beyond
twenty-one years of such person's death-the interest is valid and the
process ends without proceeding to subsequent questions. To establish a
violation of the common law rule, however, one must proceed through
all of the questions and steps of the methodology. Only then will one
know that there is no validating life to be found and that vesting can
occur beyond the allowed time period.'72
1. The Methodology Stated
a. The Basic Methodology
Step One-Determination of When the Period of the Common Law
Rule Begins
When does the period of the rule commence-from what point in
time is the subject matter of the interest "tied up"?'73
see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.34-.35 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMEs & A. SMITH,
supra note 22, §§ 1274-75. For an illustration of how this "second look" is applied, see infra illus-
tration IV A-8.
170. For further discussion and elaboration of the proposed methodology in regard to powers of
appointment, see infra notes 197-219 and accompanying text. For an illustration of the methodol-
ogy as applied to a special power of appointment, see infra illustration IV A-8.
171. See infra Steps Three A, Three B, Three C, and Three D, text accompanying notes 175-95.
172. To find a violation of the common law rule, one must, of course, determine that no validat-
ing life exists. This is accomplished with the use of Steps Three A, Three B, Three C, and Three D.
Each of these steps isolates testing lives in being and applies thecritical test to them. Nevertheless,
the failure to discover a validating life in being does not necessarily mean that the interest violates
the rule. One must proceed through the entire methodology, including Step Four which applies the
critical test without any life in being: Must the interest vest, if at all, within twertty-one years of the
time the period of the rule begins? See infra Step Four, text accompanying note 196,
173. See supra notes 162-65, 167-68 and accompanying text.
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Step Two-Determination of Which Interests are Contingent.
Which interests are contingent under the common law rule against
perpetuities? And what conditions, express or implied, make them
contingent? 74
Step Three-Selection of Testing Lives In Being and the Application
of the Critical Test to Determine Whether a Validating Life In Being
Exists
A. Looking to the taker or group of takers of the interest in ques-
tion, in light of facts known when the period of the rule commences, is
such individual or group restricted to lives in being and to lives already
ended when the period of the rule begins because of descriptive language,
because of applicable rules of construction, or because they are not phys-
ically capable of expansion or reconstitution to include those that are
afterborn? 17
5
If the answer is NO, then proceed to the next group of potential
testing lives in being contained in Step Three B.
If, however, the answer is YES, then use such taker or takers to test
after eliminating those who have predeceased the point in time when the
period of the rule begins.' 76 Looking at all possibilities for vesting in
light of facts known when the period of the rule begins and in light of
applicable rules of construction and principles of law,' 7 7 including those
possibilities that are most remote, must the interest vest, if at all, within
twenty-one years of the death of one of these testing lives in being?' 78
If the answer is YES, then such testing life becomes a validating life
in being; therefore, the interest is VALID-it satisfies the common law
rule against perpetuities-and one need go no further with the process.
If, however, the answer is NO, if the interest can vest beyond
174. For further discussion and explanation of Step Two, see infra notes 238-50 and accompany-
ing text
175. For further discussion and explanation of Step Three A, see infra notes 251-60 and accom-
panying text.
176 For further discussion and elaboration, see infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
177 For further discussion and elaboration, see infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text. For
an illustration of why and how one accounts for relevant rules of construction and principles of law
in applying the critical test, see infra illustration IV B-3.
178 For further discussion and explanation of the critical test, see infra notes 269-82 and ac-
companying text,
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twenty-one years of the deaths of each of these testing lives in being,
then proceed to the next group contained in Step Three B.
B. Looking to each of the other individual takers or groups of tak-
ers within the same provision, in light of facts known when the period of
the rule commences, is such individual or group restricted to lives in
being and to lives already ended when the period of the rule begins be-
cause of descriptive language, because of applicable rules of construc-
tion, or because they are not physically capable of expansion or
reconstitution to include those that are afterborn? t79
If the answer is NO for each of these other takers or groups of
takers, then proceed to the next group of potential testing lives in being
contained in Step Three C.
If, however, the answer is YES for any other individual taker or
group of takers, then use such other taker or takers to test after eliminat-
ing18° those who have predeceased the point in time when the period of
the rule begins.18' Looking at all possibilities for vesting in light of facts
179. For further discussion and explanation of Step Three B, see infra notes 261-66 and accom-
panying text. See also supra note 175.
180. One sometimes might wish to eliminate other takers as testing lives even though they are
clearly restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended. As the methodology indicates, one
does not actually test with lives already ended when the period of the rule commences. See supra
note 176. Additionally, one might eliminate an other taker or takers when such person or persons
are also takers of the interest in question and have previously been tested and failed to validate. This
should not be done, however, when the definition of the other taker is different from the taker of the
interest in question even though their identity might be the same. Consider, for example, this testa-
mentary trust created by A: "Income to B and C for their joint lives, and then income to the
survivor of them for life; thereafter, if a Democrat is then President of the United States, principal to
B absolutely, and if a Republican is then President of the United States, principal to C absolutely."
B and C qualify as testing lives under Step Three A; nevertheless, in testing them individually, one
cannot make a valid proof. One cannot say that B's alternative contingent remainder must vest, ifat
all, within twenty-one years of B's death, nor can one say that C's alternative contingent remainder
must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of C's death. B and C also qualify as other takers with
respect to the joint life estate, and because they are defined in the same way as they are described as
takers of the interest in question, one can dismiss them for purposes of further testing. Nevertheless,
there is an additional other taker that cannot be dismissed; namely "the survivor of them.' The
"survivor of them" will be either B or C, and he is also a potential taker of the interest in question.
Both description and definition of this other taker differ from that of the taker of the interest in
question. Accordingly, given the fact that the survivor is restricted to a life in being, one must apply
the critical test to him. Although neither B nor C, as such, affords a valid proof, one can say for the
"survivor of them" that the interests in question must vest, if at all, at his death. This discussion
may appear overly complicated to some who use this methodology. The solution for them is a
simple one: when in doubt, do not dismiss an other taker, but instead apply the critical test to him.
181. See supra note 176.
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known when the period of the rule begins and in light of applicable rules
of construction and principles of law,"8 2 including those possibilities that
are most remote, must the interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years
of the death of one of these testing lives in being?' 83
If the answer is YES, then such testing life becomes a validating life
in being; therefore, the interest is VALID-it satisfies the common law
rule against perpetuities--and one need go no further with the process.
If, however, the answer is NO, if the interest can vest beyond
twenty-one years of the deaths of each of these testing lives in being,
then proceed to the next group contained in Step Three C.
C. Looking to specific people or groups of people otherwise men-
tioned or separately and differently mentioned within the same provision
or elsewhere in other provisions directly related," 4 in light of facts
known when the period of the rule commences, is such individual or
group restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended when the
period of the rule begins because of descriptive language, because of ap-
plicable rules of construction, or because they are not physically capable
of expansion or reconstitution to include those that are afterborn? 85
If the answer is NO for each of these other individual people or
groups of people, then proceed to the next group of potential testing lives
in being contained in Step Three D.
If, however, the answer is YES for any such mentioned person or
groups of people, then use such person or group to test after eliminat-
ing' " those who have predeceased the point in time when the period of
the rule begins." 7 Looking at all possibilities for vesting in light of facts
182. See supra note 177.
183 See supra note 178.
184 For further discussion and explanation of Step Three C, see infra notes 282-98 and accom-
panying text. For specific discussion of the phrase "provisions directly related," see infra notes 295-
98 and accompanying text.
15 For further discussion concerning the determination of whether such individual or group is
rc,tricted to lives in being and to lives already ended, see supra note 175.
18n The problem ofavoiding duplicative testing and eliminating lives that already qualify under
Steps Three A or Three B, see supra note 180. should not arise under Step Three C. Someone who is
,,Ircady a taker of the interest in question or an other taker will not qualify as a testing life under Step
Three C unless he is "'separately and differently mentioned." See hifra notes 282-98 and accompany-
ing te\t Accordingly, only those lives already ended should be dismissed. As a general rule. how-
csCr, when in doubt, one should apply the critical test, even when it seems to repeat the process
unnecessarily.
1,87 For further discussion, see Nupra note 176.
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known when the period of the rule begins and in light of applicable rules
of construction and principles of law, 8' including those possibilities that
are most remote, must the interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years
of the death of one of these testing lives in being?"8 9
If the answer is YES, then such testing life becomes a validating life
in being; therefore, the interest is VALID-it satisfies the common law
rule against perpetuities-and one need go no further with the process.
If, however, the answer is NO, if the interest can vest beyond
twenty-one years of the deaths of each of these testing lives in being,
then proceed to the next group contained in Step Three D.
D. Once again, looking to the taker or group of takers of the interest
in question, if one has previously answered in Step Three A, YES, that
such individual or group is restricted to lives in being and to lives already
ended when the period of the rule begins, and after testing with these
lives in being one has also answered NO, that there is no testing life in
being within this group about whom one can say such interest must vest,
if at all, within twenty-one years of his death, then proceed to Step
Four. 190
If, however, one has previously answered in Step Three A, NO, that
such individual taker or group of takers is not restricted to lives in being
and to lives already ended when the period of the rule begins, then pro-
ceed to the next question within this step.
In light of facts known when the period of the rule commences, do
the parents that provide the relationship necessary to satisfy the descrip-
tion of such taker or group of takers consist exclusively of lives in being
and lives already ended when the period of the rule begins because they
are not physically capable of expansion or reconstitution to include those
that are afterborn?' 91
188. For further discussion, see supra note 177.
189. For further discussion, see supra note 178.
190. There is good reason why the parents of the takers of the interest in question should be
bypassed in this situation. If the takers themselves are restricted to lives in being, they will fail to
validate only when the condition that renders their interest contingent is unrelated to their lifetimes
or is specifically performable more than twenty-one years after their deaths. If their lives do not
validate, neither will their parents' lives unless the condition itself is specifically connected to the
lives of the parents. Even if the parents' lives are tied to the fulfillment of the condition, there is no
need to apply the critical test to them under Step Three D because the connection already qualifies
them for testing under either Step Three B or Step Three C.
191. For further discussion, see infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text. There is no need to
carry the process further and search for validating lives among ancestors more remote than parents,
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If the answer is NO for any of these parents, then proceed to Step
Four.
If, however, the answer is YES for these parents, then proceed to
the next question within this step.
Do such parents fully coincide with testing lives in being previously
tested under either Step Three B or Step Three C?192
If the answer is YES for these parents, then proceed to Step Four.
If, however, the answer is NO, then use these parents to test after
eliminating those who have predeceased the point in time when the pe-
riod of the rule begins.' 93 Looking at all possibilities for vesting in light
of facts known when the period of the rule begins and in light of applica-
ble rules of construction and principles of law,19 4 including those pos-
sibilities that are most remote, must the interest vest, if at all, within
twenty-one years of the death of one of these testing lives in being? 95
If parents of the takers in interest fail to validate, then so will grandparents or great grandparents
unless they are connected to the fulfillment of the condition. And if their lives are tied to the condi-
tion, they already will have qualified for testing under Steps Three B or Three C.
Professor Dukeminier, in his most recent explanation of the common law rule, sets out the various
groups of people who are most likely to "affect vesting." Among them is: "Any person who can
affect the identity of the beneficiary or beneficiaries...." His illustration uses parents of such benefi-
ciaries. presumably, however, this group could also include grandparents, great grandparents, etc.
Sce Dukeminier, supra note 130, at 1875. Conceivably, Dukeminier might exclude these more re-
mote ancestors on the basis of an additional principle: redundancy. Id. at 1874-75. Yet it is not
clear His example of redundancy uses a parental spouse. "You cannot prove anything by them that
you cannot prove by (the parent) " Id. at 1874. This would be true for all ancestors beyond parents
unless the condition is somehow specifically tied to their lifetimes. In such a case, Dukeminier
would include them under another group: "Any person who can affect any condition precedent
attached to the gift, or, in case of a class gift, any person who can affect a condition precedent
attached to the interest of any class member." Id. at 1875. The implication, then, is that "the person
who can affect the identity of the beneficiary or beneficiaries" is limited to the parent who satisfies
the necessary relationship. Nevertheless, Dukeminier does not specifically limit this group to such
parcnts accordingly, one might assume that they include others as well-namely, more remote
ancestors,
192. For further discussion, see infra notes 299-312 and accompanying text. Unlike Step Three
B, see supra note 180, the text of the methodology makes explicit a separate set of questions that
attempts to avoid repetitious and fruitless application of the critical test. The methodology incorpo-
rates this substep because of the great likelihood that the parents of the taker or takers of a gift of
principal have been previously considered as other takers, under Step Three B, or as people other-
wise mentioned or separately and differently mentioned, under Step Three C. Nevertheless, if a
determination of congruency with hes previously tested under Step Three B or Step Three C be-
comes confusing, one can omit this substep and apply the critical test to such parents. Just as before.
when in doubt, apply the critical test.
193. For further discussion, see 5upra note 176.
194. For further discussion, see upra note 177.
195. For further discussion, see vipra note 178.
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If the answer is YES, then such testing life becomes a validating life
in being; therefore, the interest is VALID-it satisfies the common law
rule against perpetuities-and one need go no further with the process.
If, however, the answer is NO, if the interest can vest beyond
twenty-one years of the deaths of each of these testing lives in being,
then proceed to Step Four.
Step Four-Application of the Critical Test with the Period of Years
Only
Looking to the interest in question and at all possibilities for vesting
in light of facts known when the period of the rule begins and in light of
applicable rules of construction and principles of law, including those
possibilities that are most remote, must that interest vest, if at all, within
twenty-one years of the time when the period of the rule commences?' 96
If the answer is YES, then the interest is VALID-it satisfies the
common law rule against perpetuities-and one need go no further with
the process.
If, however, the answer is NO, if it can vest beyond twenty-one
years of the time the period of the rule commbnces, then the interest
violates the common law rule against perpetuities and it is invalid.
Once again, there is no violation of the common law rule against
perpetuities when one reaches a conclusion that the interest is VALID
under either Step Three A, Step Three B, Step Three C, Step Three D,
or Step Four. To find a violation, however, one must proceed through all
of the foregoing steps without reaching a conclusion that the interest is
valid under any one of them.
b. Multiple Conditions
Before offering some further elaboration and explanation of the forego-
ing steps and the questions within them, it should be observed that this
methodology requires several addenda to deal with special situations and
the problems they present. To begin with, there is the matter of multiple
conditions.'97 Multiple conditions do not arise very often, and when
196. For further discussion, see infra notes 317-26 and accompanying text.
197. For further elaboration and explanation of substitute Step Two concerning multiple condi-
tions, see supra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
Beyond this addendum involving multiple conditions, there are addenda that concern powers of
appointment, including discretionary powers given to trustees. See infra notes 198-219 and accom-
panying text. For an addendum that addresses the situation in which the transferor has merely an
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they do, frequently one can consolidate the testing of these conditions
because one condition subsumes all others. As a result, most students
have little difficulty with the situations in which multiple conditions
arise. Somehow, they are able to make whatever adjustments are needed
to apply the common law rule correctly. Nevertheless, there are those
who will have a difficult time of it; consequently, this addendum on mul-
tiple conditions is included. When used, it should be substituted for Step
Two. Finally, because this substitute Step Two introduces greater com-
plexity in the application of the methodology, all elaboration, explana-
interest of limited duration, see infra notes 220-23, 227-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of contingent gifts to charitable institutions, see in fra note 239. For further discussion of multiple
conditions that are expressly split in the alternative, see infra note 250. For a discussion of gifts to
subclasses or gifts to classes on a per capita basis, see infra note 244.
Another situation that warrants brief but separate attention concerns options to purchase. Gener-
ally options which give the optionee a right to specific performance create in the optionee a contin-
gent equitable interest that is subject to the common law-rule against perpetuities. Consequently, the
rule then would apply to option contracts involving land or unique personal property. If so, the
option is, invalid unless it must be exercised, if at all, within the period of the rule. Whenever and
wherever an option must satisfy the common law rule, the process for applying the methodology
requires an obvious and simple adjustment. The optionor who creates the option must be treated the
same as any other transferor: in particular, the optionor cannot become a testing life in being unless
hc independently qualifies under one of the steps of Step Three. If the optionor is also the optionee
(as may be the case with a transfer accompanied in the same instrument by a right to repurchase),
then the option may constitute a right of re-entry and, therefore, escape application of the rule
altogether. Additionally, the optionee who receives the right to exercise the option must be viewed
a, a taker of the interest in question, and one then must examine whether either the optionee or his
parents qualify as a testing life in being under Steps Three A and Three D. Finally, because option-
ors frequently give options to corporate entities, there are circumstances in which the optionee can-
not possibly serve as a testing life in being under Step Three A. See infra note 251.
Despite the foregoing discussion, it is not entirely clear whether and when options, or the variant
preemptive options, are subject to the common law rule against perpetuities. Because of the impact
options have upon the alienability and improvement of land, two bodies of law would seem to gov-
ern: perpetuities and direct restraints upon alienation. Most courts and commentators conclude
that options given to lessees for the term of their respective leases ought not to be subject to either
the rule against perpetuities or the rule that forbids direct restraints upon alienation. Others ques-
tion any application of the rule against perpetuities to commercial transactions of this nature. In
principle, the period allowed by the common law rule is too long, while in application they observe
thai these options are always intended to expire within a reasonable time, something less than
isvnty-one years. Many also believe that preemptive options should be subject to the rule which
forbids unreasonable restraints against alienation, but that these options should be free of the rule
against perpetuities. The real perpetuities issue respecting these options, then, is not how the com-
mon law rule should be applied, but whether and when it should be applied. For a full discussion of
these problems, see 6 Amt-RicSN L %w OF PROPERTY §§ 24.56-.57, 26.64-.67 (A. Casner ed. 1952):
Risi \Ii S I N (SLCOND) Oi PROPRTN (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) ch. 4, at 210-28 (1983): L. SiMEs
& A Sxi iit, vupra note 22, §§ 1154. 1243-45: Dukeminier, supra note 130, at 1908-09.
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tion and illustration of the methodology that appears hereafter will
reflect inclusion of this substitute.
Step Two-Determination and Assessment of Contingent Interests
A. Which interests are contingent under the common law rule
against perpetuities? And what conditions, express or implied, make
them contingent?
B. Is the contingent interest in question subject to multiple condi-
tions which are express or implied?
If the answer is NO, then proceed directly to Step Three and, if
necessary, Step Four to determine whether a valid proof can be made.
If, however, the answer is YES, then proceed to Step Two C.
C. Do the multiple conditions appear cumulatively; that is, does
the language impliedly or expressly require satisfaction of each of the
multiple conditions before the interest in question vests?
If the answer is NO because the multiple conditions appear alterna-
tively, so that the interest can vest if any one of the group of alternative
conditions is satisfied, then proceed to Step Two D.
If, however, the answer is YES, then proceed to Step Two C (1).
Finally, if there are conditions appearing alternatively and there are also
other conditions appearing cumulatively, then one must make a determi-
nation of validity or invalidity for the alternative conditions by proceed-
ing with Step Two D. And one must make a determination of validity or
invalidity for the cumulative conditions by proceeding with Step Two C
(1).
(1). Among the multiple cumulative conditions, is there a con-
dition that completely subsumes one or more of the other conditions, so
that such subsuming condition cannot be satisfied without also satisfying
the requirements of the subsumed condition or conditions as well?
If the answer is NO, then proceed to Step Two C (2).
If, however, the answer is YES, then also proceed to Step Two C
(2). Nevertheless, in doing so, one should test the subsuming condition
along with other conditions required by Step Two C (2), recognizing that
the subsuming condition cannot be validated under Step Three and, if
necessary, Step Four without prior or simultaneous validation of the sub-
sumed condition. Finally, if the subsuming condition subsumes each of
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the other multiple conditions, then proceed directly to Step Three and, if
necessary, Step Four to determine whether a valid proof can be made
with the subsuming condition.
(2). Looking to each of the cumulative conditions, does the
same act or event satisfy the requirements of two or more of the cumula-
tive conditions?
If the answer is NO, then proceed directly to Step Three and, if
necessary, Step Four to determine whether a valid proof can be made. In
doing so, one should evaluate and test each of the cumulative conditions
separately, recognizing that the interest in question is valid only if a
valid proof can be made with all of the cumulative conditions.
If, however, the answer is YES, then proceed directly to Step Three
and, if necessary, Step Four to determine whether a valid proof can be
made. In doing so, one should evaluate and test each of the cumulative
conditions separately, recognizing that the interest in question is valid
only if a valid proof can be made with any one of the multiple cumulative
conditions predicated upon the same event and all of the cumulative con-
ditions predicated upon different events.
D. Having concluded under Step Two C that there are multiple
conditions that appear in the alternative, one must now examine and
evaluate these conditions. In doing so, first dismiss those implied condi-
tions that are implied derivatives of the express condition to which they
are joined in the alternative. If elimination of these implied derivatives
leaves one with a single express condition and not multiple conditions,
then proceed directly to Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four to deter-
mine whether a valid proof can be made with respect to such condition.
If, however, one is left with multiple conditions, then also proceed di-
rectly to Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four to determine whether a
valid proof can be made with the remaining express conditions that sepa-
rately appear in the alternative. In doing so, one should evaluate and
test each of these express alternative conditions separately just the same
as if multiple gifts had been made upon each of these separately ex-
pressed alternative conditions; accordingly, the interest in question will
be enforced for each express alternative condition for which a separate
and valid proof can be made.
c. General Testamentary and Special Powers of Appointment
Beyond the matter of multiple conditions, this methodology requires
1989] 1009
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an addendum to deal with special problems presented by general testa-
mentary and special powers of appointment. As indicated previously,
the period of the rule begins from the time these powers are created. 98
The common law rule against perpetuities allows a delay to determine
how the power is exercised only if there is no possibility for exercise be-
yond the period of the rule. If this possibility for remote exercise does
not exist, then application of the rule awaits exercise of the power.1 99
198. See supra note 168. One always must observe carefully when the period of the common law
rule against perpetuities begins. This is especially important when it comes to general testamentary
and special powers of appointment: the period commences when the power was created. This, how-
ever, does not always coincide with the effective date of the instrument that creates the particular
power under consideration. If such power has been created by the exercise of another general testa-
mentary or special power, then the period of the rule begins at the time of creation of the original
power. Consequently, in applying the methodology contained in this addendum for powers of ap-
pointment, one must remember that any power, or an appointment pursuant to it, that is created by
exercise of a previous power must be evaluated upon the same basis as were the original power and
original appointment themselves. In particular, this means that the period of the rule commences at
the time the original power was created. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.32 (A. Casner
ed. 1952).
199. Special powers of appointment and general testamentary powers are sometimes invalid
from the time of their creation. The common law rule against perpetuities forbids all appointments
by these powers when they are exercisable beyond the allowed time period. If there is any possibility
for exercise of the power beyond a life in being plus twenty-one years measured from the time the
power is created, the power is immediately invalid even though its exercise is actually attempted
within the allowed time, and even though the interests appointed vest immediately. If, however, this
possibility for remote appointment does not exist, the common law rule allows its application to be
deferred until after the power is actually exercised.
For example, consider this testamentary trust: "Income to B for life, and then income to B's
oldest living child for life; thereafter, principal to whomever such oldest child appoints by will and in
default of the exercise of such power, the principal shall then pass to C absolutely." Assume that B
is childless at the estate owner's death-the time when the trust and power are created. Regardless
of what happens thereafter, this general testamentary power of appointment is invalid. B may have
an afterborn child, and it is possible that all lives in being at the estate owner's death, including B,
may then die. Such afterborn child may die more than twenty-one years later. Accordingly, exer-
cise of this general testamentary power of appointment by such afterborn child might occur beyond
the period allowed by the rule. Therefore, because of this possibility of remote exercise, the power
itself is invalid. If, however, such oldest child had been given a general power of appointment pres-
ently exercisable by deed or will, it would have been valid. The rule does not require that this
general power must, if at all, be exercised within such period; the rule only requires that it must
unconditionally be capable of exercise within the time allowed by the rule. Given this variation, B's
oldest child will have an exercisable general power of appointment by deed or will no later than the
age in which the law allows a person to act in such capacity. Because this cannot occur more than
twenty-one years after the death of B, this general power of appointment does not violate the rule.
and all interests created by its exercise will be determined under the rule measured from the time
such child actually exercises the power. For discussion of the common law rule against perpetuities
as it applies to powers of appointment quite separately from the interests created by their exercise.
see 6 AMF:RICAN LAW O1 PROPE'RTY §§ 24.31-.32 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. Sttls & A. Sstit.
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And then the rule is applied to contingent interests created under the
power, with possibilities for remote vesting determined in light of facts
known at the time the power is exercised, not at the time it was created
and the time when the period of the rule began.2 °°
With this procedure in mind, several changes in the process must be
made, beginning with the selection of testing lives in being. Most impor-
tant, in applying Step Three to a determination of the validity of the
power itself, one must view the donee of the power as the "taker of the
interest" under Step Three A.211 Consequently, Step Three A will cover
testing lives in being to be found among donees of the power of appoint-
ment. Steps Three B and C will cover testing lives in being to be found
elsewhere, including the objects of the power, the substitute takers in
default of its exercise, and the takers of other interests within the same
provision. Step Three D will cover testing lives in being to be found
among the donee's parents.2°2
upra note 22, §§ 1272-73. For further illustrations of the application of these perpetuities principles
to powers of appointments, see infra illustrations IV A-8, IV A-10.
200, Sec supra notes 169-70.
201. The powers under consideration in the text are not the only kinds of powers that might
raise perpetuities questions. Most important are the discretionary powers given to trustees. Gener-
ally, courts will uphold the power or find that the common law rule has no application if the power is
purely administrative, such as a power to sell and reinvest. If, however, the power enables a trustee
to alter beneficial interests-for example, if it gives a trustee discretion to allocate income among
beneficiaries-then such power is subject to the rule. In applying the rule, courts will treat such
power the same a- a special power of appointment. Accordingly, when confronted with a discretion-
ary power to shift income or principal, one should view the trustee as the donee of the power and,
therefore, as the "'taker of the interest" in question; thereafter one should continue to apply the
methodology just the same as it is used to determine the validity of all other special powers.
Although courts construe these powers to uphold them wherever possible and some courts maintain
that discretionary powers over income constitute a series of annual powers that should be upheld for
the period of time allowed by the rule, the safer approach still seems to be for a practitioner to rest
hi-s perpetuities determination upon the same criteria needed to uphold a special power of appoint-
ment For a discussion of the common law rule and its application to powers given to trustees, see 6
AMLRICAN Lxw OF PROPERTY §§ 24.32, 24.63 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra
note 22, § 1277.
202. For example, suppose A disposes of the residue of his estate with a testamentary trust that
provides: "'Income to B's eldest child for life, thereafter, principal to such eldest child's children as
he or she appoints by will, however, if such child fails to exercise this testamentary power, then to C
absolutely." Assume that B survives A but that he has not had any children by the time of A's
death In assessing the validity of the power, under Step Three A, one examines the donee of the
powcr-B'. eldest child. If B had had a child alive at A's death, such child would have qualified as a
testing life under Step Three A Furthermore, one then could have made a valid proof with such
child The power would hase been exercised, if at all, at the death of such child, one who was in
being at A's death. Nevertheless. B had no children whatsoever at A's death, and unless the gift is to
fail altogether, such donee necessarily will be one who was not in being. Under Step Three B, C
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However, the application of Step Three changes somewhat once the
process reaches the stage of testing the validity of interests created by
exercise of a valid power. Therein, as expected, one views the objects of
the power-those for whom interests have been created-as the takers of
the interest in question. Consequently, Step Three A covers this group,
Steps Three B and C cover testing lives in being to be found elsewhere,
including the donee, the substitute takers in default, and the takers of
other interests within the same provision, and Step Three D covers the
parents of the takers of the interests created by exercise of the power.
Beyond these changes, some additional adjustments must be made. To
establish the validity of the power itself, observe carefully under Step
Two A the conditions attached to the exercise of such power. Invariably,
there is no condition beyond the exercise of the power itself. And if there
are other conditions, such as the implied requirement of birth, these con-
ditions almost always are subsumed by the exercise of the power itself.
Consequently, pursuant to Step Two C (1), one can continue the process
with a consideration of the subsuming condition. Next, after affirming
that the period of the rule begins when the power is created, proceed to
Step Three and then to Step Four if necessary. It should be emphasized
that in asking the question whether the proposed testing lives are re-
stricted to lives in being under Steps Three A, Three B, Three C, and
Three D, one must answer the question in light of only those facts that
are known when the power is created'and the period of the rule begins.201
qualifies as an other taker. Nevertheless, in applying the critical test, one cannot make a valid proof.
(For a full statement of such test, see infra note 204.) Such eldest child may be born and exercise the
power at his death more than twenty-one years beyond the death of C. The objects of the power, the
eldest child's children, should be considered under Step Three C because, technically, they have no
interest before exercise of the power. Yet nothing is lost by giving them prior consideration under
Step Three B. Under either step, the eldest child's children will not qualify as testing lives. Because
their parent has not been born by the time of A's death, necessarily they cannot be lives ii being.
However, under Step Three C, B will qualify as a testing life who is otherwise mentioned in the
provision. Nevertheless, in applying the critical test to B, one concludes that B's life will not validate
the power. (For a full statement of such test, see infra note 204.) B may have a child who then
might exercise the power at his death more than twenty-one years beyond the death of B. Under
Step Three D, one considers the parent of the donee of the power; this would be B. However, B has
already been tested and, therefore, he must be dismissed from further consideration. Finally, one
arrives at the critical test to be applied under Step Four. (For a full statement of such test, see itfra
note 204.) Because B may have a child who then might exercise the power at his death more than
twenty-one years after the death of A, one cannot make a valid proof under Step Four. Conse-
quently, after having exhmined the power under Step Three and Step Four, one must conclude that
the power itself violates the common law rule against perpetuities.
203. This requirement should be apparent. In theory, the exercise itself of a general testamen-
tary or special power of appointment is viewed the same as the vesting of a contingent remainder or
[Vol. 67:949
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In addition to this important cautionary reminder, one must amend the
critical test whenever the process calls for its application under Step
Three or Step Four. It should read:
Looking at all possibilities for exercise of the power in light of facts
known when the period of the rule begins and in light of applicable rules
of construction and principles of law, including those possibilities for ex-
ercise that are most remote, must the power be exercised, if at all, within
twenty-one years of the death of one of these testing lives in being (or
within twenty-one years of the time the period of the rule commences at
the creation of the power)?2 4
If one cannot establish that the power is valid under any of these steps,
then the power violates the common law rule without regard to its exer-
cise. If, however, one can establish that it is valid under any of these
steps, then return to Step Two to examine which interests created by the
power are contingent after its exercise205 and to Steps Three and Four to
contingent executory interest. Under the common law rule against perpetuities, one must prove that
contingent remainders and contingent executory interests cannot vest beyond the allowed time pe-
riod in light of possibilities calculated on the basis of facts known when the period of the rule begins.
Logically, the same must be true for any validation of a general testamentary or special power of
appointment. See R. LYNN, supra note 30, at 123-25; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1273;
Leach, supra note 11. at 652.
204. Using a previous illustration (see supra note 202), one should elaborate the full statement of
the critical test in relation to C under Step Three B as follows: Looking at all of the possibilities for
exercisc of the power in light of facts known when the period of the rule begins and in light of
applicable rules of construction and principles of law, including those possibilities for exercise that
arc most remote, must the power be exercised, if at all, within twenty-one years of the death of C?
Under Step Three C, one should apply the critical test by substituting B in place of C in the forego-
ing statement. Finally, under Step Four, one should elaborate the full statement of the critical test as
follow , Looking at all of the possibilities for exercise of the power in light of facts known when the
period of the rule begins and in light of applicable rules of construction and principles of law, includ-
ing those possibilities for exercise that are most remote, must the power be exercised, if at all, within
twenty-one years of the time the power is created at A's death?
205 Consider this testamentary trust created by A regarding the residue of his estate: "Income
to B for life, thereafter, to B's children upon such conditions and in such proportions as he may
appoint by will; however, if B fails to exercise this testamentary power, then to C absolutely." At
A's death, assume that B has two children. B-I and B-2, and that these children are both under the
age of ten. At B's subsequent death, assume further that B exercises his power on behalf of "his
children who attain age thirty " Also assume that, before his death, B has another child, B-3.
Finally, assume that B's only children. B-I, B-2, and B-3, have all attained age thirty by the time of
his death. First, the power itself satisfies the rule against perpetuities because a valid proof can be
made with B under Step Three A Second, looking then to the interests created by B's exercise of the
power, without more, it appears that B has created contingent interests because of the age require-
ment. Nevertheless, the common law rule permits one to account for facts known when the power is
exercised. At B's death, all of his children have already attained age thirty; thus, there is no condi-
tion to be fulfilled after the exercise of the power and after the time these interests are actually
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determine their validity under the rule. In this application, the operation
of most steps remains the same. Nevertheless, because the common law
rule allows for a "second look" at facts and possibilities as of the time the
power is exercised, 20 6 two important changes must be noted.
First, one must amend slightly the process for ascertaining testing lives
in being. In asking the question whether the proposed testing lives are
restricted to lives in being under Steps Three A, Three B, Three C, and
Three D, one must answer in light of facts that are known when the
power is exercised.2 °7 For example, under Step Three A, one would ask:
Looking to the taker or group of takers of the interest in question,
in light of facts known when the power is exercised, is such individual or
group restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended when the
period of the rule begins at the creation of the power because of descrip-
tive language, because of applicable rules of construction, or because
they are not physically capable of expansion or reconstitution to include
those that are afterborn?
Second, to reflect further the opportunity for a "second look," one
created in B's children. Accordingly, these interests which B creates by exercise of the power should
be treated as if they were vested and, thus, they satisfy the rule.
206. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
207. This opportunity for a "second look" at facts known about potential testing lives when the
power is exercised can make a significant difference. Consider a previous illustration. See supra note
205. Assume, however, that B dies shortly after the time of A's death, that his two children, B-I
and B-2-alive at A's death-also survive him, and that both of these children are under age five
when he dies. Assume that all other facts remain the same, especially those involving his exercise of
the power of appointment. If the search for testing lives were conducted on the basis of facts known
when the power is created at A's death, one would have to conclude that B's children could not
qualify under Step Three A. Nothing in the terms of the power restricts the appointees to those alive
at A's death, nor is there a principle of law which does so. Additionally, because B is alive at A's
death, the objects of the power are not restricted to lives in being because of physical impossibility.
The common law rule against perpetuities, however, allows a "second look" at the time B actually
exercises the power at his death. And with this "second look," one discovers that the appointees, B's
children, do qualify as testing lives and that they do afford a valid proof. Under Step Three A, the
takers of the interest in question are B's children. B exercises the power at the time of his death,
after which he can have no more children. One knows at that time the identity of all potential
members of the class because one knows the identity of all the children he will ever have. B-I and
B-2 are B's only children and they constitute the only potential class members. One knows their
identity at B's death; accordingly, one also knows that the class will now consist of only those alive
at A's death. Indeed, its membership is now restricted to lives in being at A's death because of
physical impossibility even though one could not have reached this same conclusion if tile determi-
nation had to be made in light of facts known at A's death. Applying the critical test to these testing
lives, B's children, one can conclude that their interest must vest, if at all, within their respective
lives. Neither B-1 nor B-2 can attain age thirty beyond their deaths. Accordingly, no one can join
the class beyond the death of a life in being at A's death.
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must amend the critical test whenever the process calls for its application
under Step Three or Step Four.2" 8 It should read:
Looking at all possibilities for vesting in light of facts known when
the power is exercised and in light of applicable rules of construction and
principles of law, including those possibilities that are most remote, must
the interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of the death of one of
these testing lives in being (or within twenty-one years of the time the
period of the rule commences at the creation of the power)?20 9
d. Presently Exercisable General Powers of Appointment
This methodology also requires an addendum to deal with the special
problems presented by general powers of appointment that are presently
exercisable both during the donee's lifetime and at the donee's death.
Once again, there are two parts to the application of the common law
rule: Is the power itself valid, and if so, do the interests created by its
208 This discussion focuses upon interests created through a valid general testamentary or spe-
cial power of appointment. Yet what about the gift in default? Generally, the gift in default of the
cxercise of a power of appointment is not viewed as contingent simply because it is dependent upon
the donee's failure to make an appointment. It becomes contingent only if it is subject to an addi-
tional condition, one beyond a default in the exercise of the power itself. For example, consider this
restamentary trust created by A: "Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of B's descend-
ants as B may appoint by will, in default of B's appointment, then to such of B's children who attain
age thirty." Assume that B survives A and is childless at such time. Further assume that B thereaf-
ter die% without exercising his power of appointment and that he is survived by two children, B-i
and B-2, ages eleven and ten. respectively. Clearly, the interest created by A in default of the
appointment is contingent; namely, it is conditioned upon B's children being born and upon attain-
ment of age thirty. If the common law rule against perpetuities did not offer a "second look," as it
would sith any' appointment made by A. and treated the gift in default the same as any other
Lntingent interest, then the contingent interest created in B's children would violate the rule.
Although B' children cannot be conceived beyond B's death, looking at al! possibilities in light of
facts known at A's death, one cannot say that B's children must, if it all, attain age thirty and join
ihc class within twenty-one years of B's death or within twenty-one years of anyone else's death.
This issue has not been the subject of much litigation, but some have said that this is the view that
should he preferred. See, e.g., L SIMiis & A SMITH, supra note 22, § 1276. With this approach, a
contingent gift in default should be treated the same as any other contingent interest under this
methodology. Some commentators, however. maintain that the gift in default should be accorded a
"ccond look" just the same as the appointment itself. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 130, at
1903 The principle to be applied is a simple one: if the power itself is valid, then the validity of the
gift in default should be determined just the same as if the power had been exercised at the time it
expired on the exact same terms as the gift in default. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.36
CA Casner ed. 1952). With this in mind, one would then apply the steps of this methodology to the
gift in default exactly the same as one would apply it to interests created by exercise of the power.
Accordingly. one could then make a valid proof under Step Three B: both B-I and B-2 must join
the lass, if at all, within twenty-one years of B's death.
2(09 Sc, supra note 204.
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exercise violate the rule?2 1 ° In determining the validity of a general
power presently exercisable, the period of the rule commences when the
power is created.2 11 However, if this kind of general power is valid, one
determines the validity of contingent interests created under it by mea-
suring the period of the rule from the time such power is exercised.212
With this in mind, some observations should be made regarding the
selection of testing lives in being. In evaluating the validity of the general
power itself, once again, one must view the donee of the general power as
the "taker of the interest" under Step Three A.213 Consequently, under
Step Three, Three A will cover testing lives in being to be found among
the donees of the power of appointment. Steps Three B and C will cover
testing lives in being to be found among the substitute takers in default of
the power's exercise, the takers of other interests within the same provi-
sion and people'otherwise mentioned, while Step Three D will cover test-
ing lives in being to be found among the parents of the donees. Because
this determination of the validity of the general power must be made
without regard to its exercise, the ultimate objects of the power once
exercised must be disregarded as a source of potential testing lives in
being.214 When one evaluates the validity of contingent interests created
210. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.30 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 22, § 1271. For a thorough discussion of the common law rule against perpetuities in
relation to powers of appointment, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.30-.36 (A. Casner ed.
1952); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1271-77.
211. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.31 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 22, § 1273; L. WAGGONER, FUTURE INTERESTS 269-70 (1981).
212. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.33 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 22, § 1274; L. WAGGONER, supra note 211, at 271-72. Because the donee has the power
at any time to make the subject matter his own, alienability is not impaired after the power is cre-
ated. For this reason, the perpetuities period is deferred beyond the time the power is actually cre-
ated. Indeed, the situation is treated just the same as if the donee had made the subject matter his
own and thereafter disposed of it at the time the power is exercised and the appointment is made.
Quite differently, under general testamentary powers of appointment, the subject matter is tied up
until the power can be exercised at the donee's death. Until then, the donee cannot make the subject
matter his own, and then it is only for the benefit of his estate. And under special powers of appoint-
ment, disposition of the subject matter is tied up throughout; the donee cannot make it his at any-
time. Accordingly, appointments under general testamentary powers and special powers are subject
to a perpetuities period measured from the time the power is created.
213. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
214. The reason for this observation should be quite clear. By definition, one is testing the valid-
ity of a general power of appointment that can be exercised on behalf of anyone whatsovever. By
definition, one does not know the identity of the appointees; there is no way in advance of the
exercise of the power by which one can know whether the appointees will be restricted to lives in
being when the power is created. Also, the donor of the power of appointment may not qualify
automatically for immediate testing even when he irrevocably creates the power during his lifetime.
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by exercise of a valid general power, however, those for whom the gen-
eral power is exercised do become a potential source of testing lives in
being. As expected, one views them as takers of the interest in question.
Consequently, Step Three A covers the person or group for whom inter-
ests have been created. Steps Three B and C cover testing lives in being
to be found elsewhere, including the donee, the substitute takers in de-
fault, the takers of other interests within the provision creating the
power, and those otherwise mentioned within directly related provisions.
Finally, Step Three D covers the parents of the takers of the interests
created by exercise of the power.
Beyond these matters concerning the selection of testing lives in being,
some additional observations and adjustments must be made with respect
to the application of Steps Three and Four in assessing both the validity
of the power and interests created by exercise of a valid power. To deter-
mine the validity of the power, observe carefully under Step Two A the
conditions attached to the exercise of such power. Invariably, there is no
condition beyond the exercise of the power itself. And if there are other
conditions, such as the implied requirement of birth, these conditions
frequently are subsumed by the exercise of the power itself. Conse-
quently, pursuant to Step Two C (1), one can continue the process with a
consideration of the subsuming condition.
Next, after observing under Step One that the period of the rule begins
when the power is created, one should proceed to Step Three and then to
Step Four. It should be emphasized that in asking the question whether
the proposed testing lives are restricted to lives in being under Step Three
A, Step Three B, Step Three C, and Step Three D, one must answer the
question in light of only those facts that are known when the power is
created and the period of the rule begins. In addition to this important
cautionary reminder, one must amend the critical test whenever the pro-
cess calls for its application under Step Three or Step Four. It should
read:
Looking at all possibilities in light of facts known when the power is
created and in light of applicable rules of construction and principles of
Even if the donor is a life in being, he will not automatically qualify without establishing some
independent relevance for testing. Unless he qualifies under Step Three A because he is the donee of
the powter, or under Step Three B because he receives an other interest within the provision, or under
Step Three C because he is otherwise or separately and differently mentioned, or under Step Three D
because he i a parent of the donee of the power, the donor's life is totally irrelevant to vesting and it
cannot possibly sersc as a basis for a %alid proof.
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law, including those possibilities that are most remote, must the power
become unconditionally exercisable, if at all, within twenty-one years of
the death of one of these testing lives in being (or within twenty-one
years of the time the period of the rule commences at the creation of the
power)?2 .
If one cannot establish that the power is valid under any of these steps,
then the power itself violates the common law rule without regard to its
exercise and, of course, this concludes the process of application. If,
however, one can establish that it is valid under any one of these steps,
then one can proceed to examine the validity of interests created under
the power.216 In doing so, one must remember that the process is just the
same as if the donee of the general power himself had fully owned the
subject matter and then created such interests.21 7 Accordingly, under
Step One the period of the rule commences when the power is exercised,
and under Step Two determinations as to contingent interests also are
made at that same point in time. Under Step Three, one searches for
testing lives who are in being when the power is exercised, and therefore
one asks the question whether the proposed testing lives are restricted to
lives in being in light of facts known when the power is exercised.21 8
215. See supra note 204.
216. Once again, the question arises about how one determines the validity of the gift in default.
When the power itself is valid, the preferred view would seem to be one in which the gift in default is
treated the same as if, when the power expires, the donee had exercised the power on the same terms
as the gift in default itself. See supra note 208. With this in mind, one then must apply to the gift in
default the same steps within this methodology used to determine the validity of an appointment
made by a general power of appointment presently exercisable by deed or by will. In short, if the
power itself is invalid, then the gift in default must be evaluated the same as any other contingent
interest. If, however, one determines that the general power is valid, then the process for applying
the methodology is the same as if the donee of the general power himself had fully owned the subject
matter during his lifetime. Then, when the power expires-at the donee's death if never exercised or
released during his lifetime-one evaluates the gift in default the same as if the donee had then
created it.
217. See supra note 212.
218. For example, consider this trust created by A's appointment under his presently exercisable
general power: "Income to my wife for life; thereafter, principal to such of my children who attain
age thirty." If A's transfer is testamentary, then under Step Three A the takers themselves of the
interest in question, his children, are restricted to lives in being. The period of the rule begins when
the appointment is made and, presumably, A cannot have children beyond the period of gestation
following his own death. A's children, therefore, qualify as testing lives and they also supply a valid
proof. No child can attain age thirty beyond his death; each child must satisfy the age requirement,
if at all, within his respective lifetime. Consequently. no child can join the class beyond his own
lifetime, and the class gift is valid because each child is, of course, a life in being.
If, however, A makes his appointment during his lifetime, instead of at death, the children cannot
qualify as testing lives under Step Three A. Nothing in the descriptive language limits the gift of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
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Further, under Step Three, the critical test is applied in light of facts and
possibilities known when the power is exercised. Finally, under Step
Four, in applying the critical test, one measures the twenty-one year pe-
riod from the time the power is exercised and one determines possibilities
also in the light of facts known at that same point in time.219
e. Interests Certain to End
Finally, it should be observed that there is a circumstance in which an
additional step must be added to the methodology previously described.
Thus far, the process for solving perpetuities problems rests upon the
assumption that the transferor has or is able to convey an inheritable
estate, usually a fee simple. This, however, is not always the case, even in
situations in which the transferor purports to create a fee simple.220 Ac-
principal to children alive when the living trust becomes effective during A's life, nor is there any
rule if construction that does so. Additionally, while A is alive he is capable of having more chil-
dren presumptively, there is no physical impossibility of an expanded class of takers. Carrying the
application of the methodology further, one discovers that a valid proof cannot be made. Under
Step Three B. A's wife qualifies as a testing life, but she cannot validate because a child born just
before her death can join the class by attaining age thirty more than twenty-one years later. Under
Step Three C, A qualifies as a testing life because he is otherwise mentioned but he fails to validate
because of the same possibilities previously applied to his wife. Under Step Three D, one dismisses
A because he has been tested previously. And under Step Four, one observes that A may have
another child who could then satisfy the age requirement and join the class more than twenty-one
years from the time the living trust became effective. Consequently, this gift of principal, if ap-
pointed through an exercise made during A's lifetime, violates the common law rule against
perpetuities.
219 For example, consider this trust created by A's appointment, made at his death, under a
presently exercisable general power: "Income is to be accumulated and added to principal until the
time for its distribution; in the year 2010, principal shall be distributed to those of my descendants
who are then living." Under Step Three A, one cannot conclude that the descendants are restricted
to lives in being when A dies. Under Step Three B, one observes that there is no other taker at all.
Under Step Three C, no one qualifies as a person otherwise mentioned or separately and differ-
ently mentioned. The limitation mentions A, but one must dismiss him because the same test will
eventually be applied under Step Four Under Step Three D, no one qualifies as a testing life. Be-
cause it is impossible to determine who the descendants will be, it becomes impossible to identify
their parents and to make the determination that the' are restricted to lives in being. Finally. then,
one comes to Step Four. If A dies in the year 1990. one can account for the facts at the time he
makes his testamentary appointment Consequently, one can make a valid proof because all interests
must vest, if at all, twenty years after A's death. If, however, A had died in 1988, or if he had made
a lifetime appointment in 1988, after taking into account facts known in 1988, one discovers that a
valid proof cannot be made under Step Four. Because all interests would then vest, if at all, twenty-
two years after A's death, one must finally reach the conclusion that the gift of principal to A's
descendants violates the common law rule against perpetuities.
220 Suppose that A executes and delivers a deed concerning Blackacre which provides: "'To B
and his heirs forever and in fee simple absolute." If A has a fee simple absolute, or the power to
transfer one, then B would receive such estate. If, however, A has a life estate with no additional
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cordingly, after establishing when the period of the rule begins under
Step One, as a safeguard one should ask:
Is the transferor able to convey some kind of inheritable interest or
one that is not certain to end?221 If the answer is YES, if the transferor
has or is able to convey some kind of estate in fee simple or even in fee
tail or an interest which may never end, then one must proceed directly
to Steps Two, Three and Four as before.
If, however, the answer is NO, if the transferor has an estate of
limited duration and is unable to convey an inheritable estate, then one
must add Step One A.
A. Must the duration of the interest held by the transferor when
the period of the rule begins terminate with absolute certainty within
twenty-one years or within twenty-one years of the deaths of lives in
being or lives already ended when the period of the rule begins because
the duration of the transferor's interest is restricted to such period of
time by express language, by rules of construction, or by physical impos-
sibility as to the group of lives used to measure the transferor's inter-
est?222 If the answer is YES, that the transferor's interest must end
within this specified time, then the interests created by the transferor are
VALID, and one need go no further with the process.
powers, then regardless of the form of the transfer, A cannot give B any more than the estate which
he owns. Accordingly, B only acquires a life estate, one which will not last forever but must end at
A's death.
221. In nearly every instance, the answer to this question is YES because the transferor has sonic
kind of fee simple. Nevertheless, there are dircumstances in which the answer is YES even though
the transferor does not have a fee simple or, conceivably, a fee tail which can be disentailed by
statute. Instead, the transferor might have an interest "that is not certain to end." This category of
interests might include equivalents of the fee simple held in personal property, namely, interests that
are absolute but may not be styled a fee simple. Although most of the present estates that exist in
real property can be found among chattels, they do not always bear the same description. See L.
SimES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 359. Additionally, this category might include a periodic ten-
ancy held by the transferor. Such estate is continuous in nature until and unless it is terminated on
the anniversary of the period with notice that is both timely and proper. Most important, the peri-
odic tenancy does not cease upon the death of either the landlord or tenant. Unless tile tenancy is
previously terminated, the tenant can transfer his interest during his life or at death. Indeed, the
periodic tenancy can continue indefinitely for generations to come. See I AMERICAN LAW Or PROr-
ERTY. § 3.23 (A. Casner ed. 1952). Accordingly, these are interests like the fee simple in the sense
that they can last indefinitely and so they might carry on beyond the period of the rule. And from
these interests, one can carve out contingencies that cause perpetuities violations. For this reason,
they must be treated like the fee simple and, thus, the full methodology must be applied.
222. This determination may seem complicated, but it is not. For further explanation of Step
One A and an illustration of its application, see infra notes 227-37 and accompanying text; illustra-
tion IV B-4.
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If, however, the answer is NO, that the transferor's interest can last
beyond this period of time, then one must proceed to Steps Two, Three,
and Four and apply them to the interests actually created by the
transferor.
In answering this question and making this determination, one must
observe that if the remaining duration of the interest held by the trans-
feror is for a period of years that exceeds twenty-one, then the answer to
this question must be NO, and one then should proceed directly to Steps
Two, Three, and Four.223
2. Some Explanation and Elaboration
This section discusses step by step the foregoing methodology. At the
outset, Steps One and Two A present obvious components of any formu-
lation of the common law process, and the questions within these steps
have been considered briefly in the previous section on preliminary obser-
vations.224 Nevertheless, because of their importance, further emphasis
and explanation is desirable.
Step One -As to Step One, because the common law rule focuses upon
a measuring period, one cannot conduct the process of application with-
out always knowing when the period begins and, therefore, at what point
in time testing lives in being might be found. Accordingly, one must
know when the dispositive instrument "ties up" the property.225 For ex-
ample, the distinctions between revocable and irrevocable lifetime trans-
fers and between a general power to appoint by deed or by will and all
other powers of appointment must be understood fully.
226
Before proceeding to Step Two, one first must determine whether it is
necessary to apply Step One A. If the transferor can confer an inherita-
ble estate, or an interest that is not certain to end, one must proceed
directly to Step Two and the remainder of the process for solving perpe-
tuities problems. If, however, the transferor has only an interest of lim-
ited duration to confer, one must examine under Step One A whether its
duration must end within the period allowed by the common law rule.
To determine this by asking the principal question contained within Step
One A, one first must examine carefully the estate classification into
223 For further discussion and explanation, see infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
224 Sce upra notes 147-70 and accompanying text.
225 Sce wupra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 164-70.
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which the transferor's interest falls and any language that further affects
its specific duration.22 7 Accomplishing this may not always be easy, but it
should never be as obscure-and therefore difficult-as determining the
measuring period and testing lives when one applies the common law
rule to inheritable interests.228 Accordingly, there is no need to use vari-
ations of Steps Three and Four to conduct the test contained in Step One
227. Estates must exist according to fixed classifications. See infra note 229. In most instances,
courts make these classifications on the basis of language within the limitation and other language
within the entire instrument itself. Inevitably, the solution to disputes requires such determination
because of the different legal consequences that derive from various estates. The prevailing view
today is that an interest is presumed to be a fee simple unless there is language that clearly indicates
a lesser interest. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.4 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
Consequently, in determining whether Step One A is to be applied, one cannot conclude that the
estate is of a limited duration without clear evidence to support that conclusion. Nearly always, this
evidence must lie in the language itself. A particular estate classification may not always be clear
cut; nevertheless, courts must and do make these determinations quite commonly. See infra note
231. Accordingly, to conduct this methodology, one must ask: What kind of interest does the trans-
feror, A, have? To answer, one must go back to the source of A's interest. Assume that A's prede-
cessor, T, had a fee simple absolute and that the transfer to A had read: "To A in fee simple
absolute"; "To A and his heirs"; or "To A." In each instance, A has a fee simple absolute and one
proceeds to Step Two. If, however, the provision had been "To A for life" or "To A for fifty years,"
then A would have received a life estate or an estate for years respectively. In either instance, his
estate is of a limited duration, and one must then proceed to Step One A. Finally, assume the
provision had read: "To A for fifty years unless A ceases to practice law." Clearly, A has an estate
of limited duration; it is an estate for years. Accordingly, one must apply Step One A. Nevertheless,
before doing so, one must account for the special limitation attached to A's estate for years. A has
an interest that will not endure beyond fifty years, but because of the special limitation, it cannot
endure beyond A's death as well. As A cannot practice law after his death, his estate necessarily will
end at his death or the expiration of fifty years, whichever happens first.
228. In applying the common law rule against perpetuities, one searches for lives in being that
are connected or relevant to vesting. Somehow, this has proved to be a difficult task for a great many
students of the rule. Perhaps this happens because the connections are often very obscure and be-
cause scholars often disagree on the application of a principle of relevance. Or, perhaps this happens
because of the confusion engendered by a limitation replete with lives who have no relevance to
vesting and a commonly held temptation to apply the critical test to each of them. See, e.g., infra
illustration IV B-1.
Ordinarily, lawyers and students have a much easier time classifying estates and determining their
specific duration. Perhaps this happens because they must do this more often by way of interpreta-
tion of existing interests or the creation of new ones. Perhaps this happens simply because the task is
much easier. In creating interests, the guidelines for creation of particular estates are clear. If one
wishes to give B a life estate measured by his own life, one would provide: "To B for life." In the
interpretation of an existing limitation, one begins with the assumption that it is a fee simple abso-
lute. If something less has been created, the constructional choices are restricted to conventional
classifications. See infra note 229. Further, it can only be something less as a result of specific
evidence, almost always within the language itself. Because the choices are restricted and because
evidence of an estate of limited duration is usually apparent and quite clear, the task of classification
is an easier one. At least it is not one that generations of lawyers have viewed as their nemesis.
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A. The transferor has to have some kind of acknowledged interest. 229 If
it is an estate of limited duration, there must be something-usually ex-
press language-that identifies such limits and, therefore, the point in
time at which such interest must end.230 Consequently, if the transferor
does not have an inheritable estate, the end point of his interest is usually
explicit; and if it is not clearly expressed, some conclusion must always
be reached in making the necessary estate classification.231
Now then, after having determined the end point of the transferor's
interest, one readily can determine whether such interest must terminate
within the period allowed by the common law rule. For example, if the
transferor has an estate for years that will last no longer than twenty-one
years from the time the period of the rule begins when his transfer be-
comes irrevocably effective, then the answer to the principal question of
Step One A is YES and the interests created by the transferor are neces-
sarily valid.232 However, for any estate for years that may last longer,
the answer must be NO, and one then must proceed to Steps Three and
Four to examine the validity of the interests actually created by the
transferor.2
33
229 Under the Anglo-American system of land law, the ownership of all interests must fall
within fixed types or estates. The system allows for some flexibility within acknowledged kinds of
interests. Nevertheless, it forbids the creation of entirely new kinds of entities. As a practical mat-
ter, this means that even when the language used to create an interest is unconventional or obscure,
courts must and will find an acknowledged category for classification of such interest. See L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 61, 63.
230. Se supra note 227.
231 The matter of estate classification is not always an easy one to resolve, especially when there
is no language used to describe the interest or when such language is obscure or presents inconsisten-
cies. Sec, e.g., Foley v. Gamester, 271 Mass. 55, 170 N.E. 799 (1930); Thompson v. Baxter, 107
Minn. 122, 119 N.W. 797 (1909); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 300 Pa. 146, 151 A. 339 (1930).
232 Consider this devise of Blackacre by A: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever
used for any purpose other than residential, then to C in fee simple absolute." If A has a fee simple
to devise, then the contingent executory interest created in C violates the common law rule against
perpetuities. Se infra illustration IV B-1. If, however, A has a term of years with only ten years
remaining at the time of his death, there would be no perpetuities violation. Must the duration of
the interest held by A at the time of his death terminate with absolute certainty within twenty-one
ears or within twenty-one years of the deaths of lives in being or lives already ended at A's death?
The anser is, of course, YES. Although A purports to devise a fee simple, he cannot create in B or
C an interest greater than the one he has at the time of his death. Accordingly, the contingent
interest given to C must vest before the duration of the estate held by A expires. The interests A
creates at his death in Blackacre cannot last beyond ten years. A's interest must clearly terminate by
the end of ten years and, therefore, so must the interests of B and C. Because of this, C's interest
must vest, if at all, within ten years. a duration that is clearly within the period allowed by the
common law rule.
233. Using the previous example, 5ee supra note 232, assume that thirty years of A's term of
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If the transferor has a life estate, however, then one must ascertain the
lives that measure his estate. If each of the lives is identified by name as a
specific individual in the instrument that creates his interest, then neces-
sarily by the descriptive language that governs the duration of his inter-
est, such interest will end by the deaths of lives that are in being when the
transferor creates the new interest and the period of the rule begins.234
Accordingly, the answer to the key question is YES and the new interests
created by the transferor are valid. If, however, the lives that measure
the estate are identified by group description, then, in light of facts
known when the period of the rule begins upon the transferor's creation
of new interests, one must determine whether the individuals that com-
prise the group have been confined to lives in being as of that time.235 A
conclusion that they are confined to lives in being might be reached be-
years remained at his death. Must the duration of the interest held by A at the time of his death
terminate with absolute certainty within twenty-one years or within twenty-one years of the deaths
of lives in being or lives already ended at A's death? The answer is, of course, NO. Because at the
time of his death A has a term for thirty years, one cannot say that his interest and the interests he
creates in B and C must terminate within twenty-one years. Nor can one conclude that termilation
of the estate for thirty years must occur within twenty-one years of the deaths of lives in being or
lives already ended at A's death. In answering this question, one must make the same assumptions
used in applying the critical test. See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. More specifically,
each and every person alive at A's death can thereafter have a child and then die within nine years of
A's death. Because of these possibilities, no matter how extraordinary they might be, one cannot say
that B's and C's interests must end within twenty-one years of lives in being at A's death.
234. Consider this devise of Blackacre by A: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever
used for any purpose other than residential, then to C in fee simple absolute." IfA has a fee simple
to devise, then the contingent executory interest created in C violates the common law rule against
perpetuities. See infra illustration IV B-1. If, however, B has a life estate measured by the life of the
survivor of X, Y, and Z, there would be no perpetuities violation. Must the duration of the interest
held by A at the time of his death terminate with absolute certainty within twenty-one years or
within twenty-one years of the deaths of lives in being or lives already ended at A's death? The
answer is, of course, YES. Although A purports to devise a fee simple, he cannot create in B or C an
interest greater than the one he has at the time of his death. Accordingly, the contingent interest
given to C must vest before the duration of the estate held by A expires. A's estate in Blackacre is
measured by the survivor of X, Y, and Z. These are specifically named individuals and, obviously,
they are lives in being or lives already ended at A's death. Accordingly, A's interest must clearly
terminate by the time of the last of this group to die, and so will the interests given to B and C.
Because of this, C's interest must vest no later than the death of someone who was a life in being at
A's death.
235. Some jurisdictions, however, might not permit the use of lives to measure the duration of a
life estate once it commences other than those who are actually in existence. See REsTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 107-08 (1936). If so, presuming that the life estate belonging to the transferor does
not fail altogether, then one must conclude that the lives that measure his life estate are confined to
lives in being when the new interests are created by the transferor. Accordingly, one can then an-
swer YES to the key question; the transferor's interest cannot last beyond the period allowed by the
rule, and the new interests he creates are necessarily valid.
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cause of some rule of construction or because the procreators of the
group of measuring lives are dead by the time the transferor creates the
new interest. 6 If, for example, the group of lives that governs the dura-
tion of the estate is fixed and cannot expand or change identity after the
period of the rule begins when the transferor creates the new interest,
then the transferor's interest will end by the deaths of lives that are in
being. Accordingly, the answer to the key question is YES, the trans-
feror's interest cannot last beyond the period allowed by the rule, and the
new interests he creates are necessarily valid.237
Step Two -This section will use substitute Step Two for the purpose of
further explanation. One observes that Step Two A raises questions re-
specting the contingent character of particular interests created by the
transferor. If an interest is not classified as contingent,238 it is not subject
236. For example, using the limitation presented previously, supra note 234, assume that A had
purchased life estates created in "the children of W for the life of the survivor of them." Further,
assume that W had predeceased A and that W had left three children-X, Y, and Z-who survived
A. In this situation, because of W's previous death, one can conclude that the group of lives used to
measure the interests of B and C are confined to lives in being at A's death.
237. Using the limitation presented previously, supra note 234, with its variation, supra note 236,
C's interest would not violate the common law rule against perpetuities. The reasoning is much the
same as before. Knowing, at the death of A, that the group of lives that measures the interests
created in B and C is fixed and cannot include people born thereafter enables one to conclude that
both A's interest and the interests he creates in B and C must terminate at the death of lives in being
at A's death. These lives are, of course, X, Y, and Z. Accordingly, the answer to the principal
question raised by Step One A must be YES.
238. The American Law Institute avoids the term "contingent" and instead applies the rule
against perpetuities to "non-vested" interests. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONA-
TIVE TRANSFERS) ch. 1, at 13-80 (1983). For the sake of consistency, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also adopts the term "non-vested" in the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities. See Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 569, 570 (1986).
It is not clear, however, why the American Law Institute chose to apply its rule to "non-vested"
interests. The term has appeared in the literature on the law of future interests. Frequently, it is said
that all executory interests are non-vested; more specifically, an executory interest can never vest
until the time it divests. Presumably, this description is required because it would not be accurate to
describe an executory interest limited upon an event certain to occur as contingent. (For example,
when A devises Blackacre: "To B in fee simple absolute from and after five years from this date.")
Without an unfulfilled condition precedent, one cannot properly classify such interest as contingent.
See L SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 36-38 (1951). The preferred posi-
tion has been to exempt these kinds of executory int-rest from the common law rule against perpetu-
ities. See L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1236. Because the Restatement applies its rule
against perpetuities to "non-vested" interests, one might think it reaches a different result with re-
spect to executory interests that divest a prior interest upon an event certain to occur. The comment
to § 1.4 indicates otherwise. An interest is non-vested only if it is subject to an unfulfilled condition
precedent, but an executory interest is not deemed subject to such a condition if throughout its
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:949
to the common law rule against perpetuities.23 9 Several important
things, however, must be kept in mind. To begin with, in determining
which interests are contingent, one must account carefully for all condi-
tions that might affect the characterization of an interest, especially those
conditions that are implied and not fully expressed.24 ° Additionally, an
interest that is vested subject to divestment is not, without more, subject
existence it is certain to divest a prior interest upon the death of a person or upon the expiration of a
specified period of time. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.4
comment b (1983).
239. Stated affirmatively, if an interest is contingent then it is subject to the common law rule
against perpetuities. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. There are, however, exceptions
to this requirement. First, although possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry are contingent,
they are not subject to the common law rule. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1238-39.
See also infra note 441. An exception also exists with respect to charitable gifts. A gift to a single
charity may tie up the subject matter indefinitely; despite this, such gift is upheld because of a policy
strongly favoring and encouraging charitable gifts. Given this position, courts also have concluded
that successive gifts to charities should be upheld even though the latter gift is dependent upon a
condition precedent that may happen beyond the period allowed by the common law rule. Ostensi-
bly, courts uphold such contingent interests because of their belief that a gift to two charities does
not adversely affect alienability any more than a gift to one. This exception, however, does not apply
without successive charitable gifts. Although courts actively may attempt to eliminate or moderate
conditions involving charities, this exception does not protect a contingent gift over from a charity to
a noncharity, nor does it protect a contingent gift over from a noncharity to a charity. In either case,
such contingent interest is subject to the common law rule the same as any other contingent interest.
See L.SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 1278-87. Consequently, when a charitable gift does not
involve successive gifts to charities, the methodology developed in this article must be applied to the
contingent interest as it is applied to any other kind of contingent interest subject to the common law
rule. In that application, however, the charitable institution can never qualify as a testing life in
being under Step Three A, Step Three B, Step Three C, or Step Three D.
To illustrate, consider this devise of Blackacre by A: "To the Washington University School of
Law; however, if Blackacre ever ceases to be used by them for the purpose of legal education, then to
the American Red Cross absolutely." In this example, A has given the Washirngton University
School of Law a defeasible fee simple and he has created in the American Red Cross a contingent
executory interest in fee simple absolute. Ordinarily, the latter interest would violate the common
law rule. See infra illustration IV B-1. Nevertheless, because this example involves successive char-
itable gifts, the contingent executory interest given to the American Red Cross escapes application of
the rule.
Additionally, consider this devise of Blackacre by A: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is
ever used for a purpose other than residential, then to the Washington University School of Law
absolutely." Here, A has given B a possessory defeasible fee simple and has also created in the
Washington University School of Law a substitute contingent executory interest in fee simple abso-
lute. Because this example does not involve successive possessory and nonpossessory interests in
charitable institutions, the contingent executory interest given to the Washington University School
of Law is subject to the common law rule and must satisfy its requirements. In applying the method-
ology of this article, one must conclude that the charitable gift to the Washington University School
of Law violates the common law rule against perpetuities. See hifra illustration IV B-I.
240. The distinctions developed by courts to distinguish between vested and contingent interests
are complex and often obscure. See supra notes 149, 150, 151, 153. Perhaps the most common and
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to the rule.24' However, the substitute executory interest is contingent,
and it can violate the rule. Furthermore, for purposes of the common
law rule, an entire class gift is regarded as contingent until the last eligi-
ble member has joined, or failed to join, the class.242 Even though mem-
bers within a class have interests that otherwise are characterized as
vested absolutely, the interests are still contingent under the rule2 43 if the
difficult problem courts have concerns whether the limitation imposes a requirement of survivorship
even though such requirement is not clearly expressed.
For example, consider this devise of Blackacre by A: "To B in fee simple, but if B dies without
leaving surviving descendants then to the children of C in fee simple absolute." To be sure, C's
children have a contingent executory interest, one that is expressly contingent upon B's death with-
out descendants surviving him. Nevertheless, is there an additional condition of survivorship as
well, namely, that for a child of C to take, he or she must also survive B? Theoretically, a conclusion
that C'c children have a contingent interest should not lead to the conclusion that they also must
survive the time of possession. There is no reason why a contingent interest cannot also be transmis-
sible at death. Some courts, however, conclude that such contingent interest is subject to a require-
ment of survivorship and, therefore, is nontransmissible at death. Some courts have done this
without more, while others have done this on the basis of additional language or circumstances that
justify such implied requirement. See, e.g., Evans v. Giles, 415 N.E.2d 354 (Il. 1981); Blackstone v.
Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N.E. 154 (1917); Drury v. Drury, 271 111. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1915). For
further discussion of these problems with respect to requirements of survivorship, see L. SIMES & A.
SwtIIH, supra note 22, §§ 571-94.
241 A vested interest subject to divestment escapes the common law rule against perpetuities
unles, it involves a class gift which is subject to open. Consider this testamentary trust created by A:
"Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to B's eldest child; however, if such child fails to graduate
from college by age twenty-five, then to C absolutely." Assume that B has one infant child, B-I, by
the time of A's death. In this situation, B-I has an interest that is vested subject to divestment,
vhile C has a contingent executory interest. C's interest is subject to the rule against perpetuities;
nevertheless, it does not cause a violation because one can make a valid proof with B-I under Step
Three B.
Suppose. however, that the gift of principal had provided: "to B's children; however, if any child
fails to graduate from college by age twenty-five, then his or her respective share shall be given over
to C absolutely." In this situation, once again, B-I has a vested interest subject to divestment, while
C has a contingent executory interest. Although B-I's interest is vested, it must satisfy the require-
ments of the common law rule because the remainder now involves a class gift which is subject to
open until B's death. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. In short, the rule requires that
the interests of all class members vest, if at all, by the members being born within the allowed period
oftime In this instance, although B- I's interest is subject to the rule, it does not violate it because a
%alid proof can be established with B under Step Three B.
242 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
243. One should note two very important exceptions to the "all or nothing" rule (see supra notes
157-58 and accompanying text) involving class gifts. First, if a stated sum is given per capita to each
member of a class, those members' interests which must vest or fail within the period of the rule will
be upheld even though there may be other potential members with interests that violate the rule. See
6 AMI RICAN LAW O PROPERTY § 24.28 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note
22, , 1266 For example, consider this bequest by A: "$100,000 apiece to each and all of my daugh-
ter D children who attain age thirty " Assume that D survives A along with her two children. D-I
and D-2, both of whom are under age five. Assume further that the gift of residue is deferred so that
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class is subject to open.2"
The foregoing observations can be illustrated. Assume that A creates
a testamentary trust that provides: "Income to B for life, and thereafter,
principal to C absolutely; however, if C predeceases B, then principal to
such of B's children as attain age twenty-five." Assume further that B
survives A and has only one child at A's death, B-, who is already age
twenty-five. Most courts would conclude that C has a vested interest
subject to divestment, while B's children have a contingent executory in-
terest. Although possession of C's gift of principal is subject to a prece-
dent requirement that C must actually survive B, courts generally view
this requirement as a condition subsequent, thereby making C's interest
vested and defeasible but not contingent.245 Accordingly, C's interest is
the rule of convenience itself would not otherwise restrict the class gift to D's children alive at A's
death. In this instance, because a valid proof can be made under Step Three A, the interests of D-1
and D-2 satisfy the common law rule. Courts will uphold these gifts even though a gift to D-3, a
child born after A's death, would violate the rule. If, however, the gift bad been of a sum to be
divided equally among D's children, then the entire class gift would have violated the rule. In this
situation, courts will apply the "all or nothing" principle and invalidate the entire class gift even
though it is quite apparent that the shares of D-1 and D-2 must vest, if at all, within their own
lifetimes, namely, the lifetimes of lives in being at A's death.
Second, if an estate owner constitutes a class gift in terms of a series of subclasses, then those
subclasses that must be fully determined, if at all, within the period of the rule will be upheld even
though there may be other potential subclasses that violate the rule. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OP
PROPERTY § 24.29 (A. Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1267. Consider, for
example, this testamentary trust created by A: "Income to B for life, and at B's death, income to B's
children for the life of the survivor of them; when the last of B's children dies, principal to B's
grandchildren, per capita, absolutely and forever." Assume that the following people are alive at A's
death: B; B's only child, his daughter B-I; and B's only grandchild, his grandaughter G-1. The gift
of principal to B's grandchildren violates the common law rule and this includes the share of G-1
even though it was fully vested at the time of its creation at A's death. For further explanation, see
hifra illustration IV A-7. Assume, however, that A had provided differently for subclassess: "...
and at B's death, income to B's children for the remainder of their respective lives; after the death of
each child, the share of principal from which he or she had been receiving income shall then pass
absolutely to such child's children." Because of the gift of principal to subclasses of B's grandchil-
dren, courts will uphold the gift of principal to B-l's children, G-1 and any others born thereafter,
but they will invalidate the gift to the children of any other child of B, someone who necessarily must
be born after A's death. The gift to B-l's children satisfies the common law rule because a valid
proof can be made under Step Three B using the life of B-I.
244. For an illustration of a perpetuities violation involving a class gift that contains an interest
which is vested subject to open, see hifra illustrations IV A-6, IV A-7.
245. Most frequently, courts and commentators will say that an interest is contingent if there is
some precedent requirement to possession other than the termination of preceding estates. See, e.g..
J. GRAY, supra note 1, § 101. Applying this test to C's interest, one might conclude that it is contin-
gent. For C's interest to become possessory, there is a requirement beyond the termination of B's
income interest for life: C must survive B, otherwise a substitute gift will be made to B's children.
Nevertheless, this is not the only test courts use to distinguish between vested and contingent inter-
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not subject to the common law rule against perpetuities, but the substi-
tute gift to B's children is. Now then, what are the exact conditions that
make the children's executory interest contingent and, therefore, subject
to the rule? Two are clearly expressed; namely, C must predecease B and
each child of B must attain age twenty-five before he can share in the
substitute gift of principal. There is also an implied, but obvious, condi-
tion: as to children of B other than B-I, such children must be born.246
Finally, there is another implied condition that courts sometimes find:
all of B's children, in addition to being born and attaining age twenty-
five, must survive B.247 These, then, are the possible conditions that
render the interest of B's children contingent in interest, and one must
keep them in mind carefully while applying the common law rule and
conducting the methodology. When C predeceases B, B-l's interest be-
comes vested absolutely, assuming there is no implied condition requir-
ing B-1 to survive B. Nevertheless, the common law rule requires
something more. B-l's interest remains contingent under the rule until
the last of B's eligible children joins the class by attaining age twenty-five
or fails to join it by dying before age twenty-five. In short, the rule re-
quires that the class membership be fully determined within the allowed
time period. 248 All class interests must satisfy the rule, otherwise none
csts. Often, courts will focus on the form of a condition rather than its operative requirements in
relation to possession. Accordingly. courts will classify an interest as vested if the condition appears
after the presence of other language that makes a prior gift to an ascertained taker or group of
takers Stated differently, if the conditional language is located subsequent to a description of the
taker whose interest is subject to the condition, then the interest is characterized as vested subject to
divestment. It is a test which focuses upon the order and form of language rather than the operative
requirements for possession. See id., § 108. Applying this test to C's interest, one should conclude
that C has a remainder that is vested subject to divestment. The condition of survivorship attached
to C's interest appears in a separate clause only after language which creates a remainder in C.
Gi'en the strong preference for vested interests, if either of these tests calls for a vested construction,
courts will rely upon such test instead of others. For further discussion and illustration, see L. SiMES
& A. SMirrii, supra note 22, §§ 139. 141, 149.
246. S'e infra note 330.
247 See supra note 240.
248. B-I's interest violates the common law rule against perpetuities, even if there is no implied
rcquirement that a child of B must survive B. Ultimately, the critical test must take the following
form for any appropriate testing lives found under Step Three: Will all of B's children join, or fail to
join, the class by (being born), attaining age twenty-five and by C's predeceasing B within twenty-
-nu .years of the testing life or of A's death" In setting out the critical test, parentheses are used to
identify one or more of several multiple conditions that appear cumulatively, specifically the ones
that are subsumed by another condition. However, pursuant to Step Two C (I), one should always
use the subsuming condition to test and validate the interest in question under Steps Three and Four.
Sce infra text accompanying notes 249-50.
Under Step Three A. the takers-B's children-are not restricted to lives in being. No descriptive
Washington University Open Scholarship
1030 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
will do so.2 4 9
The remainder of Step Two appears exceedingly formidable. Never-
theless, one should not feel overwhelmed because of its length and appar-
ent complexity. This is the case because limitations that involve multiple
conditions frequently contain a condition that subsumes each of the
others. Consequently, in applying this methodology, one seldom pro-
ceeds through all of Step Two. Therefore, in a first reading of the meth-
odology one is advised at this point to proceed directly to the explanation
of the most important step-Step Three.
Step Two B asks one to determine whether the contingent interest in
question includes multiple conditions, express or implied. The answer to
this question is, of course, already supplied by Step Two A. Once again,
one should not overlook the presence of an implied condition. For exam-
ple, the most common kind of implied condition requires the very exist-
ence of the taker; that is, the taker must be born. Consequently, every
class gift which is subject to open to afterborn members contains the
implied condition of birth. Quite often, this is the only condition; never-
theless, there are times when the class gift is subject to another condition,
one that is usually express. In this latter situation, one must conclude
that the interest in question is subject to multiple conditions.
This can be illustrated with a testamentary gift by A: "(In trust) in-
come to B for life; thereafter, principal to B's children." Assume that B
has one child, B-1, at A's death. B-i's interest is vested absolutely, but
it is also subject to open. Because it is subject to open, it is contingent for
purposes of the common law rule against perpetuities. This contingency
is implied and it involves the birth of other potential members of the
class. Nevertheless, because this condition is the only one that makes the
language limits the class to B-1 and, because distribution of principal is deferred until B's death, no
occasion exists for the rule of convenience to fix maximum membership before the possibility for
additional children has been exhausted. Finally, because B survives A, one must presume there is a
physical possibility for additional children. Under Step Three B, B and C do qualify for testing.
Nevertheless, in applying the critical test separately, one observes that neither life validates. In both
instances, a second child, B-2, might be born just before the death of B or C. Accordingly, B-2
might attain age twenty-five and join the class more than twenty-one years after the death of either
person. Under Step Three C, absent a saving clause, there is no one otherwise or separately and
differently mentioned. Under Step Three D, B qualifies as a parent of the takers; nevertheless, one
dismisses him from further consideration because he has already been tested under Step Three B.
Finally, applying the critical test under Step Four, one should observe immediately that every child
of B born after A's death necessarily will join the class, if at all, more than twenty-one years after the
trust takes effect at A's death.
249. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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gift of principal contingent, one must conclude that the interest in ques-
tion is not subject to multiple conditions. And with this conclusion, one
can then bypass the rest of Step Two and proceed directly to Step Three
and, if necessary, Step Four. Suppose, however, that the gift of principal
had read: ". . . thereafter, principal to B's children who attain age
twenty-one." Regardless of B-l's age, there are now two conditions that
apply to potential class members: first, there is the implied condition
that they must be born, and second, there is the express condition that
they must attain age twenty-one. With this in mind, one must conclude
that the contingent class gift to B's children is subject to multiple condi-
tions, and one must now proceed to Step Two C.
Step Two C first examines how multiple conditions are ordered and
connected. And ultimately, it focuses on multiple conditions that appear
cumulatively-namely, those in which each condition, express or im-
plied, must be satisfied before the interest in question vests. If one deter-
mines that the multiple conditions do not appear cumulatively, that
instead they appear alternatively (with the interest able to vest if any one
of the group of alternative conditions is satisfied), then one should bypass
the rest of Step Two C and proceed directly to Step Two D.
This can be illustrated with the following testamentary gift by A: "(In
trust) income to B for life; thereafter, principal to his daughter, B-i, if
and when she either graduates from law school or medical school." In
this instance, the gift of principal contains two express conditions, and
they appear in the alternative so that B-1 can take her interest following
B's death upon fufillment of either of these conditions. With this conclu-
sion, one must then proceed to Step Two D. Suppose, however, the con-
ditions had read: ". . . thereafter, principal to his daughter, B-i, if and
when she graduates from both law school and medical school." In this
instance, the gift of principal contains the same two conditions, but they
appear cumulatively, so that both conditions must be satisfied before B-1
is entitled to principal. Consequently, one must carry on with Step Two
C by proceeding to Step Two C (1).
The introductory portion of Step Two C also raises the possibility of
multiple conditions in which some conditions appear cumulatively while
others appear alternatively. These circumstances are not commonplace;
nevertheless, they are possible. When multiple conditions appear in this
manner, one must then evaluate and test these conditions by proceeding
with Step Two D for the alternative conditions, and with Step Two C (1)
for the cumulative conditions. In conducting this portion of the method-
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ology, when multiple conditions appear in this mixed format, one should
recognize that the multiple conditions can be articulated in terms of sub-
sets of cumulative conditions and subsets of alternative conditions. Ac-
cordingly, one should find it is easiest to proceed first with an evaluation
of each subset before examining the entire set of multiple conditions.
This can be illustrated with the following testamentary gift by A: "(In
trust) income to B for life; thereafter, principal to his daughter, B-l, if
and when such child graduates from either law school or medical school
and marries." This set of multiple conditions contains a subset of alter-
native conditions-law school or medical school-that are cumulatively
joined to another condition-marriage. Accordingly, one should pro-
ceed first to test the alternative subset under Step Two D, and then one
should test the remaining conditions under Step Two C (1).
Assuming that one has concluded that all conditions appear cumula-
tively, then Step Two C (1) requires a determination whether any of the
multiple conditions subsumes one or more of the others, so that satisfac-
tion of the subsuming condition necessarily satisfies the requirements of
the subsumed condition. If one finds such a subsumed condition, then
one proceeds to evaluate and test the subsuming condition along with
other cumulative conditions-those that are not subsumed-under Step
Two C (2). Further, if the subsuming condition subsumes each of the
other multiple .conditions, then one should proceed immediately to Step
Three and, if necessary, Step Four to determine whether a valid proof
can be made with such subsuming condition.
This can be illustrated with the following testamentary gift by A: "(In
trust) income to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of B's children
who are alive at her death and who attain age thirty." Assume, further,
that B is childless at A's death. With respect to the gift of principal, this
limitation contains one implied condition: that potential children be
born. It also contains two express conditions: that a child survive B and
attain age thirty. Nevertheless, one can readily observe that the implied
condition is subsumed by each of the express conditions. None of B's
children can survive her or attain age thirty without first being born. As
a result, one must concentrate on the subsuming conditions in any subse-
quent attempt to make a valid proof. And in this instance, one then
should proceed to Step Two C (2). Suppose, however, one of the express
conditions had been omitted: ". . . thereafter, principal to such of B's
children who attain age thirty." In this instance, the condition that chil-
dren must be born is completely subsumed by the condition that children
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attain age thirty. Accordingly, one then should bypass the rest of Step
Two and proceed directly to the matter of making a valid proof with the
subsuming condition under Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four. This
latter circumstance is a very common one; consequently, in most situa-
tions, the complexity of Step Two will be bypassed.
Step Two C (2) is the last step one must consider for cumulative condi-
tions before proceeding to the matter of making a valid proof. Step Two
C (2) asks whether two or more of the cumulative conditions are satisfied
by the same event. The answer to this question determines which cumu-
lative conditions must be found valid. If each cumulative condition is
predicated upon a separate event, then the interest in question cannot be
upheld unless one can make a valid proof with all cumulative conditions.
However, whenever one finds two or more cumulative conditions predi-
cated upon the same event, then in assessing these particular cumulative
conditions, a valid proof need only be made with respect to one of the
conditions.
This can be illustrated with a testamentary gift by A: "(In trust) in-
come to B for life; thereafter, principal to B's children who attain age
forty within twenty-one years of B's death and within twenty-one years
of B's spouse's death." Assuming that B is childless at A's death, how
does one evaluate the multiple conditions attached to the gift of princi-
pal? Recognizing under Step Two C (1) that the implied condition of
birth among B's children will be subsumed by each of the express condi-
tions, one observes that both conditions are predicated upon the same
event; namely, in each case, a child of B must do the same thing to satisfy
the condition-attain age forty. Accordingly, in making a proof under
Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four, one can prove validity for both
conditions by making a proof with just one of them. Suppose, however,
the gift of principal had read: ". . . thereafter, principal to B's children
who attain age forty within twenty-one years of B's death and who prac-
tice law within twenty-one years of B's spouse's death." Here, the cumu-
lative conditions are not predicated upon the same event: the actor is the
same, but the requirements are not. Consequently, a valid proof can be
made under Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four, only if one is able to
validate both of these cumulative conditions.
Step Two D applies only if one has previously found conditions that
appear in the alternative and it applies exclusively to these conditions. In
assessing these conditions, one must first identify the implied conditions
and the express conditions from which they are derived and to which
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they are joined in the alternative. These implied derivative conditions
must then be dismissed. Having done this, one is then ready to proceed
to Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four to determine whether a valid
proof can be made as to the remaining condition or as to the remaining
conditions that are now separately expressed in the alternative. In doing
so, one carefully should observe that each express alternative condition
must be tested separately just the same as if multiple gifts had been cre-
ated. As a result, a court will uphold each of the conditions for which a
valid proof can be made and strike those conditions in which a valid
proof cannot be made.
This step can be illustrated with the following devise of Blackacre by
A: "To B in fee simple; however, if none of B's children becomes a cler-
gyman, then to C in fee simple absolute." Assume that B is childless at
A's death. As written, C's contingent executory interest is subject to a
single condition; namely, every one of B's children must fail to become a
clergyman. Some analysts, however, might find an alternative condition
that derives from the express condition itself: that C may take if B dies
without having had any children whatsoever. Accordingly, one might
view the devise as if it had said: "To B in fee simple; however, if B dies
without having had children or if none of B's children becomes a clergy-
man, then to C in fee simple absolute." If the devise actually had been
expressed in this manner, then each of these alternative conditions would
need to be evaluated and tested separately under Step Three and, if nec-
essary, Step Four. Accordingly, if one can make a valid proof with the
first alternate condition but not the second, then the first condition will
be enforced and the second struck, and the devise to B will be upheld just
the same as if it had said: "To B in fee simple; however, if B dies without
having had children, then to C in fee simple absolute." Nevertheless, if
the devise appears as originally hypothesized, so that B's death without
having had children becomes merely an implied component of the ex-
press condition, then one must dismiss the implied derivative condition
and determine whether a valid proof can be made solely on the basis of
the express condition. With this in mind, a court will not enforce C's
executory interest simply because B thereafter dies without having had
any children whatsoever. 250
250. For further illustration, consider this gift in which A creates a testamentary trust that
leaves: "Income to B for life and, after his death, income to his then living wife for her life; thereaf-
ter, principal to his children absolutely who are then living at the time of distribution." Assume that
B (age eighty), W (B's wife, age seventy), and B-I (B's son and only child, age forty) survive A. If'A
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Step Three A-Step Three A initiates the process of selecting the test-
ing lives in being.25 ' It focuses on the takers of the contingent interest
under consideration, and asks whether such takers are restricted to lives
in being and to lives already ended when the period of the rule com-
mences. Steps Three B, C, and D also raise the same question, but they
do so with respect to different individuals and groups that might be con-
nected in some way to the contingent interest.2 5 2 In each step, one must
intend-, the gift of income to B's wife to include not just W but any person married to B at the time of
B'% death, then the gift of principal to B's children violates the common law rule against perpetuities.
See infra illustration IV A-9. The above condition imposed upon B's children embodies alternative
circumstances upon which they are eligible to share the principal. It enables them to take if B
%urvive% his wife and they are then living. It also enables them to take if B leaves a surviving wife
and they are alive at her death as well. The former circumstance or condition must happen, if at all,
at B's death, a point in time within the rule, but the latter may happen at the widow's death, a point
in time beyond the period of the rule because she may be unborn at the time of A's death. Neverthe-
less, under the common law rule, the conditions are treated as one and the entire gift of principal
must fail.
If, however, A had expressed these two contingencies separately and in the alternative, most
courts would enforce the contingency that satisfies the common law rule because it must happen, if
at all, within the allowed period of time. If, for example, A had stated: ". . . thereafter, upon B's
death, if he does not leave a surviving wife, or upon his wife's death if B leaves a surviving wife,
principal to his children absolutely who are then living at the time of distribution," courts will elect
to enforce the first condition but not the second. The gift of principal will be made to B's children
living at the time of distribution only if B survives his wife. Consequently, in enforcing this first
condition, courts will "'wait and see" whether B leaves surviving children but no surviving wife. See
0 AMEI RICAN LAW OF PROPFRTY § 24.54 (A. Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
FRTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.4 comment o and reporter's note 15 (1983); L. SiMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 22, § 1257.
251. The entities that qualify as testing lives under Steps Three A, Three B, Three C, and Three
D must be one or more human beings; indeed, the common law rule against perpetuities does not
allow a valid proof to be made with anything else. See L. SIMS & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1223.
Consequently, if the estate owner creates a contingent interest in a corporation, then one cannot use
Step Three A to make a valid proof with respect to such interest. Further, if the estate owner, in
addition to the contingent interest under consideration, creates another interest in a corporation,
then one cannot use such corporation to make a valid proof under Step Three B. Finally, if the
estate owner, in addition to creating the contingent interest under consideration, otherwise mentions
or separately and differently mentions a corporation within other directly related provisions, then
one cannot use such corporation to make a valid proof under Step Three C.
252. Step Three involves a search for li%es in being that are connected or relevant to vesting. It
attempt'. to comprehend and classify all potential sources of connected or relevant lives. Instead of
relying exclusively upon the logic of connection or relevance to discriminate among potential testing
hvce it creates broad categories into which these lives necessarily fall. Although the logic of connec-
tion and relevance is implicit in the formulation of this methodology and the categories of Step
Three, without full reliance upon these criteria as the sole principle for selection, one cannot avoid
categories that over include. Inevitably, then, Steps Three A, B, C, and D sometimes offer lives for
testing that are destined to fail in an attempt at validation. Once again, this is unavoidable unless
one applies the ultimate test of relevancy to all potential testing lives found within each category.
Because of the difficulties students and lawyers have had relying upon relevance and connection, this
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determine whether the individual or group has been restricted to lives in
being and to lives already ended because of descriptive language, because
of applicable rules of construction, or because they are not physically
capable of expansion or reconstitution to include those who are
afterborn. In determining physical capability, the common law rule re-
quires that one assume that a person is able to conceive a child at any
time during his or her life.253 Accordingly, so long as a procreator of a
taker is alive or capable of being born, one cannot conclude that the taker
or takers are physically incapable of expansion or reconstitution.
The process for determining testing lives under Step Three A can be
illustrated. Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that provides:
"Income to B for life, and after B's death, principal to B's grandchildren
who attain age twenty-five." Further, assume that B, a child of B (B-l),
and two grandchildren of B (G-l, age twenty-six, and G-2, age twenty)
are all alive at A's death. In this instance, the gift to the grandchildren is
clearly contingent. It is contingent, of course, because of the express age
requirement,254 but it is also contingent for purposes of the common law
rule because the class is subject to open 255 and will allow afterborn
grandchildren to join the class.2 56 In this example, the contingent inter-
methodology dispenses with its overt use in an effort at simplification. All that is lost in doing so is
the extra time it takes to apply the critical test to irrelevant lives in being who stand no chance at
validation. For an illustration that reveals lives in being under Step Three A and Step Three B that
inevitably fail to validate because they are in fact irrelevant to vesting, see hifra illustration IV B-I.
253. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.22 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. LYNN, supra note
34, at 58, 60-61; R. MAtIDSLEY, supra note 21, at 49, 52-53; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22,
§ 1229. Although actual cases offer greater support for the presumption of fertility at age eighty
than they do for such a presumption at age five, both are viewed as part of the fantastic possibilities
for which one must account in a careful and foolproof application of the common law rule against
perpetuities. However, these possibilities have been amended by many of the reforms that have
attempted to patch up problems caused by the common law rule. See infra note 370.
254. In this situation, courts sometimes find by implication an additional condition: that the
grandchildren must survive B. See supra note 240.
255. The gift of principal to the grandchildren is subject to open to include potential members
born after the death of A unless language or circumstances clearly indicate that A intended to pre-
clude afterborn grandchildren or unless the "rule of convenience" operates immediately to fix the
maximum size of the class. In this example, there is neither language nor circumstances that demon-
strate A's intention to restrict group membership to those born by the time of his death. Further,
because of the income interest given to B, distribution of G-l's share, and the share of any other
grandchild who attains age twenty-five, must be deferred until B's death, and the "rule of conven-
ience" will not close the class until then. Consequently, the class gift created in the grandchildren
will remain open until the death of B.
256. Absent circumstances indicating A's intent to confine grandchildren to the children of B-I.
the class of grandchildren is still subject to open and expansion even if B-I, B's only child. had
predeceased A. Presumptively, there can be afterborn grandchildren because their procreators. B's
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est of the grandchildren is not restricted to lives in being and to lives
already ended; consequently, the grandchildren cannot serve as testing
lives in being on that basis.
If, however, the hypothetical had limited the gift of principal "... to
B's grandchildren who are alive at the death of A and attain age twenty-
five," then the group of takers of the interest in question would have been
restricted to lives in being by the descriptive language used to define the
class. Thus, they would become testing lives in being.257 Additionally,
returning to the original language of the limitation, if B had predeceased
A, the "rule of convenience" would operate to close the class before the
possibility of further grandchildren had been exhausted at the death of
B's last child to die.258 More specifically, the class would be confined to
G-1 and G-2. G-l would be entitled to immediate distribution of his
minimum share because the only prerequisites to possession were the
death of B and G-1 reaching age twenty-five. Both of these were accom-
plished immediately at A's death.
The class gift is still contingent as a whole because G-2 has not yet
joined the class; nevertheless, the class has been confined to lives in being
at A's death because of a rule of construction that forecloses additional
members once the time for first distribution has arrived. Thus, in this
instance, the grandchildren will serve as testing lives in being.
259
children, are capable of being born The common law rule against perpetuities requires one to as-
sume that B, regardless of age. can have another child, B-2, and that B-2 can thereafter bear an-
other grandchild. G-3, before the death of B and before distribution must be made of the share
belonging to G-1. Accordingly. G-3 would then be eligible to join the class upon attaining age
twenty-five. For further discussion of this presumption, see supra note 253.
257 Applying the critical test to these takers of the interest in question: Must all grandchildren
join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age twenty-five within twenty-one years of the
death of one of these grandchildren? The answer is, of course, YES. Each grandchild is a life in
being and each grandchild must attain age twenty-five within his or her own lifetime. Accordingly,
each grandchild, a life in being, has an interest which must vest, if at all, within his or her own life.
The lives of the grandchildren themselves can be used, then, to make a valid proof with regard to
their respective interests.
258. For a discussion of the rule of convenience, see supra note 160.
251) If B had predeceased A. there would be no perpetuities violation. One could make a valid
proof under Step Three A using the takers of the interest in question, namely. the grandchildren
themselves. And the reasoning would be the same as before. See supra note 257. More specifically,
G-l's interest vests immediately upon creation, while G-2, a life in being at A's death, has a contin-
gent interest that must vest. if at all. within his own lifetime. If, however, G-1 had been only age
twventx-four at the death of A. the takers would not then be restricted to lives in being and to lives
alie.dy ended. The "rule of convenience" would not operate to close the class immediately at A's
death because no one i, then entitled to distribution of principal. Instead, the class would remain
open to include grandchildren born thereafter. Indeed, the class should include grandchildren born
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Finally, with respect to the original hypothetical, assume that both B
and B-1 have predeceased A and that both grandchildren are under age
twenty-five at the time of A's death. G-1 and G-2 have contingent inter-
ests, and because of the contingency they are not entitled to join the class
and share in the principal until they respectively satisfy the age require-
ment. Nevertheless, this class gift is restricted to lives in being because
the procreator of the class, B-i, is dead and because no additional pro-
creator can be born as B is also dead. Accordingly, the class of takers
whose interest is contingent is confined to lives in being because they are
not physically capable of expansion or reconstitution. Stated differently,
the class of takers cannot be expanded to include afterborn members,
nor, even if its maximum number remains fixed, can its composition be
altered to include afterborn members. Therefore, once again, one can use
these lives as testing lives in being and proceed to apply the critical
test.260
Step Three B-Step Three B operates much the same as Three A. The
potential testing lives in being, however, will be found among other tak-
ers of interests within the "same provision." "Same provision" includes
other takers of interests respecting the same subject matter. Most often,
this involves that person or those people who take prior income inter-
ests.26' It is important to note that "same provision" does not mean only
those takers who are included within the "same paragraph." Indeed,
among dispositive designs used today, it is not uncommon to find distri-
bution of the residue carried out over several paragraphs.262
The process for selecting testing lives under Step Three B can also be
illustrated by the foregoing hypothetical in its original form.263 Once
before the time in which the first grandchild actually attains age twenty-five or before the time in
which B-I dies, whichever occurs first. Consequently, given this variation of fact, the grandchildren
could not serve as testing lives in being.
260. If both B and B-1 had predeceased A, there would be no perpetuities violation. Again, a
valid proof can be made under Step Three A. And the reasoning would be the same as before. See
supra notes 257, 259. See also infra illustration IV A-I. More specifically, both G-I and 0-2, lives
in being at A's death and the only potential class members, have interests that must vest, if at all,
within their respective lifetimes.
261. See, e.g., infra illustrations IV A-I to IV A-4, IV A-6 to IV A-I 1, IV B-I, IV B-3 to IV
B-5.
262. For a collection of current will and trust forms that take multiple paragraphs to dispose of
given subject matter (for example, the residuary estate or whatever remains after the settlor's death
in the case of a revocable living trust), see R. WILKINS, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS AGREE-
MEN'rs-A SYSTEMS APPROACH (1980).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
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again, so long as B survives A, under Step Three A the takers of the
contingent gift of principal-B's grandchildren-do not constitute a
group that is confined to lives in being when the period of the rule begins.
Whether B-1 is alive at A's death is immaterial because B is alive and he
is assumed capable of having additional children who can then bear other
grandchildren before the earliest time for distribution.2" Nevertheless,
under Step Three B, someone qualifies as a testing life in being. B him-
self is an individual taker within the same provision. B is ascertained and
by descriptive language is restricted to a life in being. Consequently, one
can apply the critical test to him.265
Quite differently, assume that the hypothetical had added an income
interest following the death of B: ". . . then to B's children for the life of
the survivor of them...." B's children would constitute another group
of takers within the same provision; however, they would not qualify as
testing lives because there was no descriptive language or any other basis
for restricting the group to lives in being and because B was alive and
capable of bearing children born after A's death who would then join the
class of income beneficiaries.266
264 The earliest time for distribution will be at B's death, the time in which his income interest
ccaw, At A's death, G-I already has attained age twenty-five and, therefore, his interest vests
immediately. His interest is absolute and will pass to his successor even if G-1 thereafter fails to
survvsie B. Accordingly, G-I or his successor will be entitled to a share of principal immediately
after the death of B. As a result, the "rule of convenience" will require that the maximum size of the
class be fixed in order to make such distribution. Even if B-i has predeceased A, one cannot say
that the grandchildren are restricted to lives in being at A's death. If B has survived A, one must
pre',ume that B can have another child, B-2, and that B-2 thereafter can have a child, G-3, before
B' death-the time for distribution of G-l's interest and the closing of the class gift to the
grandchildren. For further discussion of the presumption of fertility required by the common law
rule against perpetuities, see supra note 253 and infra note 370.
205 Applying the critical test to B. one asks: Must all grandchildren join the class, if at all, by
(being horn and) attaining age twenty-five within twenty-one years of B's death? Taking into account
the po,,ible times in which potential grandchildren can join the class, one concludes that the answer
is NO The critical test requires that one examine all possibilities for remote vesting. For example,
.ilthough no grandchild can be born after the death of B and still be eligible to join the class because
o the rule of convenience, B-I (or any' afterborn child of B) might have a child after A's death who
ha' not reached age four by the time of B' death. It then becomes possible for such afterborn
grandchild to attain age tventy-five and join the class more than twenty-one year- beyond the death
of B Accordingly, B does not become a %alidating life in being.
26 With thi, variation, B's children are not restricted to lives in being at A's death as a result
of decriptive language or physical impossibility. Furthermore, they are not affected by the "rule of
convenice " Their claim to distribution of income is necessarily deferred until the death of their
parent, B, namely. until a time when there can be no more children. Accordingly, there is no occa-
sion f i the "rule of convenience" to close off membership before the possibility of additional chil-
dren has been eshausted. Finally, even if the only income interest created by A had been for the
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Applying the critical test-Before one continues to specific considera-
tion of Steps Three C and D, it should be observed that there are two
central components to each of the steps of Step Three. First, one must
determine whether a particular person or group-in Step Three A, for
example, the takers of the interest in question-is confined to lives in
being and to lives already ended at the time the period of the rule begins.
Second, assuming one has found a group that cannot include afterborn
members, the critical test must then be applied: Must the interest vest, if
at all, within twenty-one years of the death of one of these testing lives in
being?
Before proceeding with this critical test, several important observa-
tions must be made. To begin with, prior to administering the critical
test under Step Three A, Step Three B, Step Three C or Step Three D,
the methodology requires elimination of those projected testing lives who
have predeceased the point in time when the period of the rule com-
mences-that is, those lives that "have already ended." These lives be-
come unnecessary for testing because, if one adds twenty-one years to the
time of their respective deaths, such period will never exceed the twenty-
one years that are measured from the time the rule begins, namely the
testing period used in Step Four. Stated differently, assuming the period
of the rule begins at the estate owner's death, twenty-one years added to
the estate owner's death always will exceed twenty-one years added to
the death of someone who predeceases him.267 As an aside, it should also
be noted that there is no need to apply the critical test to the estate owner
under a transfer effective at his death because Step Four already accom-
plishes this. However, when an estate owner makes an irrevocable trans-
fer during his life, he can, depending on the terms of the transfer,
function as a testing life under Step Three A, Step Three B, Step Three C
or Step Three D. This will happen only if the estate owner independently
qualifies as a testing life under one of these steps. 268
benefit of B's children and not B himself, one would still be unable to conclude that the children
were restricted to lives in being. Because the "rule of convenience" should not apply to multiple
distributions of income, the class of B's children would not be restricted to those born by the time of
first distribution. See L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 649.
267. For example, consider the previous illustration involving a gift of income to B and a gift of
principal to B's grandchildren who attain age twenty-five. See supra text accompanying notes 253-
54. Suppose B had died one year before the testator, A. Adding twenty-one years to B's death
would extend to twenty years beyond the death of A. This is clearly less than the time period
permitted by the common law rule which always allows for vesting within twenty-one years of the
time interests are created-in this instance, twenty-one years beyond the death of A.
268. Under an irrevocable lifetime transfer, unless the estate owner's life or death has sonic
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After dismissing lives already ended, when one conducts the critical
test of validity under any of the parts of Step Three, and thereby specu-
lates about possibilities for remote vesting, it is very important to assume
that testing lives in being can die immediately after the period of the rule
begins and, when necessary, that their deaths can be delayed until after
they have had a child who would not be regarded as a life in being.
269
This latter assumption is predicated upon two others: that the testing
lives in being can have children whatever their age, and that they will do
so within the shortest possible time after the period of the rule begins to
run.
2 7
Once again, using the previous illustration involving B and B's
grandchildren, 271 assume that as of A's death G-1 is age twenty-six, G-2
is age twenty, B is age ninety, and B-1 is already dead. The takers of the
contingent gift of principal-the grandchildren-cannot serve as testing
lives because B, regardless of age, is assumed capable of having addi-
tional children and because these afterborn children are then assumed
capable of having children (B's grandchildren) before B dies, in which
case they would then be eligible to join the class when they attain age
twenty-five thereafter. They would be eligible to join the class because it
is not limited to existing grandchildren by descriptive language and be-
cause they would be born before the time for first distribution.272 How-
ever, under Step Three B, as a taker of another interest within the same
relevance or connection to vesting, there is no way in which he can be used to make a valid proof
under the common law rule against perpetuities. If, however, the estate owner independently quali-
fies as a testing life under Steps Three A, B, C, or D, this establishes a connection that justifies
applying the critical test to him For an illustration of a situation in which a settlor of an irrevocable
living trust does independently qualify as a testing life in being, see infra illustration IV A-I 1.
269. The common law rule against perpetuities does allow for consideration of a period of gesta-
tion Those born within a period of gestation following the time when the period of the rule begins
are regarded as lives in being. Presumably, then, a group that is limited to those born within a
period of gestation from the time a gift is created will consist exclusively of lives in being. For
further discussion of the common law rule against perpetuities in regard to the period of gestation,
'lee uzira note 364.
270. See supra note 253 and infra note 320.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
272 The "'rule of convenience" will not preclude inclusion of additional grandchildren born
before the time of B's death. Assuming that nothing in the language justifies limiting the class of
grandchildren to those alive at A's death, afterborn grandchildren will be entitled to share the prin-
cipal. Even though G-1 has an interest that is fully vested because he has already attained age
twentv-five, G-1 will not be entitled to distribution of his share until the income interest ceases at B's
death Firt distribution will not occur until then; accordingly, there is no occasion to close the class
before B's death For further discussion of the "rule of convenience," see supra notes 160-61 and
accompanying text.
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provision, B does qualify as a testing life in being. Nevertheless, in con-
ducting the critical test, one must again assume, despite B's advanced
age, that the group of grandchildren can expand and that it can do so
before B dies; namely, B can have a child at an advanced age, while that
child thereafter can have a child (B's grandchild) at an early age.
Further, in hypothesizing possibilities for remote vesting, it is irrele-
vant that one happens upon a possibility that is more than twenty-one
years beyond the death of the testing life under specific consideration and
yet is still within the life of another person who is in being. One must
carefully and faithfully observe that if this other life in being can be used
to validate, this will be accomplished elsewhere in the methodology
through the use of another step.
In applying the critical test, one should also observe that the process is
facilitated when one determines what limits exist, if any, upon the time
for fulfillment of the conditions that make the interest in question contin-
gent. For example, assume once again that A devises Blackacre: "To B
in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever used for any purpose other
than residential, then to C in fee simple absolute." Both B and C are
ascertained; accordingly, neither interest is contingent for want of a fully
identifiable taker. B's interest in fee simple is vested subject to divest-
ment in the event that B or anyone else ever uses the land for a nonresi-
dential purpose. Consequently, C's substitute executory interest is
contingent upon a violation of this ongoing restriction concerning land
use. And, after A's death, this restriction is the only condition in the
limitation that affects vesting.27 3 Now then, in using either C or B to test
273. Because the condition herein is unrelated to the life of C, one might observe that it is futile
to use him as a testing life and, therefore, one should summarily dismiss C as a testing life in being.
Professor Dukeminier, however, views all beneficiaries as causally related to vesting. For an interest
to vest, the beneficiary must be ascertained and all conditions precedent must be satisfied. Because
the former requirement must be satisfied with respect to every beneficiary, all beneficiaries are rele-
vant to and affect vesting of their own interests. And this is true for every beneficiary, even those
who are fully ascertained at the moment such interest is created. Accordingly, he maintains that all
beneficiaries should be tested in applying the common law rule and that they should also serve as
measuring lives under any "wait and see" test. Professor Waggoner, however, believes otherwise.
He admits that the common law rule against perpetuities is concerned with vesting and, conse-
quently, with those lives causally related to vesting. Nevertheless, he maintains that the rule focuses
upon aspects of vesting that are not already settled at the moment the gift is made; namely, it focuses
upon those conditions that make the interest subject to the rule in the first place. Accordingly,
because the beneficiary (C) is fully ascertained the moment the devise is made by A and because C's
life does not in any way affect the express requirement that conditions his interest (that Blackacre be
used for some purpose other than residential), Waggoner would argue that one must dismiss C as a
causal life in being and, therefore, one should not apply the critical test to him. See Dukeminier.
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under Steps Three A or B, one should observe that this condition carries
with it no restrictions upon the time for vesting because fulfillment or
breach can occur at any time; that is, the condition does not restrict vest-
ing by creating a time limit or point in time beyond which vesting cannot
occur.
2 7 4
Assume, however, the hypothetical had provided: "... however, if
Blackacre is ever used for any purpose other than residential during B's
lifetime, then to C in fee simple absolute." In this instance, the substan-
tive limitation upon land use is the same as before. However, the condi-
tion does fix a point in time beyond which vesting cannot occur, namely,
B's death.27' For another illustration, assume that A creates a testamen-
tary trust that provides: "Income to B for life, and then after B's death,
principal to the first of B's children to attain age twenty-five." Further,
assume that at A's death, B is living and that he has one child, B-l, who
is age five. The gift of principal to B's child is, of course, contingent:
attainment of age twenty-five is an express and obvious condition affect-
ing vesting. However, because B-1 may never satisfy this requirement
and because the gift is not confined to children alive at A's death, there
are two additional conditions respecting any potential child of B born
after A's death: such child must be born and all older children must fail
to attain age twenty-five. Accordingly, in using B to test under Step
Three B,276 one should observe that these conditions restrict the time for
vesting. Vesting cannot occur later than twenty-five years after a particu-
supra note 59, at 1661, 1706; Dukeminier supra note 62, at 1732-37; Dukeminier, A Final Comment
Bt Prolssor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1742 (1985); Waggoner, supra note 50, at 1719-24;
Waggoner, supra note 76.
274 Cs contingent executory interest violates the common law rule against perpetuities. For
further discussion, see infra illustration IV B-I.
275 With this limitation upon the duration of the condition, B's fee simple will become absolute
in his successor so long as the restriction upon land use is not violated during the remainder of B's
lifetime With this time limitation, it should also be clear that C's interest does not violate the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities Applying the critical test to B under Step Three B, one readily
concludes that C's interest must vest, if at all, within B's lifetime.
276 The taker of the interest under consideration ("the first of B's children to attain age twenty-
five-) cannot qualify as a testing life under Step Three A. Such taker is not restricted to a life in
being or to a life already ended because of descriptive language, because of a rule of construction, or
because of physical impossibility. Nothing in the language itself confines the gift of principal to
someone born by the time of A's death. The "rule of convenience" is irrelevant because this is not a
class gift. Further, because B is alive and presumed capable of having additional children, there is no
physxcal impossibility that precludes a gift to someone born after A's death. Quite differently, how-
ever, B will qualify as a testing life under Step Three B. By the descriptive language itself, the other
taker is restricted to someone alive at A's death.
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lar child's birth. And because it is possible that B's youngest child may
be the first to reach age twenty-five-that all elder children might die
before attaining age twenty-five-the latest point in time for vesting
would not be later than the time in which the youngest of B's children
might attain age twenty-five. Assuming B's youngest child must be born
by the time of B's death, or within a period of gestation thereafter, 277
vesting could not occur later than twenty-five years after the death of B.
With this in mind, one can apply the critical test to B. This recognition
of the latest time for vesting, however, is not enough to make a valid
proof.27
8
Additionally, in applying the critical test and assessing time limits
upon the fulfillment of relevant conditions, one must always keep in
mind the effect of other rules of construction. For example, assume that
A creates a testamentary trust that provides: "Income to B for life, and,
after B's death, then principal to B's grandchildren." At A's death,
assume that B is alive and that he has one child, B-l, and one grandchild,
G-l, who are then living. G-l's share of the gift is vested in interest
absolutely because the only apparent condition attached to each
grandchild's interest is being born. 2 7 9 However, for purposes of the com-
mon law rule, G-l's interest remains contingent until the last eligible
grandchild joins, or fails to join, the class.28° Presumably, A intends the
class of B's grandchildren to include all who may ever be born, and,
therefore, vesting under the rule cannot occur until the death of B's last
277. Given the miracles of modern science, the assumption that a person's children must be born
by the time of his or her death, or within a period of gestation thereafter, may no longer be justified.
Nevertheless, in all likelihood, courts will continue to observe this assumption, especially in deter-
mining who falls within the meaning of a gift made to a class. In this example, then, courts might
view the gift made by A as if it had been given expressly to the first of B's'children who attains age
twenty-five and is born by the time of B's death. For further discussion of this assumption, see htfra
note 337.
278. Therefore, when one applies the critical test under Step Three B, B's life will not afford a
valid proof. Must the first of B's children to attain age twenty-five do so, if at all, within twenty-one
years of B's death? The answer is, of course, NO. B-1 might die shortly after the death of A and,
thereafter, B might have another child, B-2. Further, as already observed in calculating the latest
time for vesting, B could die before B-2 attains age four, perhaps even within days of B-2's birth.
And with this assumption, it then becomes possible for B-2 to become the first to attain age twenty-
five more than twenty-one years beyond the death of B.
279. There are, however, circumstances in which courts have found additional conditions even
when the conditions are not clearly expressed. For example, courts sometimes impute a requirement
of survivorship of the time of possession or distribution. In this example, such requirement would
mean that G-1 and all other grandchildren must survive B. For further discussion, see supra note
240.
280. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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child to die-someone who may be born after A's death. Nevertheless,
because of the "rule of convenience,"28 the class of grandchildren will
be fixed at B's death. G-l has an interest that is vested and transmissible
at death. Payment must be made to him, his successors, or his estate at
B's death, and, in order to make such distribution, courts will close the
class at that time. As illustrated, in order to understand conditions and
the time for their fulfillment under the rule, and to apply the critical test,
one must first account for applicable rules of construction-in this in-
stance, the "rule of convenience.,
282
Finally, in considering any group of testing lives identified under Step
Three, one must remember two things while applying the critical test:
Must the interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of the death of
one of these testing lives in being? First, validity is established whenever
one can make a proof with a single member of the group of testing lives.
There are times, however, when one can make a valid proof with several
members. This never affects one's conclusion that the contingent interest
under consideration satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities.
Instead, it merely cumulates the opportunities for demonstrating
validity.
Second, sometimes validity as to all members of a group of takers can-
not be established with merely one member of the group of testing lives
in being, especially with one testing life who can be specifically identified.
Nevertheless, the interest in question may still satisfy the common law
rule. The requirements of the critical test will be met if one is able to find
different people within the group of testing lives that, taken collectively,
validate the interests of all members of the group of takers. Somewhat
differently, the requirements of the critical test also will be met whenever
one can demonstrate that it is logically impossible for the interests of
every member of the group of takers to vest beyond twenty-one years of
the death of some member of the group of testing lives in being-some-
one who exists and clearly falls within the group, but someone who can-
not be identified precisely at the time the rule is applied. In applying the
critical test, most people will reach this same conclusion by intuition be-
281. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
282. The "rule of convenience" is not the only rule that must be observed when one applies the
critical test. For example, one must also account for the common law rule that renders contingent
remainders destructible when applicable. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. For an
illustration of how this rule might operate to avoid a perpetuities violation, see hifra illustration IV
B-3. See also Drury v. Drury. 271 II. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1916).
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cause the methodology requires one to group people together for pur-
poses of testing.
The second point can be illustrated with this testamentary trust of A:
"Income to W, my wife, for life; thereafter, principal to my grandchil-
dren absolutely." Assume that A is survived by W and three children,
A-i, A-2 and A-3, and that A had no grandchildren by the time of his
death. Consequently, the gift to the grandchildren is contingent; specifi-
cally, each grandchild must be born before becoming eligible to join the
class. Nevertheless, this gift of principal does not cause a perpetuities
violation because one can make a valid proof with A's children under
Step Three D.
There are two ways to accomplish this. To be sure, one cannot use
A-1 to validate the interests of all grandchildren, nor can one use solely
A-2 or A-3. However, one can use A-1 to validate the interests of A-i's
potential children, A-2 to validate the interest of A-2's potential chil-
dren, and A-3 to validate the interests of A-3's potential children. The
reason for this should be clear. None of A's children can have a
grandchild of A beyond such child's death. Each set of A's grandchil-
dren must be born by the time of such grandchildren's respective parent's
death. As a result, A-i, A-2, and A-3 collectively will validate the in-
terests of all of A's potential grandchildren.
Alternatively, one can make a valid proof with a somewhat different
analysis. No grandchild of A can be born and join the class beyond the
death of A's last child to die. Although one does not know if that person
will be A-1, A-2, or A-3, one does know that either A-l, A-2, or A-3
will become the survivor beyond whose death a grandchild cannot be
born. One of A's children will become the survivor. Even though it is
not known precisely which person it will be, a valid proof can be made
with this one person. And this is all that the common law rule requires.
Step Three C-Step Three C continues the search for a viable group of
testing lives in being. It focuses on specific people or groups of people
otherwise mentioned or separately and differently mentioned within the
same provision or elsewhere in other directly related provisions. A per-
son shall be deemed "otherwise mentioned or separately and differently
mentioned" through the use of a pronoun or phrase that clearly identifies
him. Under Step Three C, specific people or groups of people qualify as
potential testing lives even if they fall within groups already considered
under Step Three A or Step Three B provided there is "separate" lan-
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guage that identifies and defines them "differently" from the person or
groups previously considered under either of these foregoing steps. It
should be emphasized that this requirement of a different definition is not
satisfied by a new description of an exact same person or group already
covered under Steps Three A or Three B. The "different mention" must
be qualitatively or quantitatively different. For example, an individual
taker is "separately and differently mentioned" when other distinct lan-
guage identifies a group of which he is a member. The same is also true
when distinct language separately identifies an individual member of a
group that is to take an interest under the provision. Further, this group
of testing lives will consist of people "otherwise mentioned," namely new
people not found under previous steps, and they will appear within the
same provision or elsewhere within other provisions directly related.
These people "otherwise mentioned" will not take any interest within the
same provision itself, although they may take through provisions else-
where within the dispositive instrument.
In applying Step Three C, especially for lives "otherwise mentioned,"
one must account for an ever present limitation imposed by the common
law rule that circumscribes the number and identity of lives that one can
use to make a valid proof. More specifically, the rule imposes a require-
ment of feasibility: this group of lives can never be so numerous or diffi-
cult to ascertain that it becomes impractical to determine when the
survivor of them has died.2" 3 For example, consider this testamentary
trust created by A: "Income to my husband, H, for life; thereafter, prin-
cipal to such of my descendants living twenty years after the death of the
survivor of all residents of the United States alive at my death." Without
more, this group of residents of the United States qualifies as testing lives
under Step Three C. And if so, the gift to A's descendants would satisfy
the common law rule because one then could say that all of A's descend-
ants must join the class, if at all, within twenty-one years of the deaths of
lives in being-namely, all residents of the United States alive at A's
death. Nevertheless, because of the extraordinary difficulty one would
encounter in tracing the life and ultimate death of each member of this
group, the common law rule rejects consideration of the entire group
and, accordingly, the group will not offer any life that qualifies as a test-
ing life in being under Step Three C.2 8 4
210 Sc'cs upra note 130. See aAo R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 21, at 88-90.
2X4 Sc' In rc Moore (1901) I Ch. 936. 938.
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Additionally, one should observe that, theoretically this same require-
ment of feasibility applies to each of the other parts of Step Three. As a
practical matter, however, the problem is not apt to materialize because
every time the issue of feasibility arises with respect to the taker of the
interest in question under Step Three A, or the taker of an other interest
under Step Three B, there is a great likelihood that the court will have
addressed the same issue already in its determination of whether or not
the gift must fail because the description of the beneficiary is too
indefinite.285
The following examples illustrate the meaning of "otherwise men-
tioned or separately and differently mentioned." Consider this variation
of a foregoing hypothetical: "Income to B for life, and after the death of
B, principal to B-i's children who attain age twenty-five."286 Assume
that both B and B-1 survive A, along with B-l's children, G-1 (age
twenty) and G-2 (age eighteen). For the reasons given previously, B-I's
children do not qualify as testing lives under Step Three A, but B does
qualify under Step Three B.287 Additionally, although B-1 is a person
who does not take any interest within the provision itself, he is "other-
wise mentioned" and, because of the descriptive language, he is a life in
being. Therefore, he qualifies under Step Three C as a testing life.288
For an example of a person or group that is "separately and differently
mentioned," assume that the gift to B's grandchildren had provided:
"... principal to B-i's children who attain age twenty-five within twenty-
one years of the death of the survivor of B-i's children alive at A's
285. For a discussion of the principle by which a gift to trust beneficiaries may fail because they
are too indefinite, see G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 34 (6th ed. 1987).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
287. See supra notes 254-60, 263-65 and accompanying text. Although B does qualify as a test-
ing life in being, after applying the critical test, one discovers that B's life will not validate the
contingent interest created in his grandchildren (the children of B-i). See supra note 265.
288. Applying the critical test to B-I, one asks: Must all grandchildren (B-I's children)join the
class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age twenty-five within twenty-one years of B-l's death?
Taking into account the possible times in which potential grandchildren can join the class, one
concludes that the answer 'is NO. The critical test requires that one examine all possibilities for
remote vesting. For example, B-I might have a child after A's death and before the time for first
distribution, which is when the class would close because of the rule of convenience-that is, before
B's death or the time G-1 or G-2 attains age twenty-five, whichever occurs last. Such afterborn
child, G-3, would, therefore, be entitled to join the class thereafter upon attaining age twenty-five.
Yet, it is also possible for B-I then to die before G-3 has attained age four. It then becomes possible
for such afterborn grandchild (B-I's child) to attain age twenty-five and join the class more than
twenty-one years beyond the death of B-I. Accordingly, B-I does not become a validating life in
being.
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death." In this instance, the survivor of G-1 and G-2 would qualify as a
testing life in being under Step Three C. To be sure, G-1 and G-2 are
takers of the interest in question, but they do not qualify under Step
Three A because the group of takers is not restricted to lives in being
and, therefore, only to G-1 and G-2.289 However, the survivor of G-1
and G-2 is also separately and differently mentioned by general descrip-
tion, though not by individual name. The survivor derives from a group
that is expressly restricted to lives in being that is "separate" from and
"different" from the potentially larger group to whom principal is ulti-
mately given-namely, B-l's children who attain age twenty-five within
the required time, including those born after A's death.290
For a second illustration of a person or group that is "separately and
differently mentioned," consider a variation of an earlier limitation.29' A
devises Blackacre: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever
used during the lifetime of the survivor of B and C for any purpose other
than residential, then to C in fee simple absolute." Once again, C and B
qualify independently as testing lives under Steps Three A and Three
B. 21 2 But when one applies the critical test to C and B independently,
289. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
290 G-1 and G-2 qualify as testing lives under Step Three C because they are a group restricted
to lives in being that is "separately and differently mentioned"; nevertheless, do these lives validate
the gift of principal to B's children, including those born after A's death? In applying the critical
test, one asks: Must all of B-l's children join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age
twenty-five within the time required by the limitation, and do so within twenty-one years of the death
of the survivor of B-l's children alive at A's death, namely, the survivor of G-1 and G-2? Clearly,
the answer is YES. The latest time for vesting and entry into the class allowed by the limitation itself
is the same as that required by the critical test-within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor
of G- I and G-2. This is so because the limitation expressly restricts the latest time for vesting to no
later than twenty-one years after the death of a specified life in being, in this case the survivor of G-1
and G-2. Indeed, the limitation itself incorporates the requirements of the critical test into the
definition of the group of beneficiaries ultimately eligible to take the gift of principal. This is the
essence of every saving clause and every saving phrase. See Becker, Estate Planning and the Reality
oj Perpetuitiei Problems Today: Reliance Upon Statutory Reform and Saving Clauses Is Not Enough,
t4 W xsH. U.L.Q. 287, 383-90, 408-16 (1986). Consequently, with respect to the contingent interests
of G-I and G-2, the interest of the first to die must vest, if at all, before the death of the survivor,
while the survivor's interest must vest, if at all, within his own lifetime. For children of B-1 born
after A's death, only those who are born and attain age twenty-five within twenty-one years of the
death of the survivor of G-I and G-2 will satisfy the requirements of the limitation and thus be
eligible to join the class. Of necessity, they will all join the class, or fail to join it, within the period of
time allowed by the critical test.
291 See supra text accompanying notes 273-75.
292 B and C qualify as testing lives in being because they are ascertained and because the de-
scriptive language identifies them specifically by name.
1989] 1049
Washington University Open Scholarship
1050 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:949
neither life in being validates C's contingent interest.293 Nevertheless,
one of them is "separately and differently mentioned." One of them will
become the "survivor"-although we do not know who it will be-and
as a "survivor," C or B is "separately and differently mentioned." Fur-
ther, when one applies the critical test to the "survivor," there is a proof
of validity under the common law rule.294
Finally, it should be observed that testing lives in being discovered
through Step Three C sometimes are found in "other provisions" that
also deal with other property or ostensibly with other matters. This step,
however, does not require that one look to every other person or group
mentioned in the entire dispositive instrument. Above all, there must be
some direct relation between such mentioned person or group and the
interest in question.295 There must be some expressed connection be-
293. Applying the critical test to C, one must ask: Will C's interest vest, if at all, in C or C's
successors by breach of the restriction upon land use within twenty-one years of the death of C?
After taking into account the possible times in which C's interest might vest as a result of the breach
of condition, one concludes that the answer is NO. Herein one cannot eliminate all possibilities for
remote vesting. While B is still alive, C may die before violation of the restriction and, accordingly,
C is entitled to transmit his contingent executory interest to another person. Thereafter, B might
continue using the land only for residential purposes over the next thirty years and, then, breach the
restriction upon land use. In this situation, the interest would vest in C's successor more than
twenty-one years beyond the death of C. Accordingly, C does not become a validating life in being.
Applying the critical test to B, one must ask: Will C's interest vest, if at all, in C or C's successors
by breach of the restriction upon land use within twenty-one years of the death of B? After taking
into account the possible times in which C's interest might vest as a result of the breach of condition,
one concludes that the answer is NO. Herein one cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting.
While C is still alive, B may die before violation of the restriction and, accordingly, B is entitled to
transmit his defeasible fee simple to another person. Then B's successor might continue using the
land only for residential purposes over the next thirty years and breach the restriction upon land use
before C's death. Given these circumstances, the interest would vest in C more than twenty-one
years beyond the death of B. Accordingly, B does not become a validating life in being.
294. Must the interest vest, if at all, in C or his successors upon violation of the restriction upon
land use within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of B and C? The answer is, of course,
YES. The survivor is, necessarily, a life in being at A's death, and, although one does not know who
the survivor will be, the task of tracing him is not an unreasonable one. Consequently, one can
conclude that C's interest must vest or fail in C or his successors within the lifetime of a person who
is necessarily in being at A's death. At the death of the survivor, if there has been no violation of the
land use restriction, the executory interest of C will fail and B's interest will become absolute in his
successor.
295. Without finding some direct relation to the interest in question, there is no way that one can
make a valid proof with a person mentioned in another provision. Such other person must be con-
nected to events affecting vesting or possession of the interest under consideration. A determination
of whether the necessary relevance is present may not always be an easy matter. If in doubt about
whether the appropriate connection can be made, one should treat such person or persons as "people
otherwise mentioned" and include them under Step Three C. Nothing will be lost other than the
additional time it might take to conduct this step.
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tween these lives and the operation of the interest with regard to posses-
sion or vesting.296 The most common example of this297-and almost
always the only one within a dispositive instrument that introduces an
otherwise or separately and differently mentioned group of lives in an
"other provision directly related"-is the saving clause. Invariably, the
group within the saving clause will consist of "all beneficiaries under this
instrument who are alive" when the period of the rule commences.298
Step Three D-Step Three D is the final one in the search for viable
testing lives in being. Under the circumstances developed in this step, it
may become necessary to determine whether the parents of takers of the
interest in question qualify as testing lives and, if so, it may also become
necessary to use them in applying the critical test. One examines these
parents only if the takers themselves fail to constitute a group of testing
lives2"9 and only if these parents as a group differ in some respect from
296. Although the common law rule against perpetuities imposes its time constraint only upon
vesting, many saving clauses go further and control the duration of trusts and thus the time for
possession as well. See Becker, supra note 290, at 384-85.
297. Beyond saving clauses, there may be other people mentioned in directly related provisions.
For esample, because of powers granted to executors and trustees, one might view them as directly
related Accordingly, one should consider them for testing under Step Three C. Nevertheless, exec-
utors and trustees seldom qualify for actual testing under this step because they usually may be
replaced upon death or resignation by someone not in being when the period of the rule commences.
Sec infra notes 451-52 and accompanying text.
Additionally, under Step Three C. one might contemplate testing people mentioned in other dis-
positive provisions. These other provisions could be related directly to the one under specific consid-
eration This especially would be true if the provision under consideration involves a gift of the
residue and the others contain contingent interests that may render such disposition incomplete if
requisite conditions are not satisfied. Because the failure of a specific devise or bequest can affect
distribution of the residue and the composition of a residuary class gift, one must account for these
ctrcuhstances and apply Step Three C to people identified in these specific gifts. The reverse, how-
ever, should not be true. Unless the terms of a specific gift or of the residue itself can affect vesting,
distribution or termination of the specific gift under consideration in relation to the gift of the residue
itself, people mentioned in the residue are not directly related and will not qualify under Step Three
C. Nevertheless, when in doubt, one should apply Step Three C. Once again, nothing is to be lost
except the time it takes to apply Step Three C itself. Because the number of people mentioned in
dispositive .instruments is limited and not open ended, this additional time will not be great even if
one were to apply Step Three C to everyone identified in other provisions.
298 See, e.g., MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 9271 (1968 & Supp. 1983). For a discussion of saving
clauses and the problems they present, see Becker, supra note 290, at 378-416.
299). Professor Waggoner believes that the critical test should be applied to people connected to
the transaction and that these people always include persons related by blood or adoption to the
taker of the interest in question. See Waggoner, supra note 40, at 1716-17. Presumably, this group
of blood relatives always includes the taker's parents. Professor Dukeminier essentially agrees,
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other testing lives in being identified under Steps Three B and C.300
This step can be illustrated with a previous limitation involving a gift
in trust of income to B for life and, thereafter, principal to B's grandchil-
dren who attain age twenty-five.3 1 In this instance, assume that B, B-I,
G-1 (age twenty) and G-2 (age eighteen) survive A. No validation can
be established under Steps Three A, B, or C.30 2 Under Step Three D,
although one can identify the parents-B's children-of the takers of the
interest-B's grandchildren-as a group distinct from others identified
under previous steps, 30 3 these parents will not qualify as testing lives in
being. Because B is alive and capable of having additional children who,
although he would include the taker's parents among a more focused group of testing lives, namely,
persons who can affect vesting:
Any person who can affect the time a future interest vests in possession is causally related
to vesting of the interest. An interest is vested in interest when (1) the beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries are ascertained and (2) any condition precedent is satisfied. Accordingly, the per-
sons who can affect vesting in interest are:.. .(b) Any person who can affect the identity of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries (such as A in a gift to A's children); ....
Dukeminier, supra note 130, at 1875.
Nevertheless, it should be apparent that there are circumstances in which it becomes pointless to
test a taker's or takers' parents. The only conditions that a taker's parents can affect as such are
birth and events that are specifically connected in time to birth. Under this methodology, if the
takers themselves previously have qualified under Step Three A as testing lives, it means that the
group already is restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended, and that no one may affect
their identity thereafter by producing an afterborn member. Further, if the lives of the takers them-
selves have failed to validate under Step Three A, it should be clear that the condition involved is
unrelated to their lives or deaths-or to a point in time within twenty-one years of their death-and
that the lives of their parents (and all other ancestors) who have affected their existence are going to
fail as well. To be sure, when the takers have previously qualified as testing lives-when the takers
are restricted to lives in being-parents and others related to the takers sometimes can affect vesting
by having a causal relationship to its fulfillment or breach. Nevertheless, these circumstances arise
only when there is a special connection to vesting other than birth. And whenever this special
connection exists, the takers' parents (and all other relatives) previously will have qualified for test-
ing under Step Three B or Step Three C.
300. This requirement appears in the following question contained in Step Three D: Do such
parents fully coincide with-testing lives in being previously tested under either Step Three B or Step
Three C? Its purpose is the same as the requirement of "separately and differently mentioned"
under Step Three C-to avoid repetitious testing and, thereby, achieve greater economy in applying
the methodology. Nevertheless, if one is ever in doubt as to whether the takers' parents fully coin-
cide with those previously tested, there is no harm in applying the critical test to such parents.
Nothing can be lost except for the time it takes to conduct the test.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
302. For a comparable illustration in which it is demonstrated why no validation can be estab-
lished under Steps Three A, B, and C, see infra illustration IV A-6.
303. Quite obviously, under Step Three A, B's children are not the takers of the interest in
question. Under Step Three B, B-not his children-is the other taker within the provision. Fi-
nally, absent a saving clause, there is no one otherwise mentioned or separately and differently men-
tioned that qualifies under Step Three C.
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before the death of B, are also presumed capable of having children who
would then become potential takers,3 °4 one cannot say that these par-
ents-B' s children-consist exclusively of lives in being and lives already
ended.
If, however, B had predeceased A, the taker's parents-B's children,
herein B-l-would qualify for testing under Step Three D. Because both
G-1 and G-2 were under the required age at A's death and, therefore,
were not entitled to immediate distribution, the class of takers would not
be confined to lives in being.30 5 It would include those born thereafter, at
least until the first grandchild qualified for distribution by attaining age
twenty-five. Accordingly, under Step Three D, one can now examine the
parents of the takers. Who are the parents that provide the relationship
necessary to the description of the takers, namely, B's grandchildren?
They are, of course, B's children. Are they restricted to lives in being
and to lives already ended at A's death? The answer is YES because B
has predeceased A and, therefore, the group of parents is not capable of
expansion or reconstitution to include those born after A's death. Conse-
quently, assuming that B's children have not qualified as testing lives
under Step Three B (because they are not an "other taker") or Step
Three C (because they are not "otherwise mentioned"), they will qualify
under Step Three D. Therefore, one can apply the critical test to B's
only child, B-1.3 °6
304 Because of the "rule of convenience," the class of grandchildren will not necessarily remain
open to include all the grandchildren B will ever have. Instead, the maximum membership will be
fixed at the time of first distribution. This will occur at fls death or at the time in which the first of
B's grandchildren attains age twenty-five, whichever happens last. However, nothing in the descrip-
tive language confines the class of grandchildren to those born by the time of A's death, nor does
anything restrict the class to those born to B's children alive at A's death. The only time constraint
is the one imposed by the "rule of convenience." that the afterborn child of B and such child's child
must be born by the time of first distribution. Presumptively, then, B can have another child, B-2,
who could then have another grandchild. G-3, before B's death. B-2 is then the parent who pro-
sides the necessary relationship for a grandchild who qualifies as a taker of the interest in question.
Given the inclusion of B-2's child, quite obviously, the parents who provide the necessary relation to
the takers in question are not restricted to lives in being at A's death.
305 If, however, G-1 already had attained age twenty-five by the time of A's death, the class of
grandchildren entitled to share in the gift of principal then would be confined to those alive at A's
death, namely, G-1 and G-2. Because G-l's interest had vested upon creation and because this
entitled G-1 to immediate distribution of his interest, the "rule of convenience" would thereby fix
the maximum class membership at A's death and preclude all grandchildren born thereafter. See
%upra notes 160-61.
306 In applying the critical test to B-I, one asks: Must all potentially eligible grandchildren of
B join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age twenty-five within twenty-one years of
B-I's death? The answer is NO. Surely, it is possible for B-1 to have another child, G-3, before
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One additional observation must be made with respect to answering
this important question within Step Three D: Do the parents of the tak-
ers in question consist exclusively of lives in being and lives already
ended? When the period of the rule begins, if the description of the po-
tential taker or group of takers makes it impossible to determine exactly
who they are and, therefore, whether their parents are lives in being and
lives already ended, then the answer to this question must be NO. This
problem of identifying takers and their parents will arise in those situa-
tions in which the takers are defined in terms that do not reveal a specific
person, group, or generation known at the time the gift is made.1 7
This situation can be illustrated with a variation of the foregoing ex-
ample."0 8 If the gift of principal is to B's grandchildren, one can readily
identify the taker's parents as B's children. If, however, the gift of princi-
pal were ". . . to B's descendants (other than children), per capita, who
attain age twenty-five," it then becomes impossible to determine the ex-
act mix of generations that ultimately will comprise the membership of
this class gift. Accordingly, it is impossible to determine the identity of
their parents.309 This also would be true if B had predeceased A. As-
suming that none of B's descendants attained age twenty-five by the time
of A's death,310 it is impossible to determine which generations of B's
either G-1 or G-2 attains age twenty-five, the point in time at which the maximum membership of
the class of grandchildren is fixed because of the "rule of convenience." And, of course, B-I then
might die before G-3 arrives at age four. With these events in mind, it then becomes possible for
G-3 to join the class by attaining age twenty-five more than twenty-one years after the death of B-I.
307. This problem arises when the identity of the takers and their parents can change because
those who currently satisfy the description' an have children and then die, and this can happen again
and again until the time set for final determination of the group of people entitled to take. Coni-
monly, it arises when the description of the takers at the time such interest is created does not
identify a specific person, a specific group of people, or a specific generation of takers. Even though
specific takers have not been determined precisely at the time of creation, this problem should not
arise in those situations in which potential takers can be identified generationally. This problem
must not be confused, however, with the common law rule against perpetuities' general requirement
that it must be feasible to trace the lives used to validate an interest, or, more specifically, that the
number of lives used to validate should be reasonble and that it should not be impracticable to
ascertain their identity. This latter requirement applies in all situations in which testing lives arc
being gathered for the purpose of validation. See supra note 130.
308. See supra text accompanying note 301.
309. For further explanation and illustration, see infra notes 311-12.
310. If, however, G-1 had already attained age twenty-five by the time of A's death, the "rule of
convenience" would require that the maximum class membership be fixed immediately. G-I would
be entitled to distribution. To accomplish this a court would close the class to G-1 and G-2 and,
hypothetically, to any other descendants of B born by the time of A's death. In this situation, there
would be no perpetuities violation because a valid proof could be accomplished under Step Three A.
Because of the "rule of convenience," the takers themselves would be restricted to lives in being.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
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descendants ultimately might comprise the class members eligible to
share in the principal. Consequently, it also becomes impossible to
determine the identity of their parents and whether these parents consist
exclusively of lives in being and lives already ended at A's death.312
The entire group of potential testing lives must be in being: an excep-
tion-Before proceeding to Step Four, recall that, to qualify as a testing
life in being under Step Three, each individual or group must be re-
stricted to lives in being and to lives already ended when the period of the
rule begins. One should observe, however, that there are limited and rare
circumstances31 3 in which lives in being within a group must qualify as
And ais to each taker, none could attain age twenty-five beyond his own death, namely, beyond the
death of one who is in being at A's death. Their interests must either vest before their respective
deaths or they must fail at their respective deaths.
311 Changing the foregoing facts slightly, assume that (-I and G-2 are ages three and one,
rcpectively, at A's death. Now that B has predeceased A, the class will include all descendants who
attain age tssenty-five and are born before the first descendant attains age twenty-five. Once again,
the "'rule of convenience" should fix the maximum membership when the first descendant is able to
claim distribution of his share of the principal. With this in mind, what possibilities exist? To be
sure, it is conccivable that no additional descendants will be born by the time G-I attains age
iswenty-five. If so, the class membership is restricted to two grandchildren, G-1 and G-2-assuming
G-2 attains age twenty-five. However, it is also possible that G-1 will not attain age twenty-five and
that before hi,. death he has a child, X. In this situation, assume further that G-2 does become the
first desccndant to satisfy the age requirement. Nevertheless, before he does so, assume further that
B-I has an additional child. G-3, and that G-3 has two children, Y and Z. If each of these people
attain, age twventv-five, the class of takers will include G-2, G-3, X, Y, and Z-two grandchildren
and three greatgrandchildren of B. These possibilities and others exist at the death of A. Accord-
igly,. it is impossible to predict the generational composition of the class members entitled to share
in the principal. Indeed, it is impossible to make this prediction at the death of A, the time when the
period of the rule commences and the time when possibilities are to be determined in light of known
facts
312, Using the possibilities presented in the first example of note 311. supra, the parent that
provides the necessary relationship is B-I. In this instance, such parent is a life in being at A's
death Nevertheless, in the second example, the parents who provide the necessary relationship are
B- I and G-1, lives in being ~t A's death, and G-3, a parent who was born after A's death. Indeed,
with each combination of possibilities for ultimate class membership there are corresponding pos-
sbiiliiies for their parents. Because one cannot predict the class composition, one cannot reach a
conclusion about who their parents might be and whether they must be lives in being at A's death.
Accordingly, in this situation, one cannot resort to Step Three D as a source for testing lives.
313. These circumstances were discovered by Jonathan Goldstein, then a student and research
asistant at the Washington University School of Law. He believed that there must be some situa-
tions ii which one of the groups identified within Step Three could produce a validating life in being
escn though the entire group itself was not restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended. He
"as correct. However, given the limitations he needed to use to illustrate his point, my initial reac-
tion vias to ignore the circumstances altogether. Surely, conditions so absurd do not deserve to be
upheld But he was still correct Consequently, these special circumstances are addressed. Because
they are so rare, this treatment is not made a part of the formal four step methodology or the
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testing lives even though the entire group itself is not restricted to lives in
being and to lives already ended. This situation arises whenever the oc-
casion for fulfillment or failure under the requisite condition is tied to an
event which must happen before or at the time in which the first member
of the group dies. One way or another, the time of death of the first
member of the group to die must be critical.
For example, it can be critical because the condition attached to the
interest in question must be fulfilled when the first member dies or within
a period of time directly connected to such death. It also can be critical
because the interest in question may fail if the first member of the group
dies before a designated time. The following. testamentary trusts illus-
trate some of these circumstances: "Income to B for life; thereafter, prin-
cipal to his grandchildren absolutely who are living when the first (or
any) of his grandchildren dies";314 "Income to B for life; thereafter, prin-
cipal to such of his grandchildren who attain age thirty within twenty-
one years of the death of the first of B's children to die"; "Income to B
for life, then income to B's children for the life of the survivor of them;
thereafter, principal to B's grandchildren absolutely if all of them are
then living"; "Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to B's grandchil-
dren absolutely when the first grandchild 'retires' (or when the first
grandchild 'leaves' the city of St. Louis, Missouri)."3 5
Whenever any of the foregoing kinds of limitation occur, one must ask:
Does this group contain any lives in being when the period of the rule
commences? If the answer is NO, then one dismisses the group and pro-
ceeds to the next step. If, however, the answer is YES, then one must
apply the critical test to members within the group who are lives in be-
addenda discussed in Part Three B-I. After considerable thought and countless hypotheticals. I
now believe that this discussion fully accounts for the aberrational musings of research assistants.
But, one never knows for certain.
314. Once again, one must carefully observe that this exception does not apply unless fulfillment
or failure of the event to which the requisite condition is tied ittst happen before or at the time in
which the first member of the group dies. Stated otherwise, death must be an event that necessarily
determines the time of fulfillment or failure of the condition. Consequently, unlike the examples in
the text, the following illustrations do not qualify under this exception. "Income to B for life: there-
after, principal to his grandchildren absolutely who are living when the first of his grandchildren
attains age thirty"; "Income to B for life; thereafter, principal to his grandchildren absolutely who
are living when the first of his grandchildren graduates from law school"; "Income to B for life, and
then income to B's children for the life of the survivor of them; thereafter, principal to B's grandchil-
dren absolutely if all have attained age thirty."
315. This illustration assumes that "retirement" can occur during life, but that it must occur at
death. Similarly, the substitute illustration assumes that one cannot remain in St. Louis after death,
[Vol. 67:949
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ing. And in doing so, one must recognize and hypothesize that such test-
ing lives in being may or may not become the first member of the group
to die."'
For example, consider this testamentary trust created by A: "Income
to B for life, then income to B's children for theirjoint lives; thereafter,
principal absolutely to B's grandchildren born before and alive at the
termination of such life estates." At A's death, assume that B and B-1 (a
child of B) are living. Also assume that B has had no grandchildren and
no other children by the time of A's death. The interest under considera-
tion is the gift of principal to B's grandchildren. Each grandchild's share
is contingent upon birth and survivorship to an appointed time, and the
common law rule requires that all grandchildren must satisfy these con-
ditions and join the class within the allowed period of time. Under Step
Three A, one cannot say that B's grandchildren-the takers of the inter-
est in question-are restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended.
Indeed, the entire class of grandchildren will consist of lives born after
the death of A. Under Step Three B, one cannot say that B's children-
other takers within the provision-are restricted to lives in being and to
lives already ended. B is alive at A's death and can have other children
who would be entitled to share in the income interest that becomes pos-
sessory after B's death. Nevertheless, the income interest given to B's
children is for their joint lives and, therefore, it must terminate upon the
death of the first to die. And one should also observe that this is the time
at which the conditions of birth and survival for grandchildren must be
satisfied. With this in mind, one must ask: Does this group contain any
lives in being when the period of the rule commences? The answer is, of
course, YES. B-1 is alive at A's death; accordingly, one must apply the
critical test to B-1. Must all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at all,
by (being born and) surviving the first of B's children to die, within
twenty-one years of the death of B-i? Here again, the answer is YES. If
316 The special situations described in the text can be proliferated almost ad infinitum. For
example, these kinds of circumstances also arise whenever fulfillment or failure of the requisite con-
dition is tied to an event which must happen before or at the time in which the second member of the
group dies. This can be illustrated with the following testamentary trust: "'Income to B for life;
thereafter principal to B's grandchildren absolutely who are living when the second of his grandchil-
dren dies." Faced with such a condition, in applying Step Three A, one must ask: Does this group
of grandchildren (the takers of the interest in question) contain two lives in being when the period of
the rule commences? If the answer is NO. then one must dismiss the group and proceed to the next
step. If, however, the answer is YES, then one must apply the critical test to members within the
group who are lives in being, recognizing that such testing lives may or may not be the first two
members of the group to die.
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B-1 is the first of B's children to die, then all grandchildren must join the
class, if at all, at the time of B-l's death. If, however, B-1 is not the first
to die, then all grandchildren must join the class, if at all, within the
lifetime of B-1. Under either circumstance, the determination is made
within the required time period. Consequently, the gift to B's grandchil-
dren satisfies the common law rule.
Step Four-Step Four is the final step, and it should be applied if,
under Step Three, one is unable to find testing lives or one is unable to
validate with them. 317 Step Four does not use any life in being. Instead,
it tests with the allowed period of years only: Must the interest vest, if at
all, within twenty-one years of the time the period of the rule begins? It
should be observed, once again, that to conduct this test, one must antici-
pate all possibilities for remote vesting, and that one can facilitate this
issessment by determining whether there is a point in time beyond which
vesting cannot occur.318
This can be illustrated with a previous example involving a gift in trust
of income to B for life and of principal to his grandchildren who attain
age twenty-five. 319 Assume that B, B-1, G-1 (age twenty) and G-2 (age
eighteen) survive A. Under Step Two, the grandchildren's interest is
contingent. Individually there are two conditions: each grandchild must
be born and attain age twenty-five. Further, for purposes of the common
law rule, their interests will not vest until the last eligible grandchild has
satisfied, or fails to satisfy, these conditions. Under Step Three A, the
grandchildren themselves do not qualify as testing lives because they are
not restricted to lives in being.320 B does qualify under Step Three B;32
nevertheless, his own life fails to validate. Do these conditions set a time
beyond which vesting cannot occur? The answer is YES, and that latest
possible point in time is twenty-five years after the death of the last of B's
children to die.322 When one applies the critical test, it is possible for B's
317. Step Four can, of course, be applied before Step Three. And there are circumstances in
which one will do this, especially when it is apparent that a proof of validity can be accomplished
immediately under Step Four. See hifra note 484.
318. To apply the critical test throughout this methodology, one must understand all possibili-
ties for vesting and the point in time, if there is one, beyond which vesting cannot occur. See supra
notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
319. See supra text accompanying note 301.
320. For further explanation, see supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
321. B is an other taker who by the descriptive language is specifically identified as an existing
person. Accordingly, B qualifies as a testing life in being.
322. Given the fact that neither G-1 nor G-2 has attained age twenty-five by the time of A's
[Vol. 67:949
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children to live more than twenty-one years after his death and bear ad-
ditional children-B's grandchildren-thereafter, who could then join
the class by attaining age twenty-five well beyond twenty-one years from
the time of B's death. Absent a saving clause, no one else is otherwise
mentioned or separately and differently mentioned that would qualify as
a testing life in being under Step Three C.32 3 Under Step Three D,
although B-1 is alive at A's death and is a parent of the takers, B himself
is also alive and capable of having additional children, namely, additional
procreators of the class of grandchildren. Therefore, no one qualifies
under Step Three D as a testing life in being.3 24
Finally, one arrives at the test of Step Four: Must the last eligible
grandchild join the class, if at all, within twenty-one years of A's death,
the time when the period of the rule begins? Surely, the answer is NO.
The last possible time for vesting would be twenty-five years beyond the
death of the last of B's children to die.325 Clearly, this can occur more
than twenty-one years after the time of A's death.3 26 Accordingly, this
gift of principal to B's grandchildren violates the common law rule and it
must fail.
death, it is possible that neither will satisfy that condition. And it is also possible that no grandchild
will have attained age twenty-five by the time of B's death or before the death of the survivor of B's
children, whether it be B-1 or another child born after the death of A. If no grandchild satisfies this
age requirement before the deaths of B and all of his children, the "rule of convenience" will not
close the class prematurely. Instead, the class will be open to all the grandchildren ever born who
actually attain age twenty-five. With this in mind, it is conceivable that the last grandchild will be
born at the latest possible time, namely, at the death of the surviving child of B, or within a period of
gestation thereafter. Accordingly, it then becomes possible for that grandchild to satisfy the age
requirement and join the class twenty-five years later. Cf. supra notes 275-78 and accompanying
IC\t
323 A uses the pronoun "his" to describe and define the interest in question-the gift of princi-
pal to B's grandchildren. B does. of course, qualify as an other taker under Step Three B. Through
the pronoun "his," he is also "separately" mentioned. Nevertheless, to avoid unnecessary and repe-
titious testing, Step Three C also requires that one must be "differently" mentioned. And in this
instance B is not qualitatively or quantitatively mentioned "differently." For further discussion of
this requirement under Step Three C. see supra notes 282-94 and accompanying text.
324, Se upra notes 303.04 and accompanying text.
325 S e 'upra note 322.
326 This conclusion should be quite obvious; regardless, it can be confirmed with a simple illus-
tration Surely, it is possible for B-1 to have another child, G-3, two years after the death of A but
befre the death of B. It then becomes possible for G-3 to satisfy the age requirement and join the
class twenty-seven years after the death of A Under this scenario, it has become possible for a
giandchild to join the class beyond the twenty-one year period allowed by the common law rule.
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IV. THE METHODOLOGY APPLIED-SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
The purpose of this section is to provide illustrations that promote fur-
ther understanding of the foregoing methodology. For many, the preced-
ing statement and explanations afford a sufficient understanding to apply
the methodology. If so, a careful reading of Part Four becomes unneces-
sary. For others, however, a series of examples are needed to enhance
and confirm comprehension of this approach to solving perpetuities
problems. In either situation, more than enough illustrations are pro-
vided to perfect one's technique. Accordingly, many readers will find it
unnecessary to proceed through each of the illustrations. Some of the
examples used for this instructional purpose derive from classic cases327
actually involving the common law rule against perpetuities, while others
do not.328 In each instance, however, the selected illustration is designed
to demonstrate the methodology and to enable its user to become adept
in its application. At the outset, each step of the methodology wilJ be
carefully addressed, just as one might do while attempting to master
something foreign and complex. In some of the subsequent examples,
however, the discussion will proceed directly to the critical steps of the
methodology, just as one might do after developing a facility for this
testing process.
327. See, e.g., infra illustrations IV A-6 to IV A-I 1, IV B-I to IV B-2. Illustration IV A-6
combines the problems of the "fertile octogenarian" and the "precocious toddler." For a discussion
of these problems and references to cases that raise them, see R. LYNN, supra note 34, at 60-61;
Leach, supra note 1I, at 643. Illustration IV A-7 presents the problem created by two generation
trusts. For a discussion of this problem and references to cases that raise it, see McGovern, Perpetu-
ities Pitfalls and How Best to Avoid Them, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 155, 165-68 (1971).
Illustrations IV A-8 and IV A-10 present problems created by the use of powers of appointments.
For a discussion of these problems and references to cases that raise them, see id. at 168-70. Illustra-
tion IV A-9 presents the problem of the "unborn widow." For a discussion of this problem and
references to cases that raise it, see id. at 157-60. Illustration IV A-I1 presents the problem created
by the irrevocable living trust. For a discussion of this problem and references to cases that raise it,
see id. at 170-72. Illustration IV B-I presents the problem created by a restriction upon land use
that lasts for an indefinite period of time. See. e.g., Brattle Square Church v. Grant. 3 Gray 142
(Mass. 1855). Illustration IV B-2 presents the problem of the "administrative contingency." For a
discussion of this problem and references to cases that raise it, see Leach, supra note 11, at 644-46.
328. See, e.g., infra illustrations IV A-I to IV A-5. One should observe, however, that these
other illustrations are not pure fabrication. Although they may not derive from classic perpetuities
cases, they do employ familiar dispositive designs and they do resemble perpetuities illustrations that
frequently appear in the literature. See, e.g., R. MAUIDSI.EY, supra note 21, at 46-48; Leach, supra
note 11. at 641-42.
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A. Variations on a Previous Theme: "Income to B for life; thereafter,
principal to B's grandchildren."
1. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of B's grandchildren who attain
age thirty." Further, assume that B and all of his children predecease
A,3-'2 nevertheless, assume that B's grandchildren, G-l, G-2, and G-3,
do survive A, and that each of these grandchildren is under age five. Is
there a violation of the common law rule against perpetuities?
Beginning with Step One, when does the period of the rule commence?
Because the trust is created by A's will and because A's will can be al-
tered until the time of his death, the property is not "tied up" until then
and, therefore, the period of the rule must begin at A's death.
Under Step Two A, B's interest has failed, but is the remaining interest
in B's grandchildren contingent? To be sure, the interest of each of B's
grandchildren alive at A's death-G-l, G-2, and G-3-is expressly con-
tingent upon attaining age thirty. If afterborn grandchildren were a pos-
sibility, the interest of such grandchildren would also be contingent upon
their respective births.33° Finally, because this is a class gift, the entire
gift to the grandchildren is deemed contingent under the common law
rule until the last eligible member joins, or fails to join, the class.33'
Under the facts presented, at A's death, B and B's children are already
dead; accordingly, there can be no more grandchildren beyond G-l, G-2,
and G-3. B's grandchildren are fully ascertained; therefore, one must
conclude under Step Two B that the interest is not subject to multiple
conditions because the age requirement is the only relevant condition.
Examining Step Three A, are B's grandchildren restricted to lives in
being and to lives already ended when the period of the rule begins? Be-
cause B and his children have predeceased A, the class of grandchildren
is not physically capable of expansion or reconstitution to include those
that are afterborn and, therefore, the answer must be YES. Accordingly,
under Step Three A, one can then test with the grandchildren-the tak-
ers themselves. Must the interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years
321) if. however. B or an of his children had survived A. then there would be a perpetuities
lolation as to the gift of principal to B's grandchildren. See infra illustration IV A-6.
330 Interest,, created in persons who are unascertained because they are not yet born are classi-
tied as contingent Se L. Simi s & A. Smi it, lsupra note 22. § 152. Accordingly. this condition is
inherent In any class gift that is subiject to open to include members born after the time the disposi-
[i\ c Inst Inlicnt takes cfcct.
331 &c uprt notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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of the death of one of these grandchildren? Will the class of grandchil-
dren be fully determined within this period of time? The answer is, of
course, YES and, consequently, the gift of principal is valid. Although
each grandchild will require more than twenty-one years from the time
of A's death to reach age thirty, none can attain that age beyond their
respective deaths. No grandchild can satisfy the age requirement and
join the class beyond his own death-beyond the death of a testing life in
being. Each interest within the class, therefore, must vest or fail within
the lifetime of one of the testing lives in being.
2. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of B's children who attain age
twenty-one." Also assume that in this instance B survives A and, at A's
death, B is childless.332 Unlike the previous illustration, A gives the prin-
cipal to B's children and not to his grandchildren; however, in both situa-
tions, there is an age requirement. Is there a violation of the common
law rule against perpetuities?
Under Step One, the analysis is the same as before-the period of the
rule commences at A's death. Under Step Two A, the analysis is similar
to the one developed in the first illustration. B has survived A, but his
332. The analysis of the problem would be the same if B had had a child, B-I, who predeceased
A, assuming that such child's interest was not preserved by an antilapse statute. Antilapse statutes
do preserve the interests of certain relatives for the benefit of statutorily determined substitute takers,
usually descendants of the devisee or legatee. Nevertheless, many of these statutes do not expressly
comprehend class gifts, and some courts have interpreted these statutes in a manner that excludes
class gifts. Others have applied these statutes to class gifts the same as gifts to individuals. The
rationale used to justify this expansive interpretation rests upon the view that estate owners generally
wish to treat family members within a class equally. The purpose of antilapse statutes is to do more
than prevent a lapse. They are also intended to preserve equality of distribution inherent within the
dispositive scheme adopted by a testator.
In this illustration, it is assumed that A wants to treat the children of B equally and that he would
want to include the descendants of B-I, who naturally represent B-I, if B-1 were to predecease A.
Accordingly, if B-I were to have attained twenty-one before predeceasing A and if B-I were to have
left a child, G-1. who survived A, then under this interpretation G-1 would be entitled to the share
B-I would have received if he had survived A. If, of course, B-I had never attained age twenty-one,
then G-1 would be excluded just the same as if B-I had survived A but had died thereafter before
satisfying the age requirement. For a discussion of antilapse statutes and their application to class
gifts, see 5 AMERICAN LAW or PROPERTY §§ 22.48-22.51 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
The Restatement takes the same position but only when the antilapse statute, by its terms or by
judicial interpretation, applies to class gifts. It also closes the class and fixes the maximum member-
ship in an immediate gift if there is a substitute taker that qualifies as a result of the antilapse statute.
The Restatement applies this principle even though it may preclude afterborn members of the fam-
ily. See RFiSTATI.iMI.NT (SICOND) 01: PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 26. 1, § 26.1 comment
I, § 27.2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1986). One wonders whether this latter position doesn't contravene the
rationale of equality of distribution that underlies application of antilapse statutes to class gifts.
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interest is vested.33 3 However, with regard to B's potential children there
are two obvious conditions that make their respective interests contin-
gent. There is the express condition that each must attain age twenty-
one; however, before that can be fulfilled there is the obvious require-
ment of ascertainment-the birth of such child. And, once again, be-
cause this is a class gift, the interest of each class member remains
contingent under the common law rule until the class membership is
fully determined-until the last eligible member joins, or fails to join, the
class. 114 Consequently, looking to Steps Two B and Two C, one must
conclude that there are multiple conditions that appear cumulatively.
Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1) the implied requirement of
birth is subsumed by the age requirement, one can proceed directly to a
consideration of the subsuming condition under Step Three A.
Examining Step Three A, are B's children restricted to lives in being
and to lives already ended when the period of the rule commences?
Quite obviously, the answer is NO. At A's death, B's children are totally
unascertained. B is alive and is presumed capable of having children.335
Further, neither the descriptive language nor the "rule of convenience"
restricts the class of children to those alive at A's death.33 6 Conse-
quently, if this class gift is not to fail altogether, it will consist exclusively
333 In this illustration, B's interest is clearly vested. No condition whatsoever is specifically
attached to B's income interest for life. There are, of course, those conditions that attend all testa-
mentary gifts; for example, the payment of debts and taxes. These conditions, however, do not
render B's interest contingent. If they did, then all interests would be viewed as contingent. See, eg.,
Ducker v. Burnham, 146 II1. 9, 34 N.E. 558 (1893).
334. Set! suvra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
33 5 The common law rule against perpetuities presumes that B, regardless of age, is capable of
ha% ing children until the time of his death. See supra notes 253, 270. See also hifra note 370. In
this illustration, of course, if B were not capable of having children after A's death, then the gift of
principal would fail altogether for %ant of class members.
336 Nothing in the language itself describing the recipients of the gift of principal restricts the
group to those who are alive at the death of A. If there were such a restriction, express or implied.
then the class gift would, of course, fail for want of members. Further, in this illustration, the "'rule
4W convemence" will not close the class immediately. and it would not do so even if B had a child
ahiic at A's death who had already attained age twenty-one. The gift of principal is deferred at least
until the death of B who is entitled to income for the remainder of his life. Ordinarily, a class gift
,Aill include all people who may satisfy the group description, herein, all the children B may ever
have The "rule ofconvenience," however, will close the class before the possibility of further mem-
bership has been exhausted whenever the limitation requires an earlier distribution to a class mem-
ber This cannot occur in this illustration because distribution will not happen until B's income
interest ends at his death, and at that time the possibility of further membership is exhausted because
B cannot have additional children beyond his death. For further discussion of the "rule of conven-
ience," see %upra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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of members born after the death of A-after the time in which the period
of the rule begins.
Proceeding then to Step Three B, is there any other taker or group of
takers within the same provision that is restricted to lives in being and to
lives already ended when the period of the rule commences? The answer,
of course, is YES. B is the only other taker and he is ascertained and
restricted by the descriptive and identifying language itself. Accordingly,
B qualifies as a testing life in being. One can then proceed to the critical
test: Must the children's interest vest, if at all, within twenty-one years
of B's death? Additionally, because this is a class gift, the test must be
refined further: Will all eligible children join the class, if at all, by (being
born and) attaining age twenty-one within twenty-one years of B's death?
The answer is YES and, therefore, the gift of principal to B's children is
valid.
By way of explanation, the critical question might be restated: Can
any child of B join the class beyond twenty-one years of B's death? As-
suming that B cannot have a child beyond what would be considered his
death,33 7 no child can be ascertained beyond that point in time. Conse-
337. Until recently, one justifiably could presume that a person could not have a child beyond
his death, or at least beyond a period of gestation following his death. Furthermore, this presump-
tion also has been indulged by the common law rule. Accordingly, in this illustration, tile contingent
gift of principal to B's children satisfies the common law rule. Because no child of B can be born
beyond his death, or within a period of gestation thereafter, no child of B can attain age twenty-one
beyond a period of gestation plus twenty-one years following B's death. This is within the period of
time allowed by the common law rule whenever a child is actually born during such period of
gestation following B's death. More accurately, under the rule a person is deemed to be in being
when conceived and not born. In a certain sense no child of B will reach age twenty-one beyond
twenty-one years from the time of conception which must occur before the time of B's death. See L.
SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 1224.
The miracles of modern science, however, now make it possible for one to conceive after death,
and because of these advances, the preceding presumption has been undermined. Technically, one
can no longer assume that B will conceive a child no later than the time of his death. Accordingly,
one can no longer conclude that all of B's children will attain twenty-one, if at all, within twenty-one
years of his death. Without this assumption, many interests that were deemed valid under the
common law rule-such as the one created herein in B's children-might now be found invalid.
Thus far, this problem has not been fully addressed by courts or legislatures. Some states have
formally rejected the common law presumption that one can conceive throughout his or her lifetime
regardless of age. Often, this rejection is accomplished by allowing a proof of validity predicated
upon the assumption that one is deemed absolutely incapable of having or adopting a child beyond a
particular age. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). By
setting an age limit upon assumed procreation while one is alive, such statutes do, of course, deal
indirectly with the issue of conception after death.
Most perpetuity statutes, however, do not address specifically the problem of conception beyond
the time of a person's death. One proposed perpetuity reform carefully notes this problem but fun-
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quently, if a child is born as of B's death, the very latest such child can
join the class by satisfying the express age requirement would be twenty-
one years after the death of B. Accordingly, B is a testing life who vali-
dates the gift of principal to his own children.338
3. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of B-i's children who attain age
twenty-one." Also assume that B-1 is B's daughter and that both B-1
and B survive A. Finally, assume that B-1 has had no children by the
time of A's death. Is there a violation of the common law rule against
perpetuities?
Because the dispositive instrument is a will, the analysis under Step
One is the same as before: the period of the rule commences at A's
death. Under Step Two A, B's interest is vested and not subject to the
damentally ignores it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.4
reporter's note 11 (1983). Another formally disregards it. See Waggoner, supra note 238, at 591.
593. Some, however, suggest that absent language or circumstances indicating a different intent, one
should assume that with respect to class gifts, those conceived after the procreator's death should not
be included within the terms of the gift. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONA-
ITIVE TRANSFERS) introductory note to ch. 26 at 2-3 (Tent. Draft No. 9 1986).
However, Professor Leach, the foremost commentator on the rule against perpetuities, recom-
mended that gifts be held valid as if these advances in medical science had never occurred. More
specifically, he argued that children conceived after death should be included within the terms of a
gift; that the duration of a life in being under the rule should be defined in terms of reproductive
capacity; and that this period should comprehend the time in which a person has reproductive ca-
pacity e% en after death. See Leach. Perpetuities In The Atomic Age: The Spern Bank And the Fertile
Decedent, 48 A.B.A.J. 942, 944 (1962).
Upon examining existing statutes and commentary, one thing seems clear: no matter how states
choose to resolve this problem, they are not apt to do so in a way that would cause interests that are
traditionally valid under the common law rule to become invalid. At most, they might presume that
an estate owner intends to exclude class members conceived after the procreator's death. Conse-
quently, only in those instances in which the dispositive instrument contains language that over-
comes this presumption will one be unable to attempt a valid proof with the procreator of the class.
Because of this likelihood, both this methodology and its application proceed upon the assumption
either that one cannot conceive after death or, to the extent one can, that the estate owner intends to
exclude from the group those who are conceived after the procreator's death.
338. If the age requirement in this example were twenty-five instead of twenty-one, then there
would be a perpetuities violation. Just as before, the takers themselves, B's potential children, do not
qualify as testing lives under Step Three A. And, once again, B serves as a testing life under Step
Three B. Nevertheless, one cannot use B to make a valid proof. B might have a child. B-1, and then
die before that child attains age four. It then becomes possible for B-1 to join the class more than
twenty-one years beyond the death of B. Absent a saving clause or some other directly related
provision, there is no testing life to be found under Step Three C. Nor is there a new testing life to be
found under Step Three D because B. the parent of the takers of the gift of principal, has already
been tested. Finally, when one applies the critical test under Step Four, the answer must be NO.
Because B has no children alive at A's death, quite obviously, all of his children born thereafter will
attain age twenty-five more than twenty-one years after the death of A.
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rule. Nevertheless, the interest created in B-l's potential children-B's
grandchildren-is contingent and, therefore, it must satisfy the rule.
Their gift of principal is contingent because they are yet to be born, and
therefore are unascertained, and also because they must satisfy an ex-
press age requirement that takes the form of a condition precedent. Once
again, because this is a class gift, the interests of all members remain
contingent under the common law rule until the last potential member
joins, or fails to join, the class.3 3 9 Consequently, looking to Steps Two B
and Two C, one must conclude that there are multiple conditions that
appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1) the
implied requirement of birth is subsumed by the age requirement, one
can proceed directly to a corisideration of the subsuming condition under
Step Three A.
Under Step Three A, the takers of the interest-B-l's children-
clearly do not qualify as testing lives in being. Indeed, if the gift of princi-
pal does not fail for want of class members, the entire group of takers will
consist of afterborn lives. B-i, the procreator of the class, is alive and is
presumed capable of having children. Further, neither the descriptive
language nor the "rule of convenience" restricts this class to those alive
at A's death. 4 °
Nevertheless, under Step Three B, B is ascertained and because of
identifying language this other taker cannot be afterborn. Therefore, B
does qualify as a testing life in being. Accordingly, one must ask: Must
all potential class members join the class, if at all, by (being born and)
attaining age twenty-one within twenty-one years of B's death? Given
the possible time in which a potential child of B-1 can join the class,3 4 1
339. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
340. The class described consists of "B-I's children who attain age twenty-one." Presumably,
this includes afterborn children because nothing in the language limits the class to children born by
the time of A's death. Just as before, see supra note 336, if the class were restricted in this fashion,
then the gift of principal would fall not because of a perpetuities violation but, instead, for want of
any members. Further, even ifa child of B-I had been born and attained age twenty-one by the time
of A's death, because the gift of principal to B-l's children is deferred until B's death, the rule of
convenience will not operate to fix the maximum class membership before that time. Accordingly,
the class gift to B-l's children is not restricted to those who are living at A's death.
341. Given the fact that B-I has no children at A's death, the latest date that a child of B-I can
join the class is twenty-one years after her death. Conceivably, if not probably, the class will be fully
determined before then. Once B dies and once the first child of B-I attains age twenty-one, the "rule
of convenience" will fix the maximum class membership because of a need to distribute the share of
such first child. And the full class membership will be determined once the last member of the group
born by that time attains, or fails to attain, age twenty-one. Nevertheless, one must dismiss this
probability for earlier class determination in applying the critical test. The common law rule against
[Vol. 67:949
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the answer must be NO. The critical test requires that one look at all
possibilities for remote vesting. For example, B may die immediately,
and then B-1 can bear her first child, G-1, who might then attain age
twenty-one and join the class more than twenty-one years after B's
death. Because of this possibility, B fails to become a validating life in
being.1
4 2
Proceeding, then, to Step Three C, is there a person or group of people
otherwise mentioned or separately and differently mentioned within the
same provision, or elsewhere in other directly related provisions, that is
restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended when the period of
the rule begins? Absent a saving clause,343 or any other directly related
perpeturtes requires a proof that all of B-i's children must, if at all, join the class within the allowed
time period. Stated otherwise, it requires that one eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting.
Therefore, in applying the critical test, one must account for all possibilities, especially those which
defer %esting to the latest conceivable point in time.
342 Suppose, however, with this same limitation, that B-I had a child, G-l, who was age thirty
at A',, death. In this situation, there would be no perpetuities violation. A valid proof could be
made under Step Three C using B-I as the testing life, but it could also be made under Step Three B
using B as the testing life. The common law rule permits one to recognize all facts known when the
period of the rule commences. Thus, it enables one to anticipate a salutary application of the "rule
of convenience." From the moment his interest is created, G-1 has an interest that is vested abso-
lutely because he has already attained age twenty-one. No other requirements must be satisfied;
indeed, there is no condition that B-I's children must survive B. When B's income interest ends at
his death, G-I (or his successors in interest) will be entitled to distribution of his share. To accom-
plih this, the "rule of convenience" will require that the maximum class membership be fixed at that
time Accordingly, all potential class members must be born by the death of B. If such child of B-1
is horn on the day of B's death, the very latest time such child can join the class, or fail to join, is
twenty-one years after the death of B. Consequently, one is able to make a valid proof with B
because the interests of all of B-I's children must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of B's death.
343 The most popular form of saying clause functions with a safety net that supersedes all
dispositme conditions and ultimately restricts the vesting of interests or the duration of a trust to a
period of time that purportedlI satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities and, perhaps,
related rules as well The purpose of these saving provisions is to set an absolute time limit beyond
%%hich in interest created by the instrument can vest. Safety-net clauses are intended to prevent
actual %iolations and not simply to overcome them by escaping their consequences. Most of these
kinds of saving clauses expressly limit the maximum time period to the death of a designated person
oi to the survivor of a group of people or to within twenty-one years of their deaths. The persons
involsed are identified individually or referred to by a group designation, but in either case they are
always people born before the instrument becomes effective and they are usually beneficiaries under
,om11C provision. See, e g.. Ti- NOR iiHiRN TRUST COMPANY, WILt. AND TRuSr FORMS (6th ed.
1983). which provides:
SECTION 8 . . The trustee shall terminate and forthwith distribute any trust created
liereby, or by exercise of a power of appointment hereunder, and still held 21 years after
the death of the last to die of the settlor and the beneficiaries in being at the death of the
setilor Distribution under this section shall be made to the persons then entitled to re-
c.eie or have the benefit of the income from the trust in the proportions in which they are
entlcd thereto, or if their interests are indefinite, then in equal shares.
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provisions, 3" B-1 would be the only person to qualify as a testing life in
being under Step Three C. B-1 is not a taker, but she is expressly and
newly mentioned, and thus she qualifies as "otherwise mentioned." Fur-
ther, by the descriptive language itself, B-1 cannot be someone who is
afterborn. Accordingly, one should apply the critical test to B-i: Must
all potential members join the class of B-i's children entitled to share the
principal, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age twenty-one within
twenty-one years of the death of B-i? The answer is, of course, YES
and, accordingly, the gift of principal to B-l's children is valid. The ex-
planation for this conclusion is a familiar one. B-1 caninot bear a child
beyond her death,345 and if she did bear a child at the time of her death,
that child could not join, or fail to join, the class more than twenty-one
years later. Therefore, all potential class members must join the class, if
at all, within twenty-one years of B-l's death. Accordingly, B-1 is a
testing life who validates the gift of principal to her children. 46
Id. at 201-19. For further discussion of saving clauses, see Becker, supra note 290, at 378-416. By
including beneficiaries found within all provisions of the dispositive instrument, one should observe
that this kind of saving clause introduces a whole group of testing lives beyond those identified in the
limitation under specific consideration.
344. Beyond saving clauses, there can be other directly related provisions that introduce addi-
tional lives in being that should be tested to determine whether they might validate an interest con-
tained within the specific limitation under consideration. Often wills and trusts contain provisions
which, under express conditions, allow for a pourover to the residue or to other trusts, Under these
circumstances, people named within the provision that is the source of the pourover can have a
direct bearing on the conditions affecting interests created in the recipient residuary provision or
trust. Accordingly, these source provisions are directly related and the people named within them
must be considered under Step Three C.
345. Regardless of the miracles that modem science has or might produce with respect to having
children after a parent's death, for the purpose of applying the common law rule against perpetuities,
one must assume that these afterborn children are beyond the contemplation of the estate owner, A,
and, therefore, one must exclude them from the class entitled to take the gift of principal. See supra
note 337.
346. Suppose, however, that A had imposed a different age requirement, namely, one that condi-
tioned the gift of principal upon attaining age thirty. In this instance, assume that B-I had one
child, G-1 (age five), at the time of A's death and that G-1 and B survived A but B-I predeceased
him. To be sure, G-l's interest in the principal is contingent upon his attaining age thirty- neverthe-
less, it does not violate the common law rule against perpetuities. B-I is already dead when these
interests are created at the death of A. Therefore, under Step Three A, the class of takers of the
interest in question is restricted to a life in being because of physical impossibility. Applying the
critical test, then, to G-l, one observes that a valid proof exists. G-l's interest must vest, if at all.
within his own life. For a comparable analysis and proof, see supra illustration IV A-I.
Suppose,-however, that both B and B-I survive A and that B-I's child, G-1, has attained age
thirty by the time of A's death. In this instance, there would be a perpetuities violation even though
G-l's interest had vested absolutely at the time of creation. For a similar analysis, see infra illustra-
tion IV A-6. Under Step Three A, no one qualifies as a testing life because the takers are not
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
1989] PERPETUITIES METHODOLOGY 1069
4. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of my (A's) grandchildren who
attain age twenty-one." Further, assume that B and A's only children,
A-I and A-2, survive A. Finally, assume that neither A-1 nor A-2 has
had any children by the time of A's death. Unlike the previous examples,
A leaves the ultimate gift of principal to his own descendants instead of
B's. Does this gift of principal to A's grandchildren violate the common
law rule against perpetuities?
Once again, under Step One, the period of the rule begins at A's death.
Under Step Two A, although the principal will belong to A's grandchil-
dren instead of B's, the terms of the gift are essentially the same and so
are the conclusions one must reach. B's interest is vested, but the gift to
A's grandchildren is contingent. Their interest is contingent because
they are unascertained; additionally, after they are born they must satisfy
an age requirement that operates as a condition precedent.347 Because
restricted to lives in being. Under Step Three B, B does qualify as a testing life; nevertheless, one
cannot use him to make a valid proof. B-I can have another child, G-2, before the maximum class
membership is fixed, and then B can die a year later. Accordingly, it becomes possible for G-1 to
attain age thirty and join the class more than twenty-one years after B's death. Under Step Three C,
B-I qualifies as a testing life but fails to make a valid proof. B-I can have another child, G-2, before
the maximum class membership is fixed by the rule of convenience at B's death and then B-1 can die
wvithin a year. Accordingly, it becomes possible for G-1 to attain age thirty and join the class more
than twenty-one years beyond B-I" death. Under Step Three D, although the takers' parent, B-1, is
restricted to a life in being, one must dismiss B-I because she has already been tested under Step
Three C. Finally, one applies the critical test contained in Step Four. Once again, B-1 can have
another child, G-2. before B's death. Quite clearly, it then becomes possible for G-2 to attain age
thirty and join the class more than twenty-one years after the death of A, the time when the period
of the rule commences.
347 Not all age requirements operate as a condition precedent thereby making an interest con-
tingent. Consider these two illustrations of testamentary trusts created by A: "Income to B for life;
thereafter, principal to C absolutely at age thirty", "Income to B for life; thereafter, if C attains age
thirty then principal to C absolutely, if he does not. then to D absolutely." In both examples, courts
will usually find that C has a contingent remainder which is conditioned upon reaching age thirty.
In the second example, there is a substitute gift to D who has an alternative contingent remainder.
These characterizations might change, ho%%ever, with only a slight variation in language. Con-
sidcr these modifications; "Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to C absolutely, payable at age
thirty", "'Income to B for life, thereafter, principal to C absolutely; however, if C fails to attain age
thrt', then to D absolutely." Although these limitations look essentially the same, most courts
Would view C's interest in the first variation as vested absolutely with enjoyment postponed. And in
the second variation, most courts, would classify C's interest as vested subject to complete divestment
in fi ior of D. who would then hase a contingent executory interest. In both of these variations.
theic is an age requirement. Yet, in neither variation does such requirement cause C's interest to be
characte rized as contingent For a discussion of these kinds of constructions, see W. LLACH & J.
Lo(, \, FUI URI IN'tl ,RInSsS Am) Esi L rI PI \NNING 266-315 (1961). See also supra notes 150-53
and accompan.ing text.
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this is a class gift, the interest of each class member is contingent under
the common law rule until the last potential member does or does not
join the class by being born and attaining age twenty-one. Consequently,
looking to Steps Two B and Two C, one must conclude that there are
multiple conditions that appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because
under Step Two C (1) the implied requirement of birth is subsumed by
the age requirement, one can proceed directly to a consideration of the
subsuming condition under Step Three A.
Under Step Three A, one observes that the takers of the contingent
interest-A's grandchildren- do not consist exclusively of lives in being
and lives already ascertained and, therefore, they do not qualify as testing
lives in being. At A's death, they are nonexistent and, of necessity, they
will consist exclusively of afterborn lives. A-1 and A-2, the procreators
of the class of A's grandchildren, are alive and they are presumed capa-
ble of having children. Further, neither the descriptive language nor the
"rule of convenience" restricts this class to those alive at A's death.348
Under Step Three B, B does qualify as a testing life in being for the
same reasons as before. B is an other taker who is ascertained and by the
terms of this other gift it is limited to someone born before A's death.
Accordingly, one must apply the critical test to B: Must all of A's
grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age
twenty-one within twenty-one years of B's death? Taking into account
the possible times in which potential grandchildren can join the class, 349
348. The explanation, herein, is the same as before. See supra notes 336, 340.
349. In making this determination, one must dismiss the fact that the rule of convenience might
operate to close the class before the birth of all of A's grandchildren. To be sure, A-I might have a
child, G-1, who attains age twenty-one before the death of B. In that instance, the class of
grandchildren would close at B's death because G-1 is then entitled to distribution of his share of the
principal. All grandchildren born thereafter would be excluded. Consequently, one could then say
that no grandchild could join the class beyond twenty-one years of B's death. Nevertheless, the
common law rule against perpetuities requires that one anticipate all possibilities for remote vesting.
One has to prove that all of A's grandchildren must. if at all, join the class within twenty-one years
of B's life (or the life of any one else who is being tested). Stated otherwise, one must rule out all
possibilities for remote vesting, and in this example one cannot dismiss the possibility that A will not
have a grandchild who attains age twenty-one by the time of B's death. Indeed. one cannot elimi-
nate the possibility that all grandchildren ever born will be included because none attains age twenty-
one before the death of the survivor of A's children. With this in mind, one must consider the latest
time a grandchild of A can join the class. Because it is possible for any of A's children to have a
child at death, or within a period of gestation thereafter, the latest time a grandchild can attain age
twenty-one and join the class is twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of A's children (or
twenty-one years after the point in time during the period of gestation following the surviving child's
death during which such grandchild was born).
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one concludes that the answer must be NO. The critical test requires
that one examine all possibilities for remote vesting. For example, it is
possible for B to die shortly after the time of A's death. It is also possible
that A's only grandchildren will be born thereafter. If so, A's grandchil-
dren will not join the class, if at all, until more than twenty-one years
after the death of B. Accordingly, B cannot serve as a validating life in
being.
Under Step Three C, absent a saving clause or any other directly re-
lated provision, no one except for A ("my grandchildren") is "otherwise
mentioned or separately and differently mentioned" and, therefore, no
testing life can be found on this basis. To be sure, A is mentioned in the
phrase that describes the gift to grandchildren. Nevertheless, A should
be dismissed immediately because naturally his death marks the point in
time when the period of the rule begins.35° In the case of a testamentary
transfer, there is no need to test separately with the testator who is al-
ready dead. 5' The twenty-one year period of time allowed from the tes-
tator's death is separately covered under Step Four.
Proceeding next to Step Three D and the first question within it, one
observes the previous conclusion under Step Three A, that the takers of
the interest-A's grandchildren-are not restricted to lives in being and
to lives already ended. Accordingly, one can then address the next ques-
tion: Do the grandchildren's parents who provide the necessary descrip-
tive relationship consist exclusively of lives in being and lives already
ended when the period of the rule begins? The answer to this question, of
course, is YES. The parents that provide the relationship necessary to
satisfy the description of the takers-A's grandchildren-are A's'chil-
dren. This is a dispositive instrument that operates as of A's death, and
by that time all of A's children will be born." 2 After A's death, the
group of parents is not deemed physically capable of expansion or recon-
stitution; therefore, none will be deemed afterborn 353 Accordingly, the
group of parents who provide the necessary relationship must consist ex-
clusively of A-1 and A-2, both of whom are in being at A's death. Fur-
35) For further discussion, see vupra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
351 If however. A had made an irrevocable lifetime transfer, instead of one that took effect only
at his death, there might then he a circumstance in which one would apply the critical test to A.
Tiis %%ould occur only when A independently qualifies as a testing life in being under either Step
Tin cc A. Three B. Three C. or Three D For further discussion, see supra notes 267-68 and accom-
pann lg e\t.
-52 See %upra note 337
353 See %upct note 337
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ther, one notes as to the next question under Step Three D that such
group of parents does not fully coincide with testing lives in being al-
ready tested under previous steps. The only step in which one has al-
ready reached the point of testing in this example was Three B. And the
testing life, B, did not coincide with the grandchildren's parents, A-1 and
A-2. As a result of these conclusions, A-1 and A-2 become testing lives
in being. Must all of A's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being
born and) attaining age twenty-one within twenty-one years of the death
of one of these testing lives? The answer is YES and, therefore, the gift of
principal to A's grandchildren is valid.3" 4 To be sure, no grandchild can
join the class beyond twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of A-I
and A-2. The very latest time a child of A will be deemed to have a
grandchild of A is at such child's death." Accordingly, the very latest
time a grandchild will be born is at the death of the survivor of A-1 and
A-2. Therefore, the final time for attaining age twenty-one and joining
354. Suppose, however, that A had irrevocably created this trust during his lifetime instead of at
his death, and assume that all other facts remain the same except that they exist as of the trust's
creation. In this instance, the gift of principal to his grandchildren would violate the common law
rule against perpetuities. To begin with, under Step One, the period of the rule now commences
during the life of A when the trust becomes effective. Under Step Two A, the gift of principal is
subject to the same conditions; namely, grandchildren must be born and they must attain age
twenty-one. Again, under Step Two C (1), one can proceed directly to a consideration of the sub-
suming condition-the age requirement-under Step Three and, if necessary, Step Four. Under
Step Three A, the takers themselves, the grandchildren, do not qualify as testing lives for the same
reasons as before. Under Step Three B, once again, B qualifies as a testing life; nevertheless, just as
before, his life fails to validate. Under Step Three C, A is a person otherwise mentioned. In this
instance, because A makes this gift during his lifetime, by the descriptive language he is restricted to
a life in being and, accordingly, he qualifies for testing. Must all of A's grandchildren join the class,
if at all, by (being born and) attaining age twenty-one within twenty-one years of A's death? The
answer is, of course, NO. A may die shortly after creation of the trust; thereafter, A-I could have
A's first grandchild, G-I. Accordingly, it then becomes possible for G-1 and all grandchildren born
thereafter to join the class more than twenty-one years beyond the death of A. Under Step Three D,
A's children no longer qualify as testing lives. Absent anything in the instrument indicating that A
intended to include only those grandchildren born to A-I and A-2, one can no longer conclude that
the parents of the takers are restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended. InI this example,
A is alive and, therefore, one can no longer say that physical impossibility restricts the group to lives
in being when the period of the rule commences. Finally, under Step Four, one applies the critical
test by asking: Must all of A's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining
age twenty-one within twenty-one years of the time A's irrevocable trust becomes effective? The
answer is NO because all grandchildren will be born thereafter and, consequently, no one will be able
to satisfy the age requirement until twenty-one years from the time of their respective births. Neces-
sarily, this can only happen more than twenty-one years after creation of these interests, the time
when the trust becomes irrevocably effective. For another illustration of perpetuities problems
presented by an irrevocable living trust, see infra illustration IV A-Il .
355. See supra note 337.
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the class can be no later than twenty-one years after the survivor of A's
children has died. The common law rule does not require that one iden-
tify the exact validating life in being. All that is needed is a proof that
from this group of testing lives there will be one life-in this instance,
whoever the survivor is-about whom one can say that no one can join
the class, if at all, beyond twenty-one years of his or her death.356
5. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust which accumulates
income and adds it to the principal for twenty-one years and, thereafter,
leaves: "The principal to B's descendants, per capita, living twenty-one
years after my (A's) death." Further, assume that B has predeceased A,
but that B has two children, B-1 and B-2, who survive A. Finally, as-
sume that these two children are the only descendants B has ever had by
the time of A's death. Is there a violation of the common law rule
against perpetuities?
Once again, under Step One, the period of the rule commences at A's
death. Under Step Two A, the interest of B's descendants is contingent.
They are not confined to those alive at A's death;3 57 accordingly, poten-
tial members beyond B-1 and B-2 must still be born and ascertained.
Additionally, there is the condition precedent that the descendants must
be living twenty-one years after A's death. Therefore, B-1, B-2, and
356. There is another, and perhaps superior, way to understand the basis for this valid proof.
Must all grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age twenty-one within
tM entN-one years of the death of one of the members of this group of testing lives in being? To make
a valid proof, one must find a person within the testing group of lives in being who will validate the
interest of a potential grandchild, and one must do this for all grandchildren. In doing so, one need
not use the same testing life for each potential class member. What is important is that one find
some testing life to validate for each and every potential grandchild. Herein, of course, no
grandchild can join the class beyond twenty-one years of the death of his respective parent. And each
of these parents-members of the testing group-is a child of A and is naturally someone in being at
A's death. Consequently, one can make a valid proof for each potential grandchild with such
grandchild' very own parent, that is, one can satisfy the requirements of the rule for each
grandchild with the parent who supplies the necessary relationship and, therefore, is the parent who
is also the child of A.
357. A has made the gift of principal 'to B's descendants." Presumably, he was aware of B's
death and meant to include others born thereafter to B-I and B-2. Yet even if B were alive when A
c\ecuted his will, A has used the term "descendants" which suggests that he had a group in mind
that might expand beyond B-I and B-2. Therefore, absent a clear indication of another basis for a
rcstrictive interpretation, one must conclude that the descriptive language does not confine the gift of
principal to those alive at A's death. Additionally, the rule of convenience will not fix the maximum
membership to those born by the time of A's death. This rule does not close off membership until
the first time for distribution of principal, In this case, distribution for all class members must occur
at the same time and, by the express language itself, it does not occur immediately. Instead, distribu-
tion is deferred until twenty-one years after the time of A's death. For a discussion of the rule of
conenienc. see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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afterbom descendants will not satisfy this condition if they are not alive
at that time. Also, because this is a class gift, the interest of each class
member is contingent until all potential members join, or fail to join, the
class. Such special requirement should not present a problem, however,
with respect to this class gift because all members must necessarily join
the class at the same time-twenty-one years after A's death. 8 Looking
next to Steps Two B and Two C, one must conclude that there are multi-
ple conditions that appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because under
Step Two C (1) the implied requirement of birth is subsumed by the sur-
vivorship requirement, one can proceed directly to a consideration of the
subsuming condition under Step Three A.
Proceeding then to Step Three A, one observes that the takers of the
interest, B's descendants, are not restricted to lives in being and to lives
already ended. Neither descriptive language nor applicable rules of con-
struction preclude afterborn descendants of B.359 And because existing
descendants, B-1 and B-2, presumptively can have other descendants,
the group is capable of physical expansion.36 Under Step Three B, be-
cause B's descendants are the only takers included under this provision,
one cannot find other takers to serve as testing lives in being.
Under Step Three C, however, B is "otherwise mentioned" in the
phrase used to describe those who will take the principal-namely, "B's
descendants." B was, of course, ascertained, but he is dead at the time of
A's death when the period of the rule begins; therefore, B cannot serve as
a testing life in being. Additionally, A himself is "otherwise mentioned"
in the phrase that conditions the gift of principal-"after my death."
Nevertheless, A cannot serve as a testing life. Necessarily, A is not a life
358. This special requirement for class gifts under the common law rule against perpetuities only
arises when there is a condition that enables class members to join the class at different times. Only
then can one member's interest become vested before all potential members acquire vested interests
enabling them to join the class as well. Typically, these conditions involve birth and age require-
ments. For example, consider this testamentary trust of A: "Income to B for life; thereafter, princi-
pal to such of B's children absolutely who attain age thirty." Assume that B survives A and that he
has one child, B-I (age thirty-five), alive at that time. B-I has an interest which is vested absolutely.
Nevertheless, absent anything in the language restricting the group of children to those alive at A's
death, B-l's interest is subject to open. The class will include all of B's potential children who
satisfy two requirements; they must be born and they must attain age thirty. The effect of these
requirements is to produce a class gift in which members can join at different points in time.
359. See supra note 357.
360. Further. these other afterborn descendants can have additional descendants within the
twenty-one years following A's death, and these additional descendants would also become eligible
to share in the principal once they survived the appointed time.
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in being because he is dead when his testamentary trust becomes effective
and the period of the rule begins. In any event, Step Four already incor-
porates the same testing period by measuring twenty-one years from the
time the period commences at A's death. Under Step Three C, then,
absent a saving clause or any other directly related provision, no one else
is mentioned and, consequently, no testing life can be found on this basis.
Under Step Three D, one can reaffirm that the takers themselves are
not restricted to lives in being and, consequently, one should then pro-
ceed to an examination of whether the takers' parents are restricted to
lives in being and to lives already ended when the period of the rule be-
gins. Nevertheless, because the class of takers is multigenerational, and
because it can expand, it is impossible to determine the exact identity of
the takers and, therefore, their parents. 36' Accordingly, one must con-
clude that their parents fail as testing lives because they can include those
that are afterborn. Thus, one can proceed directly to Step Four.362
This final step does not call for the use of testing lives in being. Ordi-
narily, one uses it only after he has exhausted, under Step Three, the
search for testing lives in being that validate. Nonetheless, Step Four can
be applied before the search for testing lives in being begins. It can be
applied immediately after determinations under Steps One and Two have
been made. This would be appropriate especially in those situations in
which the condition that makes the interest contingent appears limited to
a twenty-one year period from the time of its creation. 63 If one acceler-
361. As noted previously, B-I and B-2 are alive at A's death. Presumptively. within the
twenty-one year period following A's death. they can have children, who can then have another
generation of children, who can then have another generation of children, etc. See iffra note 370.
Each of these descendant, will qualify for a share of the principal if he survives the appointed time
for distribution. Nevertheless, fulfillment of this express condition and the matter of how many
additional generations of descendants will be born involve uncertainty. Accordingly, because one
cannot determine the exact generational group of takers, one cannot determine the identity of their
parent,, and whether they are restricted to lives in being at A's death.
362 See supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
363 Consider, for example. this testamentary trust created by A: "Income to B for life, thereaf-
ter. principal to such of B's grandchildren who are born and attain age thirty within twenty-one
ycars of my death " Assume that B and his two children, B-1 and B-2, survive A. Also assume
that neither B-I nor B-2 have children by the time of A's death. Without the condition that
grandchildren must attain age thirty within twenty-one years of A's death, there would be a perpetu-
itics % iolation. Sec infra illustration IV A-6. With this condition, however, the interest given to the
grandchildren is valid. Indeed, a valid proof can be accomplished directly under Step Four. The
cla s must be fully determined within twenty-one years of A's death. Accordingly, one can dispense
with Step Three and proceed immediately to Step Four in order to demonstrate the validity of the
gift of principal.
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ates the application of Step Four and validates the interest, the testing is
at an end because the rule has been satisfied. If, however, one cannot
establish validity under the accelerated application of Step Four, then
one must proceed through Step Three. Once again, under this methodol-
ogy an interest does not violate the common law rule unless one has
failed to validate it under Steps Three and Four, regardless of their order
of application.
Now then, looking to Step Four, must all descendants of B join the
class, if at all, by being (born and) alive twenty-one years after A's death
within twenty-one years of the time when the period of the rule com-
mences-A's death? Quite obviously, the answer is YES and, therefore,
the gift of principal to B's descendants satisfies the common law rule.
The terms of the condition are clear. Even though the identity of the
takers can change, and even though the class may consist exclusively of
descendants born after A's death, the conditions-that they be born by
and living at a certain time-are expressly limited to a time that satisfies
the rule. Indeed, the time for application of the conditions coincides
with the period allowed by the rule: twenty-one years after A's death.164
6. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life; thereafter, principal to such of B's grandchildren who attain
age thirty." This limitation is the one used in the first illustration. This
time, however, the contextual facts surrounding A's death are quite dif-
ferent. Assume that B (age eighty-five) and B's only child, a daughter
B-1 (age sixty), survive A. Finally, assume that B-i's three children-
B's only grandchildren-also survive A. They are G-1 (age forty), G-2
364. Suppose, however, that the gift of principal had been: ".. . to B's descendants, per capita,
living thirty years after my (A's) death." Quite *clearly, this would violate the common law rule
against perpetuities because under Step Four one no longer can say that all interests must vest, if at
all, within twenty-one years of the time when the period of the rule commences at A's death. In-
deed, by the terms of the limitation itself, no one's interest can vest until thirty years after A's death.
Commentators have observed that the common law rule only allows a grace period of twenty-one
years. They believe that one cannot add to the period in gross the number of months normally
accorded a period of gestation. For example, they would argue that a gift of principal "to B's de-
scendants, per capita, living twenty-one years and one month after A's death" violates the common
law rule. They maintain that periods of gestation are relevant only when they actually arise with
respect to a particular limitation. For example, lives in being when the period of the rule commences
always include those who are actually in gestation at such time. Professor Fetters, however, dis-
agrees. He maintains that the period in gross under the common law rule is twenty-one years plus
an additional period in gross of less than five months. His argument is a very interesting one. For a
discussion of this problem, see Fetters, The Perpetuities Period In Gross and the Child En Ventre Sa
Mere In Relation to the Determination of Common-Law and Wait-And-See Measuring Lives- A Mi-
nor Heresy Stated and Defended, 62 IOWA L. REV. 309 (1976).
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(age thirty) and G-3 (age twenty-five). Is there a violation of the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities?
Once again, under Step One, the period of the rule begins at A's death.
Under this set of facts, the determinations under Step Two A become
more complicated. B has a vested interest; however, his grandchildren
have interests that must directly satisfy the time requirements of the
common law rule. 365 The gift of principal to B's grandchildren contains
two obvious conditions: a grandchild must be born and must attain age
thirty. Both G-1 and G-2 are ascertained and they have already at-
tained age thirty by the time of A's death; accordingly, they have inter-
ests that are fully vested. They must satisfy no other condition for their
interests to become possessory in them or their successors in owner-
ship."' Nevertheless, their interests are subject to open and, accord-
ingly, the exact size of their respective shares has not been fixed at the
outset. 7 Because of this, their vested interests are still subject to the
36 Once again, the common law rule against perpetuities imposes special requirements with
respeet to class gifts. All eligible class members must join the class, if at all, within the period of
time allowed by the rule. And if any potential member may not do so, then the entire class gift fails,
including the interests of even those members whose interest had vested immediately upon creation.
See upra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
366 For example, there is no express requirement that any of B's grandchildren must survive B.
their respective parents or, for that matter, any other event. As for G-1 and G-2, if they were to die
before the time for distribution of principal, their respective interests would belong to their own
succesors Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which courts have, often without adequate justi-
ficatton. found requirements of survivorship even though none had been expressed clearly. For a
discussion of these situations and of the complexities that exist with respect to the matter of charac-
terizing interests, see supra notes 153. 240.
307 Currently, there are two grandchildren, G-1 and G-2, whose interests have vested. Never-
theless, one does not know at A's death the exact size of the share of principal they ultimately will
receive They may each take a third if G-3 attains age thirty, but they may take a smaller share if
there are any afterborn grandchildren who also attain age thirty. The size of their share is unknown
at A's death because their interests are subject to open. The language within A's testamentary trans-
fer does not expressly restrict the class of B's grandchildren to those alive at A's death. Further,
because distribution of principal is not immediate but is, instead, deferred until B's income interest
ceases at his death, the rule of convenience does not require that the maximum class membership be
fixed at A's death. Finally, because B and B-I have survived A, one must presume that the class is
capable of physical expansion through the birth of additional grandchildren thereafter. Neverthe-
less, there are circumstances in which a court might immediately restrict the class of grandchildren
to the three who are alive at A's death. This occurs in situations in which a court, after considering
the language of the full instrument and all that bears upon intent, concludes that A had only these
three grandchildren in mind even though he identified them by group description rather than by
their individual names. Conceivably, this example presents such circumstances. Indeed, after taking
into account the ages of B and his daughter B-I and the virtual certainty that there would be no
more children and grandchildren. a court might be persuaded that A could only have had the three
grandchildren in mind when he made this gift of principal. If a court adopts this restrictive con-
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common law rule.368 The third grandchild, G-3, is also ascertained; nev-
ertheless, his interest is still contingent upon satisfying the express age
requirement.
Because this class is not confined by its terms to B's grandchildren
alive at A's death, it will remain open to include those born before the
time for first distribution. This will occur at B's death because two
grandchildren already have vested interests, and they can claim immedi-
ate distribution upon termination of all prior income interests. Thus, the
rule of convenience will fix the maximum class membership at that
time. 36 9 The interests of potential grandchildren born after A's death but
before B's death are, of course, still subject to both conditions: the
grandchildren must be born as well as attain age thirty. Once again,
because this is a class gift, one must carefully note that the common law
rule deems the interest of each class member contingent-including those
whose interests are otherwise fully vested, such as G-1 and G-2-until
all potentially eligible class members join, or fail to join, the class. The
class is treated as one; if any member's interest can vest beyond the pe-
riod of the rule, then there is a perpetuities violation for all members.
Looking to Steps Two B and Two C, one must conclude that there are
multiple conditions that appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because
under Step Two C (1) the implied condition of birth is subsumed by the
age requirement, one can proceed directly to a consideration of the sub-
suming condition under Step Three A.
Proceeding then to Step Three A, it should be apparent from the pre-
ceding discussion that the takers themselves cannot qualify as testing
lives in being. B's grandchildren are not restricted by the descriptive lan-
guage itself to lives in being and to lives already ended. Further,
although the rule of convenience limits the class of takers, it allows for
inclusion of those born after A's death until the time of B's death. Fi-
nally, the class can physically expand. B-l, despite her age, must be
struction, the gift to G-I and G-2 remains vested subject to open, but it is only open to G-3 when
and if he attains age thirty.
368. See supra notes 157-58, 365 and accompanying text.
369. Ordinarily, by using the descriptive term "B's grandchildren," one might assume that A
intends to include all of the grandchildren B may ever have. If so, the class of grandchildren should
remain open until B-I and any afterborn children of B die and, therefore, can have no more
grandchildren. Nevertheless, in this example the rule of convenience will not allow for this interpre.
tation. Because their interests have fully vested, G-I and G-2 must receive distribution of their
shares at the death of B. Accordingly, courts assume that A's intent is restrictive; more specifically,
they assume that A intends to include only those grandchildren born by the time of B's death the
same as if he had said exactly that.
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presumed capable of having additional children, and B, even though an
octogenarian, is assumed capable of having an additional child who
could then conceive a class member before the class closes at B's
death. 
711
Under Step Three B, B-an other taker within the provision-does
qualify as a testing life in being. By definition, B is ascertained and can-
not be a person born after A's death. Accordingly, one applies the criti-
cal test to B: Must all grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being
born and) attaining age thirty within twenty-one years of B's death?
Taking into account the possible times in which potential grandchildren
can join the class, one concludes that the answer is NO. The critical test
requires that one examine all possibilities for remote vesting. For exam-
ple, although no grandchild can be born after the death of B and still be
eligible to join the class, it is possible for B-i-or any afterborn child of
B-to have a child after A's death who has not reached age nine by the
time of B's death. It then becomes possible for such afterborn grandchild
370 Under the common law rule against perpetuities, one is presumed capable of having a child
ihroughout hi. or her entire life See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.22 (A. J. Casner ed.
1,52), R L' NN, supra note 34, at 58. 60-61; R. MAUDSLEY, supra note 21, at 49, 52-53; L. SiMES &
A S1I% ii. pra note 22. § 1229. For example, consider this testamentary trust of A: "Income to B
for 16, thereafter, principal to such of B's grandchildren who are living at my death, or are born
%% thin fi c years alter my death, and who attain age twenty-one." As of A's death, assume that B is
age eighty. that his children have presiously died, and that B has three grandchildren who have not
already attained age twenty-one Absent a construction which demonstrates A's intent to limit
grandchildrcn to the three ahve at hi,. death, one must assume that the class of grandchildren is
Lapablc ,f c\pansion. This hypothetical presents the famous cases of the fertile octogenarian and the
prccocious toddler. In applying the common law rule, most commentators believe that one must
pre'.ume that B. age eighty. is capable of having another child after A's death. Further, one must
prcsume that such afterborn child of B is capable of having a child (another grandchild of B). Fi-
nall', ,,i niu'.t presume that both eients can occur within five years of A's death. For a case that
addtc,',s this problem, see Re Gaite", Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459.
hir, prcsumptin of fcrtilt throughout one's life has been rejected by some courts and has been
atcrcd by some legislatures in an attempt to patch up problems presented by the common law rule.
Scc, i ,., In rc BaNsett Estate. 104 N H 504. 190 A.2d 415 (1963); In re Lattovf's Will, 87 N.J.
Super 137, 208 A 2d 411 (1965), A B. Wilmington Trust Co.. 41 Del. Ch. 191, 191 A.2d 98
( 19 3 ), Fi % Si xi ANN. § 689.255 (West Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-111 (1979); N.Y. EST.,
PI()xi R,,& TRU, is L\W § 9-1 3(e) (McKinne Supp. 1979). See also ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, para.
194 (c)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1989) which provides:
[l]f( notwithmtanding the prov isions of subparagraphs (c)(l) and (2) of this Section, the
,dlidil of an interest depend,, upon the possibility of the birth or adoption of a child, (A)
n, person ,hall be deemed capable of having a child until he has attained the age of 13
Nicar, (B) any person vsho has attained the age of 65 years shall be deemed incapable of
haing a child. (C) evidence shall be admissible as to the incapacity of having a child by a
hx ig pcron who ha'. not attained the age of 65 years, and (D) the possibility of having a
child or moic rcmotc descendant by adoption shall be disregarded.
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to attain age thirty and join the class more than twenty-one years beyond
the death of B. Accordingly, B does not become a validating life in
being.3
71
371. Suppose, however, that A's testamentary trust had provided: "Income to B for life; thereaf-
ter, principal to such of B's grandchildren who attain age twenty-one." Does the gift of principal
violate the common law rule against perpetuities? There is no violation because, with this change in
the limitation and with the same contextual facts, B now becomes a validating life in being. Apply-
ing the critical test, one asks: Must all grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being born and)
attaining age twenty-one within twenty-one years of B's death? Looking at all possibilities for vest-
ing in light of facts known when the period of the rule begins at A's death and in light of applicable
rules of construction and principles of law, one must conclude that the answer is YES. In applying
this test, one must account for the rule of convenience which fixes the maximum class membership at
the time when first distribution of principal is made. In this example, G-1, G-2 and G-3 have
vested interests at the moment of creation at A's death. They have already attained age twenty-one,
and no other conditions must be satisified before they are entitled to possession beyond the termina-
tion of B's income interest for life. Distribution of principal will be made to each of them, or to their
successors in interest, upon the death of B even if they subsequently fail to survive B. Accordingly,
because of the rule of convenience, all potentially eligible grandchildren must be born before the
death of B. If a grandchild is born thereafter, he will be excluded from the class entitled to principal.
With this in mind, because no grandchild can be born beyond the death of B, none can satisfy the age
requirement more than twenty-one years beyond the death of B. Accordingly, all grandchildren
must join the class, or fail to join it, within twenty-one years of B's death.
Assume, however, that neither G-1, G-2, or G-3 had attained age twenty-one by the time of A's
death. Once again, when applying the critical test to B, one must account for the rule of convenience
in calculating all possibilities for vesting. With the foregoing change in the factual context, one can
no longer say that the maximum class size must be fixed at A's death. Under the rule of conven-
ience, the class will close upon the death of B or the time when the first of B's grandchildren attains
age twenty-one, whichever occurs last. It then becomes possible for B to die immediately after A's
death and, thereafter, for B-I to have another child, G-4, before the first grandchild attains age
twenty-one. Because G-4 is born before the time for first distribution of principal, he will be eligible
to join the class when and if he attains age twenty-one. Accordingly, with G-4 having been born
after B's death, it becomes possible for a grandchild to join the class more than twenty-one years
beyond the death of B. Consequently, one cannot say that all grandchildren must join the class, or
fail to join it, within twenty-one years of B's death.
Does this mean, however, that the gift of principal violates the rule against perpetuities? Under
Step Three A, no one qualifies as a testing life in being. See supra text accompanying notes 369-70.
As just demonstrated, under Step Three B, B qualifies as a testing life, but his life fails to validate the
gift of principal. Under Step Three C, absent a saving clause or some other directly related provi-
sion, there is no one who is otherwise mentioned or separately and differently mentioned. Under
Step Three D, one can examine the parents of the takers of the gift of principal, those who provide
the necessary relationship. These people are, of course, B's children. Are they restricted to lives in
being? Nothing in the language itself limits the class of grandchildren to the children of B's children
alive at A's death; nor does a rule of construction or a physical impossibility restrict the group of
qualifying parents. The rule of convenience will not close the class before B's death. Further, B is
alive and he is presumed capable of having other children who can then have other children (B's
grandchildren) before B's death. These grandchildren will join the class when and if they attain age
twenty-one. In each instance, their parent, B's child, will have been someone who was not alive at
A's death. Consequently. B's children cannot qualify as testing lives in being.
Finally, under Step Four, one asks: Must all grandchildren join the class, if at all. by (being born
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Under Step Three C, absent a saving clause or some other directly
related provision, no one qualifies as a testing life in being. To be sure, B
is "separately" mentioned in the description of those entitled to take the
principal, which reads "B's grandchildren"; nevertheless, B is not "dif-
ferently" mentioned. Although B appears in a new context, the clause
again refers to B as an individual and not differently-for example, as
part of a group.
Proceeding next to Step Three D, one observes again that the class of
takers is not confined to lives in being, and so one must consider their
parents as potential testing lives in being. Do the parents that provide the
relationship necessary to satisfy the description of this group of takers-
B's children, but not their respective spouses-consist exclusively of lives
in being and lives already ended when the period of the rule begins? The
answer is NO. As noted earlier, B is alive and he is presumed capable of
having additional children who can have children of their own (B's
grandchildren) before B's death-before the time in which the maximum
class membership is fixed. These afterborn grandchildren-born to
afterborn children of B-would be eligible to join the class upon attain-
ing age thirty. Accordingly, the grandchildren's parents-B's children-
are physically capable of expansion or reconstitution following A's
death. 72
After having failed to establish validity through potential testing lives
and) attaining age twenty-one within twenty-one years of the time the period of the rule commences
at A's death'! The answer is NO Surely, it is possible for B-I to have a child after the death of A
but before the time for first distribution of principal, the time in which the maximum class member-
ship is i',cd. B-I's child (B's grandchild) then can join the class by attaining age twenty-one more
than twenty-one years beyond the death of A. Having failed to make a valid proof under both Step
Thrce and Step Four, one must conclude that the entire gift of principal to B's grandchildren violates
the common law rule against perpettuties
372 Suppose, however, that B had failed to survive A and that all other facts remained the
samc s, ithic a perpetuitie, violation? There is none because, in this instance, a valid proof can be
made under Step Three A The group of takers of the interest in question, B's grandchildren. is
rstricted to G-l, G-2. and G-3-grandchildren in being at A's death. Even though the descriptive
language allows for afterborn grandchildren and e\en though it is presumed physically possible for
B-I to have children after A's death, the rule of convenience operates to limit the class to the
grandchildren e\sting at A's death With the previous death of B, because G-1 and G-2 have
alreadN attained age thirty by the time of A', death, they are eligible for immediate distribution of
principal To accomplish this. the rule of convenience calls for an immediate determination of the
maanium class membership Accordingly, the class must be restricted to those alive at A's death.
6 I and G-2 join the class immediately. while G-3 will join the class when and if he attains age
this tyieicaflcr Must all grandchildren who are potentially eligible to take join the class, if at all.
hN (being horn and) attaining age thinty within twenty-one years of either the life of G-1. G-2. or
6-Y' hlie anssscr is YES G-I and G-2 join thc class immediately upon creation of their interests
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in being under Step Three, one must now proceed to the final test under
Step Four. Must all potentially eligible grandchildren join the class, if at
all, by (being born and) attaining age thirty within twenty-one years of
the time when the period of the rule commences-A's death? Quite obvi-
ously, after taking into account possible times in which potential
grandchildren can join the class, one concludes that the answer is NO.
Once again, this test requires that one examine all possibilities for remote
vesting. There are many possibilities that will extend fulfillment of these
conditions well beyond the twenty-one year time period and, therefore,
support this conclusion. For example, all that is necessary is for B-1 to
have another child before the death of B. Once this happens, that child
becomes a potentially eligible class member who cannot join the class
until attaining age thirty. Of necessity, then, such afterborn grandchild
can join the class, if at all, only after more than twenty-one years have
elapsed from the time of A's death. Having gone through all four steps
without having established a positive answer to the critical test, one can
now properly conclude that the grandchildren have an invalid interest
at A's death, while G-3 must join the class, if at all, only during his own lifetime. Thus, his own life
can be used to validate his interest.
Somewhat differently, assume that B failed to survive A, that all three of his grandchildren sur-
vived A, and that all three were under age thirty when A died. Is there a perpetuities violation? In
this situation, because no grandchild was eligible for immediate distribution of principal at A's
death, one could not conclude that the gift of principal was restricted to lives in being because of
physical impossibility, descriptive language, or the rule of convenience or any other rule of construc-
tion. Indeed, the class of grandchildren should remain open to include B's grandchildren who are
born before the first grandchild attains age thirty. Accordingly, Step Three A does not produce any
life in being eligible for testing. Nor can one find any testing life in being under Steps Three B or
Three C. B is already dead, so there is no other taker. Absent a saving clause or some other directly
related provision, there is no one who is otherwise mentioned or separately and differently men-
tioned. However, under Step Three D, B-1 does qualify as a testing life in being, No one qualifies
under Step Three A, so one must examine the parents of the takers who provide the relationship
necessary to their description. Such parents must be the children of B since the gift of principal is to
B's grandchildren. B has predeceased A; therefore, he can have no children beyond the death of A.
Consequently, his children (the parents of the takers) are restricted to lives in being. Herein, B has
only one child, his daughter B-I, alive at A's death; therefore, she qualifies as a testing life in being.
Must all potentially eligible grandchildren join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age
thirty within twenty-one years of the death of B-I? The answer is NO. To begin with, B-I might
have another child (G-4, a grandchild of B) before any grandchild attains age thirty. Accordingly,
G-4 becomes eligible to join the class thereafter upon attaining age thirty. Yet B-I may die before
G-4 attains age nine. It then becomes possible for G-4 to join the class, or fail to join it, more than
twenty-one years after the death of B-I. Consequently, B-I's life fails to validate the interest of the
grandchildren. Finally, one cannot make a valid proof under Step Four. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 372-73. As a result, one must now conclude that there is a violation of the common law
rule against perpetuities.
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because it violates the common law rule against perpetuities.373
7. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: ,"Income
to B for life, and at B's death, income to B's children for the life of the
survivor of them; when the last of B's children dies, principal to B's
grandchildren, per capita, absolutely and forever." Further, assume that
the following people are alive at A's death: B (age eighty-five); B's only
child, his daughter B-1 (age sixty); and B's only grandchild, his grand-
daughter G-1 (age thirty-five). Is there a violation of the common law
rule against perpetuities?
Under Step One, because this is a testamentary trust, the period of the
rule commences at A's death. Under Step Two A, B has a vested inter-
est; therefore, it is not subject to the rule. The successive remainders to
B's children and his grandchildren are obviously subject to the condition
that a child or grandchild must be ascertained. Nevertheless, there is no
express condition precedent to possession or benefit once a child or
grandchild is born. Accordingly, both B-1 and G-1 have vested inter-
ests. 74  Therefore, looking to Step Two B, one must conclude that
neither the interest of the children nor the interest of the grandchildren is
subject to multiple conditions. Nevertheless, because the descriptive lan-
guage does not confine children and grandchildren to those alive at A's
death, -175 and because the rule of convenience does not close a class until
373 Conceivably. a court might also invalidate B's income interest. Ordinarily, interests which
iolate the common law rule are stricken, while those that satisfy it are upheld. Perhaps for punitive
rcasons, some courts have tended to invalidate the entire instrument. See, e.g., the movie Body Heat
(Warncr/Ladd 1981). Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which most courts will go beyond
the in% alid interests themselves in striking provisions because of the rule against perpetuities. They
do so because of a principle of 'infectious invalidity." This principle fundamentally rests upon a
notion of preferred intent. Whenever it becomes clear that the invalid interest is essential to the
cstate owner's dispositive scheme and that the enforcement of valid interests alone would distort
such plan, courts have tended to invalidate other interests within and without the provision that
contains the invalid limitation. When intestacy would produce a distribution consonant with the
estate owner's apparent dispositive design, courts will sometimes go further and strike all valid inter-
ests, forcing an intestate distribution on the assumption that such action reflects the preferred intent
of the estate owner. For a discussion of the principle of "infectious invalidity" and some of the
instances in which the pnnciple is applied, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.47-.52 (A.
Casner cd. 1952); L. SiMrs & A SMITH, supra note 22, § 1262.
374 In this situation, it is clear why B-I and G-I have vested interests. To be sure, there is no
precedent requirement to distribution of their gifts other than the termination of prior estates. This
tcst is the one courts ordinarily apply in making their determinations. Nevertheless, it is not the only
one that courts use. Indeed, the problem of distinguishing between vested and contingent interests is
xery complex, and often it is difficult to anticipate the characterization a court will make. For
turthcr discussion of this problem and the tests courts use, see supra notes 149, 245.
375 Once again, without any language or specific reason to close the class prematurely, one
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the time for first distribution (which cannot occur until B's death for the
children and the deaths of B and all of his children for the grandchil-
dren),376 and because the common law rule against perpetuities presumes
that it is still physically possible for B to have children and for his chil-
dren (including B-l) to have children,37 7 B- and G-1 have vested inter-
ests subject to open to include afterborn members.3 78 This makes their
interests subject to the common law rule as well as the interests of
afterborn members whose interests cannot vest until they are born and
ascertained. Therefore, because this is a class gift,3 79 under the rule the
interest of B-1 is deemed contingent until all potential children join, or
fail to join, the class, and the interest of G-1 is deemed contingent until
all potential grandchildren join, or fail to join, the class.
Examining first, then, the contingent interest of the children, one dis-
covers under Step Three A that the takers themselves-the children of
B-cannot serve as testing lives in being. As already demonstrated, they
are not restricted to lives in being because of descriptive language, rules
of construction, or impossibility of physical expansion.380 Under Step
Three B, both B and his grandchildren constitute other takers within the
same provision. B does qualify as a testing life in being. He is ascer-
tained, and the descriptive language restricts such income beneficiary to a
must presume that, by providing a gift of income to "B's children" and of principal to "B's
grandchildren," A wishes to include in each class all of those that ever may be born.
376. In this illustration, the rule of convenience would not close the class and fix the maximum
membership of the gift to B's children before the death of B-before the time in which the possibility
of further membership is exhausted. The gift to B's children is one of income and, ordinarily. the
rule of convenience does not apply to such a gift. See L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 649.
Further, the rule of convenience would not force a determination of the maximum membership of
the class gift of principal to B's grandchildren before the possibility of further membership had been
exhausted. No grandchild can be born beyond the death of the lasi of B's children to die, and no
child can be born beyond the death of B. However, because of the successive income interests to B
and then to his children, no distribution of principal is called for before the deaths of B and all of his
children, namely, the time in which there can be no more grandchildren. Because of these successive
income interests for life, no distribution of principal can be made until the possibility for further
membership has become extinct. Accordingly, there is no conflict between A's directions concerning
who should take the principal and when they should have it. For further discussion of the rule of
convenience, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 370.
378. The term "afterborn" appears throughout the text, especially in the discussion of illustra-
tions included in Part Four. In each instance, "afterborn" refers to people born after the time when
the period of the rule begins. More specifically, in this illustration,,"afterborn members" refers to
B's.children and grandchildren who are born after A's death. Consequently, it should be quite clear
that "afterborn" does not mean born after the death of the person who procreates such person.
379. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 375-77.
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specific person. Accordingly, one can apply the critical test: Will all of
B's children join the class, if at all, by being born within twenty-one years
of B's death? Obviously, after taking into account possible times in
which potential children can join the class, one concludes that the answer
is YES. Because B is not viewed as capable of having a child beyond his
death," ' no child can be born and, therefore, enter the class beyond his
death. Accordingly, B becomes a validating life in being and his chil-
dren's interest satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities.
Examining next the contingent interest of the grandchildren, one ap-
plies Step Three A to find the takers themselves-the grandchildren of
B-cannot serve as testing lives in being. Once again, they are not re-
stricted to lives in being because of descriptive language, rules of con-
struction, or impossibility of physical expansion.3"2 Under Step Three B,
both B and his children constitute other takers within the same provi-
sion. Once again, B qualifies as a testing life in being. Therefore one
must ask: Will all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by being
born within twenty-one years of B's death? Taking into account possible
times in which potential grandchildren can join the class, one concludes
that the answer is NO. Once again, this test requires that one examine
possibilities for remote vesting, and if one finds a possibility for vesting
beyond this period, the proof fails and the answer is NO. Herein, one
can elaborate many possibilities to confirm this conclusion.38 3 For exam-
ple, it is possible for B to die immediately and for B-l's income interest to
commence. The class of grandchildren will not close until B-l's death-
the time for distribution and the time when further membership is ex-
hausted because of physical impossibility. It is also possible for B-1 to
live more than twenty-one years beyond the death of B and then, given
the common law rule's presumption, to have a child who would then join
the class beyond the permitted period of time.38 4 B's children as other
3X1 Sec %upra note 337.
3X2. Sc( upra notes 375-77
3X3 In addition to the illustration appearing in the text. one can speculate about other possibili-
tics for icmotc vesting. For example, despite his advanced age, B might have another child. B-2.
before lfi,, death, Because of the income interest left to B's children for the life of the survivor of
them, the class gift of principal given to the grandchildren will not close before the death of B-2.
Nothing in the language itself restricts the grandchildren to the children born to B-I: nor does the
rule of convenience apply to close the class before the death of B-2. Consequently, B-2 might
survive B and then have a child, G-2, more than twenty-one years later. It then becomes possible
for a grandchild to join the class more than twenty-one years beyond the death of B. Accordingly. B
cannot serve as a validating life in being.
384 In applying the critical test and in accounting for all possibilities that might lead to remote
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takers cannot qualify as testing lives in being for the same reason they
were not testing lives with respect to their own interest; namely, they are
not restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended.
Under Step Three C, B is separately mentioned in the description of
the children and grandchildren entitled to take principal. Nevertheless,
B is not differently mentioned. The reference is still to B individually
and not, for example, to a group that includes B. However, in examining
the time when the gift of principal is to be made to the grandchildren (the
takers of the interest), one observes someone "separately and differently
mentioned," namely, the last of B's children to die. Although such child
is previously included in the group of other takers (B's children), he is
individually identified separately from the group itself as the person
whose death marks the time for distribution of principal. Nevertheless,
such child of B cannot qualify as a testing life. Because B is alive and
capable of having children born after the death of A, the last of B's chil-
dren to die may not be a life in being at A's death. Absent a saving
clause or some other directly related provision, Step Three C cannot be
used to test and validate in this illustration.
Under Step Three D, one can move to an examination of the
grandchildren's parents because of the previous conclusion that the tak-
ers themselves-B's grandchildren-were not restricted to lives in being
and to lives already ended. Nevertheless, their parents-B's children-
cannot qualify as testing lives. Under Step Three B, herein, and under
Step Three A, for the children's own interest, one already concluded that
such group was not restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended.
Because B is alive and presumed capable of having additional children,
the group of parents-B's children-is physically capable of expansion.
Having failed to discover a validating life in being under all of Step
Three, one must now apply the critical test under Step Four: Must all
vesting, one must always focus only on the specific testing life or lives under specific consideration.
In this instance, the critical test is applied to B. At that moment, then, one looks only to B for the
purpose of making a valid proof. In examining possiblilities for remote vesting, one must disregard
the fact that the circumstances hypothesized involve vesting within twenty-one years of the death of
another life in being. More specifically, the possibilities hypothesized in the text above involve a
grandchild joining the class no later than B-l's death, and B-I is a life in being at A's death.
Nevertheless, this proof is for B only; for purposes of conducting this particular application of the
critical test, one must disregard B-1. If B-l's life can be used to validate, it will become evident
under another step. Eventually, in this illustration, B-1 will be considered and rejected as a testing
life under Steps Three B and D. Because B is alive at A's death and presumably can have other
children, B-1 is a member of a group of other takers that is not restricted to lives in being at A's
death.
[Vol. 67:949
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grandchildren join the class, if at all, by being born within twenty-one
years of the time the period of the rule commences-A's death? After
taking into account possible times in which potential grandchildren can
join the class, one concludes that the answer, of course, is NO. Once
again, this test requires that one eliminate all possibilities for remote vest-
ing. Herein, however, it is possible for B-1 to live for more than twenty-
one years after A's death. The class will not close until her death; there-
fore, any child she might have will definitely join the class of grandchil-
dren entitled to take the principal. And it is possible, despite her
advanced age at such time, for B-1 to have another child-a grandchild
of B-who would then join the class beyond twenty-one years of A's
death.'" Having failed to establish a positive answer to the critical test
under each of the foregoing steps, one can now properly conclude that
the gift of principal to B's grandchildren is invalid because it violates the
common law rule against perpetuities.3" 6
3X5 In addition to the illustration appearing in the text, one can speculate about other possibili-
tics for remote vesting. See supra note 383. After A's death, B might have another child, B-2,
before his death. Once again, because of the income interest left to B's children for the life of the
survivor of them, the class gift of principal given to the grandchildren will not close before the death
of B-2. Therefore, B-2 may live for more than twenty-one years after the death of A and then have
a child, G-2. It then becomes possible for a grandchild to join the class more than twenty-one years
beyond the time the perpetuities period commences at the death of A. Accordingly, no validation
can be made with the gross period allowed by the common law rule.
38t Consider these three variations of illustration IV A-7. First, using the same testamentary
trust, assume that B had failed to survive A. In this situation, the gift of principal to B's grandchil-
dren would satisfy the common law rule against perpetuities. Under Step Three B, B's only child,
B-1, is in other taker, and she qualifies as a testing life, B is already dead; consequently, he can have
no other children. The income interest given to B's children for the life of the survivor of them is,
therefore, restricted to a life in being because of physical impossibility. Applying the critical test to
B-I. one asks: Will all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by being born within twenty-one
years of B-I's death? The answer is YES. Because B-I is B's only child and because she cannot
have a child beyond her death, all of B's grandchildren-namely, all of B-l's children-must join
the class, if at all, by the time of her death.
Second, assume that A's testamentary trust had provided somewhat differently for the gift of
principal: ". ,to such of B's grandchildren, per capita, absolutely and forever who are children of
such of B's children who are born by the time of my death." Once again, there is no perpetuities
% olation Under Step Three C, B-I qualifies as a testing life. Because she is B's only child born by
the time of A's death, she becomes a life in being who is separately and differently mentioned. Just
as before, one applies the critical test to B-I, and, for the same reasons, the answer is YES. B-l is a
validating life in being. By the terms of the limitation itself, all grandchildren must be children of
lives in being; consequently. none can join the class beyond the death of a life in being.
Third, assume that A's testamentary trust had been changed in this fashion: "... to such of B's
grandchildren, per capita, absolutely and forever who are born within twenty-one years of the death
of the survivor of B and B-I." In this instance, there is no perpetuities violation. Under Step Three
C, the survivor of B and B-I is a life in being and such person is separately and differently men-
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8. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life and, following his death, principal to such of B's descendants
on whatever conditions as B appoints by the terms of his last will refer-
ring specifically to the power herein given him; in default of the exercise
of this power, principal to C absolutely." Further, assume that C (age
forty), B (age fifty-five), B's only daughter B-1 (age thirty), B's only son
B-2 (age twenty), and B's only grandchild G-1 (age five and the child of
B-i) survive A. Five years later B dies, and he is survived by C, B-I,
B-2, G-l, and G-2 (B-2's only child, born shortly before B's death).
Finally, with specific reference to the power given to B in A's will, as-
sume that B exercises his special testamentary power of appointment
387
in which he continues the trust and leaves: "Income to my children for
the life of the survivor of them; thereafter, principal to my grandchildren
absolutely and per capita." Do any of the interests created by A or ap-
pointed by B violate the common law rule against perpetuities?
First, until B has validly exercised his special power, the substitute
interest of C is vested subject to divestment. C is ascertained and there is
no condition precedent attached to his interest. Courts generally say that
such interest vests subject to exercise of the power; consequently, the rule
does not apply to C's interest.388 As a result, one can proceed directly to
a consideration of the power itself and the interests B creates under his
appointment.
tioned. Applying the critical test, one asks: Will all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by
being born within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of B and B-I? The answer is, of
course, YES. Because the limitation imposes the precise requirement that all grandchildren entitled
to take must be born by the time required by the critical test itself, the common law rule is fully
satisfied.
387. Given the definitions of general and special powers of appointment, the power created by A
in this illustration is clearly a special power of appointment. For prevailing definitions of a general
power of appointment, see I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) (1954) ("The term 'general power of appointment'
means a power which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors
of his estate .. "); I.R.C. § 2514(c) (1954) ("[Tlhe term 'general power of appointment' means a
power which is exercisable in favor of the individual possessing the power ... , his estate, his credi-
tors, or the creditors of his estate .. "). Under the Internal Revenue Code, all other powers are
deemed special powers. For another definition, see 3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 320 (1940):
(1) A power is general, as the term is used in this Restatement, if (a) being exercisable
before the death of the donee, it can be exercised wholly in favor of the donee, or, (b) being
testamentary, it can be exercised wholly in favor of the estate of the donee. (2) A power is
special, as the term is used in this Restatement, if (a) it can be exercised only in favor of
persons, not including the donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large, and (b)
the donor does not manifest an intent to create or reserve the power primarily for the
benefit of the donee.
388. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 150. If C's interest is contingent, it must derive
from an uncertainty imposed by A that is independent of the power of appointment.
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Under Step One, because this is a special testamentary power of ap-
pointment, one must conclude that the period of the rule commences at
A's death when the power itself is created. 3 9 Next, without regard to
how B exercises it, does the power itself violate the common law rule?
At this point, one passes quickly through Steps Two A and Two B, after
observing that the only condition lies in the exercise of the power itself by
B, and proceeds directly to Step Three A.3 90
For purposes of testing the power itself, one should view B-the donee
of such power-as the taker of the interest in question. Because B is
ascertained and restricted by the descriptive language to a specific person
in being at A's death, one can apply the critical test to B under Step
Three A: Must the power be exercised, if at all, within twenty-one years
of the death of B? Clearly, the answer is YES and, therefore, the power
itself is valid. B has a special testamentary power that can only be exer-
cised by his will which is viewed as effective as of his death. 9 In short,
the power cannot be exercised before or beyond the death of B; of neces-
sity, it falls within the proscription of the common law rule. Accord-
ingly, with a valid power one can then proceed to examine the interests B
actually creates in exercising his power.
B creates remainders in his children and grandchildren. They are his
"descendants" and, thus, properly fall within the scope of his power.39 2
At this point, if one engrafts B's appointment onto the terms cf A's trust,
389. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
391 B's testamentary exercise of the special power of appointment is not viewed as effective until
his death because an essential ingredient of all wills is that they are revocable until the testator's
death. See R. MENNELL, WILLS AND TRusTs 84 (1979).
392. Within the context of A's description of the objects of the power of appointment, it seems
clear that a court would find that B's exercise of the special power for both his children and
grandchildren properly has been made on behalf of his "descendants." Nothing herein indicates
otherwise. The problems of interpretation, however, become more acute when terms such as "de-
scendant," and "issue" are used as words of purchase to describe a direct gift to a group of people.
Several kinds of problems arise. For example. is the term multigenerational or does it just refer to
the children of the person used to define the gift? Ordinarily, courts find that the terms "descend-
ants" and "'issue" include multigenerational relatives other than those who are ascendant or collat-
eral. Courts may, however, confine the group to the children of the person used to define the gift if
language or circumstances imply such a restricted construction. In addition, problems arise with
respect to whether any descendants are excluded because they have a living ancestor who also falls
within the group of descendants, and they also arise with respect to whether division of shares
should be made per capita or per stirpes. For a discussion of these problems, see 5 AMERICAN LAw
O- PROPERTY § 22,36 (A. J.Casner ed. 1952); L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22, §§ 743-46. See
also RiLSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 28.2, § 28.2 comments,
statutory note and reporter's note (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1987).
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the resulting provision looks virtually identical to the one contained in a
previous illustration.3 93 In that illustration, the gift to B's children satis-
fied the common law rule, but the gift to his grandchildren did not.3 94
Should one reach the same conclusion in this example? Under Step Two
A, one must determine which interests are contingent and which are
vested. With respect to a valid power, this determination can only be
made as of the time interests are actually created by the appointment. 395
Technically, at the time the period of the rule begins, the appointment B
makes to his children is contingent.3 96 However, if the appointment cre-
ates an interest that vests immediately upon exercise of a valid power, it
will always satisfy the rule. Because the power must be exercisable only
within the period of the rule, interests which vest immediately upon ap-
pointment necessarily vest within the allowed time period. Therefore, as
of the death of B, because the interest he appoints to his children for the
life of the survivor is vested, it should not be subject to the rule. B is
dead and he can have no more children. The class is closed and there is
no condition precedent that otherwise would render their interest
contingent.
Nevertheless, as of B's death, his appointment of principal to his
grandchildren is contingent under the common law rule.397 B's appoint-
393. See supra illustration IV A-7.
394. Id.
395. If the power itself is valid, as it is in this illustration, the common law rule allows one to
wait and see" how it is exercised. Obviously, one cannot apply the rule to interests created by the
power until the appointment is made because until then one has no way of knowing whether tile
power will be exercised and what specific appointment will be made. Having waited for the exercise
of the power, one can, according to the common law rule, use facts known at the time of such
appointment to determine which interests are contingent and to determine whether such contingent
interests must vest, if at all, within the allowed period of time. See supra notes 169-70 and accompa-
nying text.
396. It is contingent, of course, upon exercise of the power itself. In a sense, B's children have a
contingent executory interest, which will divest C's vested interest when and if the power is exer-
cised. Nevertheless, many people might view this differently; they might conclude that B's children
have no interest worthy of the protection afforded executory interests before the power is actually
exercised. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 224.
397. The interests of potential class members, grandchildren born after B's death (the time when
he exercises his power of appointment), are contingent upon their respective births. See supra note
330. However, the interests of B's grandchildren alive at his death, G-1 and G-2, are apparently
vested since there is no condition precedent to possession beyond the termination of the prior life
estates given to B's children. Nevertheless, the meaning of vested and contingent takes on a new
dimension with respect to the common law rule against perpetuities. Once again, because this is a
class gift, the interests of G-1 and G-2 do not satisfy the rule unless all potential class members must
join, or fail to join, the class within the allowed time period. In a sense then, for purposes of the
common law rule, the interests of G-1 and G-2 remain contingent until the last potentially eligible
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ment to G-1 and G-2 is unconditioned and because of this they have
vested interests. However, G-l's and G-2's interests are subject to open
to include afterborn grandchildren, whose interests are, of course, contin-
gent upon their respective births. Distribution of principal cannot be
made until the death of all of B's children. Neither the descriptive lan-
guage nor the rule of convenience confines the class of grandchildren to
those alive at B's death.398 B's children, B-1 and B-2, have survived B,
and until their respective deaths they are deemed capable of adding to
the class of grandchildren. Therefore, the class membership is not fixed
at B's death by reason of physical impossibility.39 9 Because this is a class
gift, the interest of each grandchild (including the vested interests of G-1
and G-2) is deemed contingent until all potentially eligible grandchildren
will, if at all, join the class.4° Finally, one must conclude under Step
Two B that the gift of principal to the grandchildren is not subject to
multiple conditions because birth of a grandchild is the only relevant
condition attached to each class member's interest.
Proceeding then to Step Three A, one must conclude that the takers
themselves of the contingent interest-the grandchildren-are not re-
stricted to lives in being and to lives already ended. As of the time the
power is exercised at B's death, neither physical impossibility, descriptive
language nor rules of construction preclude the inclusion of grandchil-
dren born after A's death.4" Indeed, one of the grandchildren, G-2, was
born after A's death. Therefore, the grandchildren cannot serve as test-
ing lives in being to validate their own interests.
Under Step Three B, B is an other taker and by the descriptive lan-
guage itself, he must be viewed as an other taker restricted to a life in
grandchild joins, or fails to join, the class. For a discussion of the common law rule as applied to
class gifts, see supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
31)8 Because B's children. B-I and B-2, survive him. distribution cannot be made immediately
to the grandchildren, G-I and G-2. Indeed, distribution of principal will be delayed until the in-
come interests of B-I and B-2 cease upon the survivor's death. Accordingly, there is no occasion to
apply the rule of convenience and. thereby, fix the maximum class membership before the possibility
for birth of additional grandchildren has been exhausted by the death of the survivor of B's children.
For further discussion of the rule of convenience, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
31) . If. of course, B-I and B-2, B's only children, had predeceased B, then the class member-
ship of the gift to grandchildren would have been fixed immediately as of the death of B-the time in
wIch he exercises the power of appointment-by reason of physical impossibility. In this instance.
the income interests for life in B's children would have failed and the gift of principal to B's
grandchildren, G-I and G-2, would have vested immediately upon creation at B's death.
4(W) See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
401 See upra notes 397-400 and accompanying text,
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being. Accordingly, one can apply the critical test to B, and under the
common law rule, one must do this in light of facts known when the
power is exercised. Even though B is dead when one applies this test, he
should not be eliminated as a testing life because he was in being at A's
death-the point in time when the period of the rule begins. Therefore,
one must ask: Looking at all possibilities in light of facts known when
the power is exercised at B's death, must all of B's grandchildren join the
class, if at all, by being born within twenty-one years of B's death? Tak-
ing into account possible times in which potential grandchildren can join
the class, one concludes that the answer is NO. Once again, this test
requires that one eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting, but one
cannot do so here. As indicated previously, the class of grandchildren
remains open until the death of both of B's children, B-1 and B-2. How-
ever remote, it is possible for B-1 or B-2 to live beyond twenty-one years
of B's death and then to have a child, in which case this grandchild of B
would join the class more than twenty-one years beyond his death.40 2
Proceeding next to B's children, who are also other takers4 3 under
this provision, one must inquire, as of the appointment at B's death,
whether B's children are in actuality confined to lives in being or to lives
already ended at A's death. Although B could have had additional chil-
dren as of A's death, he did not. And this is something the common law
rule allows one to take into account.4° When B exercises his power at
his death, the only two children to survive him are B-1 and B-2, and
both of these children were alive at A's death as well. As of B's death,
the group of other takers-B's children-is restricted in actuality to lives
in being at A's death because it becomes physically impossible for there
to be any others beyond B-1 and B-2. Accordingly, B's children qualify
as testing lives in being and one must apply the critical test to them.40 5
402. If, of course, B-I and B-2 had predeceased B, there would be no perpetuities violation.
The interests of G-1 and G-2 would vest immediately under the common law rule upon exercise of
the power of appointment at B's death because of the physical impossibility of any other grandchil-
dren being born and joining the class.
403. C, the taker of the gift in default of B's exercise of the power of appointment, must also be
viewed as an other taker. One cannot, however, make a valid proof using C as the testing life in
being. Indeed, one cannot answer YES to the question: Must all grandchildren of B join the class, if
at all, by being born within twenty-one years of the death of C? Surely, it is possible for either B-I
or B-2 to live more than twenty-one years beyond the death of C and then have a child, a grandchild
ofB. Such grandchild would then be eligible to join the class, and he would do so more than twenty-
one years after the death of C.
404. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
405. Suppose, however. B had another child, B-3, following the death of A. Would the gift of
[Vol. 67:949
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Looking at all possibilities in light of facts known when the power is
exercised at B's death, must all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at
all, by being born within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of
B-1 and B-2? After taking into account possible times in which potential
grandchildren can join the class, one concludes that the answer is YES.
Herein, one can eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. No
grandchild of B can be born beyond the death of a child of B;4 0 6 there-
principal to B's grandchildren made pursuant to his appointment violate the common law rule
against perpetuities? First, assume that B-3 does not survive B and that, once again, only B-1 and
B-2 are alive at B's death. In this situation, one can conclude that, in light of facts known when the
power is exercised at B's death, this group of other takers is restricted to lives in being when the
period of the rule begins at A's death-the time in which the power was created. Although B could
have had children born after the death of A who survived B, his only children alive at his death were
those also alive at A's death. The group of children is, therefore, restricted to lives in being at A's
death because after B's death it becomes physically impossible for him to have any others. Conse-
quently, B's children, B-I and B-2, qualify as testing lives in being, and after applying the critical
test, one discovers that their lives validate the gift of principal just the same as in the illustration
wvtthin the text itself.
There would, however, be a perpetuities violation if B-3 had survived B. In this situation, taking
into account facts known at B's death, one must conclude that this group of other takers has ex-
panded since A's death and does in fact include someone not in being at A's death. Accordingly,
they cannot qualify as testing lives. Also, under Step Three B, C is an other taker, and C does
qualify for testing because by the descriptive language he is identified as a life in being. Applying the
critical test to C, one asks: Looking at all possibilities in light of facts known when the power is
exercised at B's death, must all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by being born within
twenty-one years of C's death? The answer is NO. Surely C may die immediately after the death of
B. Also, any one of B's three children might live for another thirty years and then have a child,
another grandchild, who then would join the class more than twenty-one years beyond the death of
C. Under Step Three C, the "survivor" of B's children might be viewed as a person who is sepa-
rately and differently mentioned Nevertheless, because the survivor might be B-3, one cannot con-
clude that such person is restricted to a life in being at A's death. Under Step Three D, B's children
are the parents who provide the necessary relationship. However, once again, taking into account
facts known at B's death, one must conclude that they are not restricted to lives in being at A's
death Because B-3 has survived B, the parents include someone born after the time the power was
created-the time in which the period of the rule commences. Finally, one must apply the critical
test contained in Step Four: Looking at all possibilities for vesting in the light of facts known when
the power is exercised at B's death, must all of B's grandchildren join the class, if at all, by being
born within twenty-one years of the time the period of the rule commences at A's death? The
answer is, of course, NO. Surely any one of B's three children may live more than twenty-one years
beyond A's death. Indeed, this may alreadN hase happened by the time of B's death. It then be-
conies possible for such child to have a child thereafter (another grandchild of B) who would then
join the class more than twenity-one years beyond the death of A. Having failed to establish a
positlie answer to the critical test under each of the foregoing steps, one now can conclude properly
that the gift of principal under B's appointment is invalid because it violates the common law rule
against perpetuities.
400 No person can have a child beyond his or her death or beyond the period of gestation
following his death. See supra note 337.
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fore, the very latest a grandchild will be deemed to join the class is at the
death of the surviving child, either B-1 or B-2. Accordingly, because B's
children become validating lives in being, the interest of the grandchil-
dren satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities and therefore is
valid.
9. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "Income
to B for life and, after his death, income to his then living wife for her
life; thereafter, principal to his children absolutely who are then living."
Further, assume that B (age eighty), W (age seventy and B's wife), and
B-1 (age forty and B's son and only child) survive A. Is there a violation
of the common law rule against perpetuities? °7
In answer to the question contained in Step One, the period of the rule
begins at A's death because these interests are created by A's will. Under
Step Two A, one must conclude that B's interest is vested but that the
interests of B's wife and B's children are contingent and, therefore, sub-
ject to the rule. Beginning with the gift of income "to B's then living
wife," because this remainder interest does not identify W specifically by
name but includes anyone who satisfies the descriptive language,40 two
conditions make the interest contingent. First, presumably such person
must qualify as B's wife at the time of his death-there is the express
requirement that they must be married and not divorced. Second, such
person, whoever she might be, must, of course, be born. Although it is
unlikely that B will be married at the time of his death to someone un-
born at A's death, this is possible, and, therefore, this becomes an im-
plicit condition. Further, one might be tempted to add that there is a
407. This illustration presents the classic case of the "unborn widow," one which has been a
fertile source of unwitting perpetuities violations. See McGovern, supra note 327, at 157-60.
408. There may be circumstances, however, in which a court will restrict the meaning of "his
then living wife." If there is evidence, especially within the entire instrument itself, indicating that A
had a particular person in mind, courts are apt to reject the construction that such a gift is to anyone
who satisfies the descriptive language at the time of B's death. Indeed, a court may construe the
language the same as it would have if a specific person had been named. See, e.g., Willis v. Hendry,
127 Conn. 653, 20 A.2d 375 (1941).
In an effort to patch up problems presented by the common law rule against perpetuities, some
jurisdictions presume this kind of language was intended to restrict the taker to a person who was in
being when the interest was created and the period of the rule commenced. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 715.7 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(b) (1981) N.Y. Esr., POWERS AND TRUSTS
LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194 (1)(C) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983): -[I]t shall be presumed.. .(C) where the instrument creates an interest in the 'widow,'
.widower,' or 'spouse' of another person, that the maker of the instrument intended to refer to a
person who was living at the date that the period of the rule against perpetuities commences to
run; .... -
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requirement of survivorship as well. Nevertheless, because B's wife has
been given a life estate, there is in the duration of the estate itself already
a requirement that such wife must be alive for the interest to endure.
Accordingly, the explicit statement that she must be "then living" is sur-
plusage.40 ' To summarize then looking to Steps Two B and Two C, one
must conclude that there are multiple conditions that appear cumula-
tively. Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1) the implied condition
of birth is subsumed by the requirement of marriage (that she be B's then
living wife), one can proceed directly to a consideration of the subsuming
condition under Step Three A.
Next, with regard to the gift of principal to B's children, one also ob-
serves two conditions. Although B has a child, B-, and although B is an
octogenarian not likely to have additional children, this class gift must be
viewed as subject to open and to reconstitution. Indeed, neither the min-
imum nor maximum class membership is fixed at the time of A's death.
No distribution of principal to B's children can be made at least until the
death of B and, accordingly, the maximum class membership will not be
fixed until the possibility of additional children is exhausted at B's
death.4"' Therefore, afterborn children will be included and for these
children there is the initial condition of birth. Additionally, for all of B's
children, including B-1, there is the explicit requirement that they be
alive when the prior life estates terminate. Once again, because this is a
class gift, each class member's interest is deemed contingent until all po-
409. Ordinarily, conditions that do nothing more than describe the time or manner in which
preceding estates terminate or simply reiterate characteristics inherent in a particular estate are not
enough to make an interest contingent. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.19 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952); L. SIMES & A. SMITH. supra note 22, § 142. If, however, the gift of principal had been "to
B's then living wife absolutely," then the language of survivorship would have added a new require-
ment and courts would, accordingly, view the gift as contingent. Consider, however, this variation
of the gift of principal: "... and after B's death, to his wife absolutely." Suppose B's only wife, W,
survives A but predeceases B. Is her interest contingent upon survivorship of B? Quite literally,
after B's death, W is no longer B's wife even if she were to survive him. Presumably, the marriage
ends with the death of B or W. This interpretation would, of course, make the gift of principal a
nullity because under no circumstance could W, or anyone else, satisfy the requirements of the
descriptive language. With this in mind, a court should not give "swife" its literal meaning and,
consequently, it should dismiss any inherent requirement of survivorship. Conceivably, in this situ-
ation, a court might construe "wife" the same as if the language had said "widow." If so, the
foregoing nullity does not exist because it is possible for a wife to survive her husband and become
his widow. With this interpretation, a requirement ofsurvivorship presents itself, and a court might
then conclude that W cannot take the principal because she has predeceased B.
410. Accordingly, the rule of convenience will not preclude inclusion of B's children born after
A's death. For further discussion of the rule of convenience, see supra notes 160-61 and accompany-
ing text.
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tentially eligible members join, or fail to join, the class.41 To summarize
then as to the gift of principal, looking to Steps Two B and Two C, one
must conclude that there are multiple conditions that appear cumula-
tively. Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1) the implied condition
of birth is subsumed by the requirement of survivorship (of B and B's
wife), one can proceed directly to a consideration of the subsuming con-
dition under Step Three A.
Applying Step Three A of the methodology first to the contingent in-
terest of B's wife, such taker cannot qualify as a testing life in being.
Neither the descriptive language nor the rule of convenience restricts
such gift to a life in being.412 However unlikely it might seem, W may
die and the person B remarries-his wife "then living" at his death-
might be someone unborn at A's death. One cannot say that B's wife is
restricted to a life in being or to a life already ended; one cannot reach
such conclusion because such taker is physically capable of reconstitu-
tion to include someone born after A's death.413
411. In this illustration, the "all or nothing" principle that is applied to class gifts under the
common law rule against perpetuities does not present a problem. Because the condition attached to
the gift of principal involves survivorship of a single point in time (namely, the death of the survivor
of B and his wife), all of B's children who become actual takers will enter the class at the same time.
Stated differently, there is no occasion for children to enter the class of actual takers at different
times and, therefore, there is no possibility for one child to have a vested interest before the class of
takers is fully determined.
412. If the language of the entire instrument makes clear that A had W specifically in mind as
B's wife just the same as if he had expressly identified her, one might then be able to say that B's
"'then living wife" was restricted to a life in being because of the descriptive language. See supra note
408. Absent such interpretation, the descriptive language must be assumed to include anyone who is
married to B at the time of his death, including those born after A's death. Nor is there any rule of
construction that restricts B's wife to a life in being when the period of the rule commences at A's
death. In particular, the rule of convenience is not applicable at all. For one thing, this involves a
gift of income and, for another, this is a gift to an individual and not to a class.
413. To qualify as a testing life, there must be no opportunity for inclusion of lives born after the
period of the rule commences. Often, some person or group that falls within the various classifica-
tions of Step Three will fail to qualify because it is possible for such person or group to expand in
number with afterborn lives. Accordingly, in finding a testing life or lives, one must rule out the
chance of such expansion. Just as important, however, one must also rule out the possibility of
reconstitution. Often the number is fixed. In this situation, B can have only one wife who Is then
living. Nevertheless, because her exact identity is not fully determined by the language itself at A's
death, the person who qualifies as B's then living wife may change by the time of B's death. Indeed,
her identity may be reconstituted. The same may be said about the gift of principal to B's children
living when the income interests cease. To be sure, although only B-I i's alive at A's death, B hnay
have additional children. The group can expand with afterborn children and more than one can
actually survive and ultimately share in the principal. Nevertheless, even though there is only one
taker who qualifies for distribution of principal, the identity of such taker may be reconstituted with
an afterborn child. Indeed, it is possible for B-I to die before B and B to then have another child,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
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However, under Step Three B, B as an other taker does qualify as a
testing life. B is ascertained and by the descriptive language his interest
can belong to no one else-a specific person in being at A's death. Ac-
cordingly, one can apply the critical test to B: Must the condition(s) of
(birth and) marriage attached to B's wife's interest be fulfilled, if at all,
within twenty-one years of B's death? Obviously, after accounting for all
possibilities, the answer is YES. Herein one can eliminate all possibilities
for remote vesting. To become B's wife at his death, one must be born
and married to him at the time of his death. Both conditions will be met,
if at all, by the time of B's death; therefore, this gift satisfies the common
law rule and it is valid.
Applying Step Three A of the methodology next to the gift of princi-
pal-the contingent interest in B's children-one finds that the takers
themselves cannot qualify as testing lives. As indicated previously,
although B already has a child, B-l, neither the descriptive language nor
the rule of convenience restricts the class to lives in being, and presump-
tively B is physically capable of having children born after the death of
A.4 4 Additionally, under Step Three B, for reasons already given, B's
wife cannot qualify as a testing life in being.4" 5 Once again, the person
who ultimately qualifies as "his then living wife" can include someone
B-2, who then might survive the time of distribution. In this case, the sole taker would be someone
born after the time the period of the rule commences.
414. A has given the principal to B's "children who are then living." B has had one child, B-1;
presumably, in making the gift to children, A intended to include any who were born after his death.
Consequently, one cannot say that the descriptive language restricts the takers of the principal to
lives in being. Additionally, the rule of convenience does not fix the maximum membership to those
alive at A's death. See supra notes 410-I1 and accompanying text. Finally, the takers are not re-
stricted to lives in being because of physical impossibility of reconstitution or expansion. Although
B is age eighty, under the common law rule, he must be presumed capable of having children. See
upra note 370. Conceivably, however, there might be a situation in which a court, after considering
the entire instrument and all surrounding circumstances, concludes that A intended that B's chil-
dren be restricted to those born by the time of A's death the same as if he had limited the takers by
expressly naming B-I. This interpretation might gather force if B had had another child, B-2, who
had died between the time A executed his will and the time of his death. Presumably, A knew of B's
advanced age and that his children were well into adulthood. Undoubtedly, he did not anticipate B's
having additional children and he probably had B-I and B-2 specifically in mind. Most likely, the
term "children" was used as a short-hand expression and not because of a desire to elasticize the
group for inclusion of those born after A's death. With this interpretation, the taker himself then
qualifies as a testing life under Step Three A because of the descriptive language. As a result, one
can then make a valid proof. B-I, a life in being, can only take the principal by surviving the time
of possession. Accordingly, his interest must vest during his own lifetime or else it will fail at his
death,
415. See supra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
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born after A's death.416
Nevertheless, under Step Three B, as an other taker B does qualify as a
testing life. Therefore, one must ask: Will all of B's children join the
class, if at all, by (being born and) surviving the life tenants within
twenty-one years of B's death? After taking into account the possible
times in which potential children can join the class, one concludes that
the answer is NO. Here, one cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote
vesting. To be sure, all of B's children will be deemed born by the time of
his death. Nevertheless, it is possible that B's wife, whoever she might
be, will survive him for more than twenty-one years. It then becomes
possible for B's children to survive her and then to join the class more
than twenty-one years after the death of B.
Under Step Three C, B is separately mentioned through the pronoun
"his" in the description of both remainder interests. Nevertheless, B is
not differently mentioned. The reference is still to B individually and
not, for example, to a group that includes B. Absent a saving clause or
other directly related provision, one must proceed next to Step Three D.
Here, because the children are not restricted to lives in being and, there-
fore, were not eligible for testing under Step Three A, one can continue
the process and consider their parent who provides the necessary descrip-
tive relationship. That parent is B, someone who is a life in being. How-
ever, because B has already been tested and failed as a validating life
under Step Three B, one must proceed directly to the critical test con-
tained within Step Four.
Will all of B's children join the class, if at all, by (being born and)
surviving the life tenants within twenty-one years of the time the period
of the rule commences-A's death? After taking into account the possi-
ble times in which potential children can join the class, one concludes
that the answer is, of course, NO. Herein, one cannot eliminate all pos-
416. If, however, the entire instrument makes clear that A had W in mind as the person to
whom he referred as "B's wife," then W will qualify as a testing life in being just as she would if A
had specifically identified her. See supra note 408. If one is able to reach this conclusion, then there
is no perpetuities violation. If "then living" refers only to the death of W, whether she dies before or
after B, a valid proof can be made with W under Step Three B. The gift of principal will belong to
B's children alive at her death. Clearly then, it must vest, if at all, at W's death. If, however, "then
living" impliedly refers to those children alive at the death of the survivor of B and W, then the
survivor qualifies as a testing life under Step Three C because such person is separately and differ-
ently mentioned. And under Step Three C, one can make a valid proof with such survivor. The
survivor of B and W is necessarily a life in being. The gift of principal will belong to B's children
alive at the survivor's death. Clearly then, it must vest, if at all, at the survivor's death. Conse-
quently, in either case, the common law rule against perpetuities is satisfied.
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sibilities for remote vesting. Very simply, B may live more than twenty-
one years beyond A's death. Whether his wife does or does not survive
him, B's children then living-B-1 alone or afterborn children as well-
will then join the class more than twenty-one years beyond the death of
A. Having failed to establish a positive answer to the critical test under
any of the foregoing steps, one can now properly conclude that the prin-
cipal interest of B's children is invalid because it violates the common
law rule against perpetuities.
10. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that leaves: "In-
come to B for life, and at his death income to his then living wife for life,
with principal to whomever the survivor of them appoints by deed or
trust during his or her lifetime or by will at his or her death and on
whatever terms or conditions the survivor elects; in default of the exer-
cise of such power, principal to C absolutely." At A's death, assume that
B, age five, survives and thirty years later marries W, who is ten years
younger than B and, therefore, was not born by the time of A's death.
Thereafter, they have two children, B-1 and B-2. B then dies, and
twenty-five years later W dies having exercised the power of appointment
in her will. Her appointment leaves the subject matter in trust: "Income
to our (B's and W's) children for the life of the survivor of them; thereaf-
ter, principal is to belong absolutely to our grandchildren per capita."
Finally, at W's death assume that B-1 (age thirty-five) and B-2 (age
thirty) survive and that they are then childless but recently married.
Once again, the interests created by exercise of this power resemble
those interests created in two previous illustrations.4" 7 Illustration IV
A-7 contained a perpetuities violation, but illustration IV A-8 did not.
Here, the gift in default to C is vested subject to divestment at the time of
A's death; therefore, it is not subject to the rule. However, in this illus-
tration, does either the power itself or the interests created by its exercise
present a violation of the common law rule against perpetuities? With
the general power to appoint during one's life or at death,41 the period of
417 See supra illustrations IV A-7 and IV A-8. Both illustration IV A-8 and this one, IV
A-10. involve powers of appointment that are exercised at the donee's death. After incorporating
these appointments into the original gift made by the donor of the power (in each case a provision
within the will of A), one observes that in all three illustrations there is a trust that leaves income
first to B for his life and thereafter to hts children for the life of the survivor of them. Further, in
each case principal will belong absolutely to B's grandchildren per capita. Illustration IV A-10,
however, includes an additional interest. The trust leaves an interest to B's wife that entitles her to
the entire income immediately after the termination of B's income interest at his death.
41S For a discussion of how the common law rule against perpetuities applies to general powers
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the rule begins at the time the power is created, and herein it is created at
A's death. The critical test ultimately to be applied with respect to some
testing life in being419 is: Must the power become unconditionally exer-
cisable, if at all, within twenty-one years of the death of a testing life in
being (or within twenty-one years of the time the period of the rule com-
mences at A's death)?42 ° And herein one should note that the right to
exercise the general power rests on two conditions: that one be born and
become the survivor of B and his wife. Nevertheless, even though this
presents multiple cumulative conditions under Step Two B and Two C,
the condition of birth is subsumed by the condition of survivorship.
Consequently, pursuant to Step Two C (1), one can proceed directly to
Step Three A for purposes of testing the general power itself.
Under Step Three A, looking at the donee of the power at the time the
power is created at A's death-looking at the survivor of B and his
wife-is the donee restricted to a life in being? The answer is NO. Obvi-
ously, B is restricted to a life in being, but his wife is not and, therefore,
the survivor of them is not limited to a life in being at A's death. The
analysis is similar to the one developed previously.42' The identity of B's
wife is not determined immediately, but at the time of his death. Whether
B is married or not at A's death, he may eventually become divorced or a
widower and remarry someone not in being at A's death who then sur-
vives B. Neither descriptive language nor rules of construction preclude
this possibility, nor is this a physical impossibility. Indeed, under the
hypothesized facts herein, B does marry someone born after A's death.
Accordingly, one must then search for a testing life under Step Three B.
As an other taker within the provision, B qualifies as a testing life. By
the descriptive language itself, the initial income interest is given to a
specific person who cannot be afterborn. Consequently, one can apply
the critical test to B to determine whether the general power given to the
survivor of B and his wife satisfies the common law rule: Must the power
of appointment that are presently exercisable during the donee's life and at death, see supra notes
210-19 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the different treatment accorded general testa-
mentary powers of appointment and special powers of appointment under the common law rule, see
supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
419. For further discussion of this test for validity of the power itself, see supra notes 210-15.
420. The phrase within the brackets constitutes the critical test applied under Step Four of the
methodology. If a valid proof cannot be made with the testing lives to be found under Steps Three
A, Three B, Three C or Three D, one must proceed to Step Four. And to accomplish this, one
should substitute the phrase within the brackets in place of the following language: "within twenty-
one years of the death of a testing life in being."
421. See supra illustration IV A-9.
[Vol. 67:949
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
PERPETUITIES METHODOLOGY
become unconditionally exercisable, if at all, within twenty-one years of
the death of B? After taking into account possible times in which the
power can be acquired and become unconditionally exercisable, one con-
cludes that the answer is YES. Obviously, B himself cannot uncondition-
ally acquire and exercise the power beyond his death, but B may not be
the surviving life tenant who acquires and can exercise the power.
Therefore, one must refine the question: Will his wife acquire the power,
if at all, by (being born and) surviving him and have a right uncondition-
ally to exercise it within the allowed time? Obviously, if she is ever to
acquire the power, this must occur at B's death, and she then can exer-
cise it immediately because there is no further condition upon her right
to make an appointment. Therefore, the general power itself is valid and
one can now proceed to examine the interests created by W's exercise of
this power.
Under Step One, once the validity of this kind of general power has
been established, it should be observed that for all other determinations
the period of the rule commences at the time the power is exercised and
appointments are made.422 Therefore, the period of the rule herein be-
gins at W's death. By way of emphasis, it is totally irrelevant that W was
not in being when the general power was created and that she may have
exercised it in fact more than twenty-one years beyond the deaths of all
lives in being at A's death.
Examining the interests W appoints at her death, under Step Two A
one observes that the income interests created in her children are vested
and not subject to the rule. The only conceivable conditions are that
their children must be born and that one of them survive her.423 Because
she cannot have children after her death and because her children-B-1
422 Sec supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
423 In all likelihood, however, the condition ofsurvivorship is a limited one. The income inter-
cst in their children is for the life of the sursivor of them. Unlike an income interest for the life of
the ife tenant, this is an interest for the life of others as well. One, therefore, cannot say that
survivorship is inherent in the duration and quality of the estate itself. There is a requirement of
surviorhip. but it is only a requirement that one child, whoever that might be, survive W.
Additionally. if the common la%; rule against perpetuities were to require one to incorporate the
actual appointment into the original gift made by the donor of the power and then to evaluate
lntcrests created by the appointment in light of facts known when the power was created, one would
have to conclude that the income interests created in B's and W's children were contingent upon
thei respective births. At the time of A's death, B was. of course, childless. Accordingly. being
horn \% ould become a condition of the children's gift of income. Nevertheless, the common law rule
does not require that one go back in time in this manner. It allows an examination of interests as of
the time the poN~er is exercised
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and B-2-survive her, both of these conditions are fulfilled by the time
her appointment is made and takes effect.
Nevertheless, those who take the principal-the grandchildren-have
a contingent interest. None have been born by the time of W's appoint-
ment. Because neither the descriptive language nor any rule of construc-
tion limits the grandchildren to those born by W's death, the class will
not fail, but instead will remain open to include those born until the time
of distribution, a time when the physical possibility of further members is
also exhausted. The grandchildren's interest is contingent solely because
they must be born, as there is no other condition precedent. Therefore,
because this is a class gift, the interest of each grandchild is deemed con-
tingent until all potentially eligible class members join the class, if at all,
by being born. Further, under Step Two B, one can conclude that this
gift of principal is not subject to multiple conditions and, thus, one can
go directly to Step Three A.
Under Step Three A, the takers themselves-the grandchildren- can-
not serve as testing lives in being. Neither the descriptive language nor
the rule of convenience limits the grandchildren to lives in being, and
because W has children who survive her, it is physically possible for there
to be afterborn grandchildren. Indeed, if this were not so, the class
would fail for want of members. Of necessity, because there are no
grandchildren alive at W's death, the entire class of grandchildren will be
comprised of members born after her death.
Proceeding next to Step Three B, one observes that the other takers of
the income interest-the children of B and W-do qualify as testing lives
in being. They are restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended
at W's death because they are not capable of physical expansion or recon-
stitution after the death of the first of the procreators to die-namely, B.
Accordingly, one must apply the critical test to the children of B and W:
Will all potentially eligible grandchildren join the class, if at all, by being
born within twenty-one years of the death of the survivor of the children
of B and W-namely, the survivor of B-1 and B-2? Taking into account
the possible times in which potential grandchildren can join the class by
being born, one concludes that the answer is YES. Presumptively, no
child of B and W can be deemed to have a child beyond his or her death.
Therefore, the very latest any grandchild can be born and join the class is
at the death of the survivor of the children, a point in time well within
the allowed period. Therefore, the principal interest W has appointed to
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her grandchildren is valid because it satisfies the common law rule
against perpetuities.
11. -Assume that A creates an irrevocable trust during his lifetime
that leaves: "Income to my mother, B, for life; thereafter, principal to
such of my (A's) children who attain age forty." Further, assume when
the trust is created that B (age eighty-five) is alive and that A (age sixty-
five) has three living children, A-1 (age forty), A-2 (age thirty) and A-3
(age twenty-five). Is there a violation of the common law rule against
perpetuities? This example bears some resemblance to a previous illus-
tration,4 24 but there are very important differences.
Most significant, one must reach a different conclusion under Step
One. Herein, A has "tied up" the property irrevocably during his life-
time; therefore, the period of the rule commences at the date the living
trust becomes effective instead of at A's subsequent death.425 One must
keep this in mind throughout. The analysis under Step Two A is much
the same as in illustration IV A-6. B's income interest is vested and,
therefore, it is not subject to the common law rule. A's children, how-
ever, have a remainder that is ostensibly contingent because of the ex-
press age requirement. A-1 has already satisfied this age requirement;
accordingly, his interest is fully vested. Nevertheless, because the gift
does not allow for distribution of A-l's interest while B is alive and enti-
tled to income, because the class of children is not by its terms restricted
to those alive when the trust is created, and because A is still alive and
presumed capable of having children,426 A-i's vested interest is subject
424 ce upra illustration IV A-4
425 Sce \upra notes 162-65. See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.12 (A. Casner ed.
1952), RLST \TIEMLN (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.2, § 1.2 comments a
and h (1983). An irrevocable trust becomes effective when the requirements for its creation have
been fulfilled. This is accomplished when a settlor manifests an intention to create a trust that
imposes fiduciary duties upon a trustee for the benefit of beneficiaries with respect to property
thercby transferred to the trustee See R MiN-Iti, supra note 391, at 198-275 (1979). Ordinarily,
this happens upon the execution and delivery (i.e., a manifestation that it shall have immediate
effect) of one or more instruments that create the trust and properly transfer property to the trustee.
Because these requirements---especially those that pertain to intent-rest upon criteria that cannot
he satified with a litmus test, there is often disagreement about whether and when a trust was
properly created. For further discussion of the requirements for creation of an express trust, see G.
BoWi Ri, vupra note 285, at 19-165
420 In applying the common laxv rule against perpetuities, one must presume that a person is
capable of having a child throughout his or her life. See supra note 370. Consequently, in using this
methodology, one must account for the presumption of fertility in determining whether a gift is
Lontingent under the rule because it is subject to open. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 425-28.
Additionally. one must account for this presumption in determining whether the groups of lives
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to open. The class will include those additional children who are born
before B's death and attain age forty.427 Accordingly, even though A-i's
interest is vested, it is still subject to the common law rule. As for A-2
and A-3, their interests are still subject to the age requirements which
they had not satisfied when A created the trust, and their interests are
contingent for that reason. As for other potential members, their inter-
ests are contingent because they must, of course, satisfy both the require-
ments of birth and attainment of age forty. Because this is a class gift,
one must carefully note that the common law rule deems each class
member's interest contingent-including those whose interest is other-
wise vested, such as A-i-until all potentially eligible members join, or
fail to join, the class. With these observations in mind, looking to Steps
Two B and Two C, one must conclude that there are multiple conditions
that appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1)
the implied requirement of birth is subsumed by the age requirement, one
can proceed directly to a consideration of the subsuming condition under
Step Three A.
Proceeding, then, to Step Three A, one should immediately observe
that the takers themselves-A's children-cannot serve as testing lives in
being. As just indicated, the class is subject to open; it is not restricted to
lives in being as a result of descriptive language,428 rules of construc-
under consideration in Steps Three A, B, C, or D are restricted to lives in being and to lives already
ended. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 428-31. Finally, one must also account for the
presumption of fertility when applying the critical test. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 431-
32.
427. The class will, of course, admit A-2 and A-3 when they respectively attain age forty. Chil-
dren of A born after creation of this irrevocable trust will also join the class at age forty if they are
born before the time of B's death. Conceivably, then, some of A's children will be excluded if they
are born too late. This occurs, once again, because of the rule of convenience. A's irrevocable trust
immediately creates an interest in A-1 that is vested absolutely. All requirements beyond the termi-
nation of B's income interest have been satisfied. A-I must attain age forty, which he has done, but
he need not survive B for his successor to take his interest. His share in the principal is certain to
become possessory. All that remains uncertain is the precise size of that share. Therefore, distribu-
tion of A-I's share of the principal, to A-I personally or to his successor, must occur at the death of
B. To accomplish this, one must close the class and fix its maximum membership. The class will
close earlier if A predeceases B. But if A survives B, the class must close at B's death (the time of
first distribution of principal) because of the rule of convenience. For further discussion of the rule
of convenience, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
428. Assume, however, that by descriptive language A had limited the gift of principal to only
those of his children who were alive at the creation of the irrevocable trust. In this situation, there
would be no perpetuities violation. The explanation is very similar to the one used in a previous
illustration. See supra illustration IV A-I. The proof of validity would be made under Step Three
A. The takers themselves would qualify as testing lives in being because the descriptive language
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tion,420 or physical impossibility.430 A is alive and he is presumed capa-
ble of having children born after creation of the trust but before B's
death-before the time for closing off the maximum class membership.431
Under Step Three B, however, B is an other taker under the provision
and she qualifies as a testing life in being. She is ascertained and by the
descriptive language used in the instrument, this other taker cannot be
someone afterborn. Accordingly, one must ask: Will all of A's poten-
tially eligible children join the class, if at all, by (being born and) attain-
ing age forty within twenty-one years of B's death? Taking into account
the possible times in which potential children can join the class, one con-
cludes that the answer is NO. Herein, one cannot eliminate all possibili-
ties for remote vesting. To be sure, the existing children of A who have
not yet joined the class-A-2 and A-3-must do so, if at all, within
fifteen years, because the youngest was age twenty-five when the trust
was created. As to potential children of A born after creation of the
trust, once again, the rule of convenience requires that maximum mem-
bership be determined at B's death and not later because A-1 is already
age forty. Although A must be presumed capable of having additional
children, no child can gain admission to the class unless he or she is born
before B's death. Nevertheless, it is possible that those born by the time
doe,, not allow for inclusion of any afterborn children of A. After applying the critical test to A's
children, one is able to conclude that the answer to the question is YES. Because no child can enter
the class beyond his own death and because each child is a life in being, each child has an interest
that must vest, if at all, no later than the time of his death. Accordingly, none of A's children can
join the class beyond the period of time allowed by the common law rule. The entire class gift,
therefore, is valid.
420 It however, B had died after the irrevocable trust had been drafted but before it had be-
come effective, th n the class of A's children would have been restricted to lives in being because of
the rule of convenience. A-I is already age forty; therefore, his interest is fully vested and he is
entitled to distribution of his share of principal immediately after creation of the trust and the time
in which it became effective. To do this, courts find it necessary to fix the maximum number of class
members Accordingly, because of the failure of B's income interest for life, the group of A's chil-
dren entitled to principal will be restricted to A-I, A-2, and A-3. For further discussion of the rule
of convenience, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. Applying the critical test to the
taker% themselves, one discovers that a valid proof can be made. No child can attain age forty
beyond his own death, and each child is a life in being. Accordingly, each child's interest must vest
or fail within his own lifetime, namely within the life of a person in being when te trust takes effect.
430 If, however, the gift of principal had been made "to such of the children born to me (A) and
my wife. W, who attain age forty" and, further, if W had predeceased the creation of the irrevocable
trust, then the class of children would have been restricted to lives in being because it is physically
impossible for any others to be born thereafter. And there would, of course, be no perpetuities
iolation Applying the critical test to the takers themselves, one discovers that a valid proof can be
made Sce vupra note 429.
431 Sc'e mupra note 427.
1989] 1105
Washington University Open Scholarship
1106 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of B's death may not attain age forty, or fail to do so, within twenty-one
years of B's death. For example, A may have an additional child, and
then B might die within the next year. It then becomes possible for such
afterborn child to attain age forty thirty-nine years later, a time period
well beyond the one allowed by the rule.432
Under Step Three C, A does qualify as a person "otherwise men-
tioned" within the provision ("to my mother" and "to ... my children");
because he is ascertained and by definition someone who cannot be
afterborn, he will qualify as a testing life in being. At this point, one
should observe that because this involves an irrevocable living trust, the
estate owner, A, necessarily is a life in being. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the settlor-estate owner always becomes a testing life in being.
It should be emphasized, once again, that there is no need to apply the
critical test to the settlor-estate owner unless such person independently
qualifies under one of the parts of Step Three.433 In this instance, A
specifically qualifies under Step Three C and, therefore, one must ask:
Will all of A's potentially eligible children join the class, if at all, by
(being born and) attaining age forty within twenty-one years of A's
death? Taking into account the possible times in which potential chil-
dren can join the class, one concludes that the answer is NO. Here, one
cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. Clearly, A cannot
have a child beyond his death. Yet, it is possible for A to have another
child after creation of the trust but before B's death and for A then to die
within the year. Given these circumstances, it then becomes possible for
a child of A to join the class, or fail to join it, thirty-nine years later-
clearly more than twenty-one years after the time of A's death. Absent a
saving clause or some other directly related provision, one must proceed
to Step Three D.
The takers themselves-A's children-are not restricted to lives in be-
ing, and so one can begin a consideration of their parents. A is the par-
ent that provides the relationship necessary to satisfy the group
description, and he is, of necessity, a life in being. Nevertheless, because
one has already applied the critical test unsuccessfully to A under Step
Three C, there is no need to repeat it under Step Three D.
432. Indeed, because it is possible for A to have children born after creation of the irrevocable
living trust and because it is possible for B to die before all of A's afterborn children attain age
nineteen, it is clearly possible for a potential member to join the class more than twenty-one years
beyond the death of B. Accordingly, one cannot use B to make a valid proof.
433. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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Having failed to validate the interest of A's children with a testing life
in being under all of Step Three, one can now proceed to the critical test
contained in Step Four: Will all of A's potentially eligible children join
the class, if at all, by (being born and) attaining age forty within twenty-
one years of the time the irrevocable trust becomes effective? Quite obvi-
ously, after taking into account possible times in which potential children
can join the class, one concludes that the answer is NO. Again, one can-
not eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. As in a previous illus-
tration,43 4 many possibilities will support this conclusion. For example,
it is possible for A to have another child, A-4, before B's death. As a
result, A-4 becomes a potentially eligible member who cannot join the
class until A-4 reaches age forty. Of necessity, then, A-4 will join the
class, if at all, only after forty years have elapsed from the time of his
birth and more than forty years from the time the trust was created.
Having gone through all four steps without establishing a positive answer
to the critical test, one can now properly conclude that A's children have
an invalid interest because it violates the common law rule against
perpetuities.
B. Some Other Illustrations
1. -Assume that A makes a lifetime transfer by deed of Blackacre:
"To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever used for a purpose
other than residential, then and in that case to C in fee simple absolute."
Assume, further, that both B and C are alive when the transfer is made
and that Blackacre is currently being used exclusively for residential pur-
poses. Is there a violation of the common law rule against perpetuities?
Under Step One, the property is "tied up" when A's deed becomes an
effective transfer, so the period of the rule commences at that same point
in time. Under Step Two A, one observes that B has a defeasible fee
simple. It is vested subject to complete divestment if the land is ever used
for a nonresidential purpose. Conversely, C has an executory interest in
fee simple absolute. It is a contingent interest that is conditioned upon
Blackacre thereafter being devoted to a forbidden use. But it is not con-
ditioned upon C or anyone else surviving the violation of the land use
restriction. Therefore, looking to Step Two B, one must conclude that
C's interest is not subject to multiple conditions. C has a contingent in-
434. See supra illustration IV A-6.
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terest, yet it is an interest transmissible at death.435 Further, because C's
executory interest is contingent, it is subject to the common law rule. To
be valid, it must vest, if at all, in C or his successors within the period
allowed by the rule.
Next, under Step Three A, C is the taker of the interest in question. C
is ascertained, and by the descriptive language itself which refers to a
specific individual, he cannot be someone born after the time in which
the deed became effective. C, therefore, qualifies as a testing life in being
under Step Three A and one must ask the question: Will C's interest vest
in C or C's successors, if at all, as a result of breach of the land use
restriction within twenty-one years of the death of C? Taking into ac-
count the possible times in which C's interest might vest as a result of the
breach of condition, one concludes that the answer is NO. Here, one
cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. C's interest is con-
tingent upon a violation of the prescribed land use. Once again, however,
no other condition is imposed upon C's interest-for example, that C
must be alive whenever the land use restriction is violated. Because A
has imposed no condition of survivorship,436 C may die before violation
of the restriction and C may then transmit his contingent executory in-
terest to another person.4 37 This might occur before Blackacre is devoted
435. For C's interest to vest, there is the express requirement that the land use restriction be
violated. Because there is no additional condition requiring C to be alive when the restriction is
violated, C has an interest that is not defeated by his death. Consequently, the interest is one that C
can transmit to others at his death. It will pass by the terms of C's will or by intestacy to his heirs at
law. See infra note 437. Nevertheless, courts sometimes infer a requirement of survivorship even
where no such condition is expressed. See sapra note 247. If a court were to find a requirement that
C must be alive when the express restriction upon land use is violated, there would be no violation of
the common law rule against perpetuities. See infra note 436.
436. If, however, A had imposed a condition requiring C to survive the time in which Blackacre
is used for any purpose other than residential, there would be no violation of the common law rule
against perpetuities. In this instance one would answer YES to the critical question: Must C's
interest necessarily vest if, at all, in C or C's successors during the lifetime of C? Breach of the
restriction upon land use would not be enough for C's interest to vest: C must also be alive at such
time. Accordingly, the interest can never vest beyond C's death. Stated otherwise, C's interest fails
if by the time of his death the restrietiofi upon land use has been observed faithfully and continu-
ously. Because of this, the interest will either vest during C's lifetime or fail at his death: conse-
quently, the condition clearly falls within the time period allowed by the common law rule.
437. In some jurisdictions, even today, contingent remainders and executoly interests may not
be alienable during the lifetime of the owner of such interest. See L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note
422, §§ 157-59. Nevertheless, absent a requirement of survivorship to the time of possession, these
interests are fully descendible and devisable at the death of such owner. See id., §§ 1883-86, 1901-
03. Whatever interest the transferee, heir, or devisee receives from the previous owner of such con-
tingent interest, it is still subject to the same condition or conditions.
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to a nonresidential use. As a result, it becomes possible for C to transmit
his executory interest at death and for the land use violation not to occur
until more than twenty-one years later.
Under Step Three B, B is an other taker under the same provision, and
he qualifies as a testing life in being because he is ascertained and the gift
is restricted to him as a specific individual. And so one applies the criti-
cal test: Must C's interest vest in C or C's successors, if at all, as a result
of breach of the land use restriction within twenty-one years of the death
of B? Taking into account the possible times in which C's interest might
vest as a result of the breach of condition, one concludes that the answer
is NO. Herein, one cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting.
B has a fee simple. By definition, B's estate will not as a matter of cer-
tainty end at his death or the death of anyone else, but instead it has a
potentially infinite duration. It will remain indefinitely in B and his suc-
cessors until the condition is violated. Further, the condition itself has
no time limit.4 3 It should be clear that both the estate and the condition
of defeasance can endure indefinitely-indeed, for many decades beyond
the death of B. Thus, it is possible for B to die without violating the
condition and for his interest in Blackacre then to pass to a successor. It
is also possible for such successor to comply with the restriction upon
land use for more than twenty-one years beyond the death of B. Finally,
it is possible thereafter for such successor to violate the condition, in
which case the fee simple in the successor is terminated and the execu-
tory interest vests in C or whoever owns C's interest at that time. Ac-
cordingly, it is possible for the divestiture to occur more than twenty-one
years beyond the death of B.
One important thing to remember when using the methodology is that
in applying the critical test one focuses only on the question raised by the
particular test. In this instance, one must focus only on events in relation
to the selected testing life-B. One is only concerned with whether the
executory interest can vest more than twenty-one years beyond B's
43S If. however, the condition of defeasance had a time limitation, a perpetuities violation might
not arise For example, suppose the limitation had read: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre
is ever used by B for a purpose other than residential, then and in that case to C in fee simple
abolute." In this instance, the land use restriction applies only to B himself. Presumably, if B
complies with the condition for the remainder of his life, his fee simple will become absolute in his
successor. Stated otherwise, C', executory interest must vest during B's lifetime, otherwise it will fail
at B's death. Accordingly, there is no perpetuities violation because a proof can be made under Step
Three B using B as the validating life. Given the terms of the condition, C's interest must vest, if at
all, within B's lifetime.
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death. In hypothesizing possibilities for remote vesting, it is irrelevant
that one happens upon a possibility that is more than twenty-one years
beyond the death of the testing life but within the life of someone who is
in being.439 One must carefully and faithfully observe that if this other
life in being can be used to validate, this will be accomplished elsewhere
in the methodology through the use of another step. To reiterate, the
only person of importance is the testing life found in applying a particu-
lar part of Step Three, and the only gross period of importance is the one
used when applying Step Four. All hypothesized possibilities must focus
squarely on the particular critical test being applied, and this should be
carried out with complete disregard for whether the interest vests within
the life of someone else in being when the period of the rule commences.
Next, under Step Three C, absent a saving clause or some other di-
rectly related provision, no one is otherwise mentioned or separately and
differently mentioned." Under Step Three D, there is no need to ex-
amine the parents of the taker of the interest in question-C. C previ-
ously qualified as a testing life in being under Step Three A, but he did
not become a validating life as well.
As a result, one must proceed directly to the critical test under Step
Four: Must C's interest vest in C or C's successors, if at all, as a result of
breach of the land use restriction within twenty-one years of the time A's
lifetime transfer became effective? Taking into account the possible times
439. For example, in explaining the possibilities which demonstrate that no valid proof can be
made with 3 under Step Three B, it was hypothesized that B might die without violating the condi-
tion and that his interest would then pass to a successor-perhaps, B-1, a child who was not in being
at the time of A's transfer. It was also assumed that B- might comply with the land use restriction
for more than twenty-one years and, thereafter, that he would then breach the condition. Accord-
ingly, the executory interest would vest in C himself or, perhaps, his successors. If it vests within the
lifetime of C, this would be within the period of the rule. But this possibility is not enough to satisfy
the rule. If C's life is to validate his own interest, one must prove that it cannot vest beyond twenty-
one years of his death. One has, however, already observed under Step Three A, that this proof
cannot be made. Therefore, in conducting this methodology with testing lives under Steps Three A,
Three B, Three C or Three D, one must focus only on the testing lives being used under the particu-
lar step. It is totally irrelevant that one happens upon a possibility for vesting within the lifetime of
another life in being. In applying the critical test, one adheres only to the lives in being who are
being tested under that particular step. If someone else's life may validate, it will surface under a
different step and such person or persons will be tested accordingly.
440. Suppose, however, that the limitation had read: "To B in fee simple; however, if Blackacre
is ever used for purposes other than residential during the lifetime of the survivor of B and C. then
and in that case to C in fee simple absolute." In this instance, C's contingent executory interest
would satisfy the common law rule against perpetuities. The survivor of B and C would constitute
someone "separately and differently mentioned" under Step Three C, and a valid proof could then be
made using the survivor as a testing life in being. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
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in which C's interest might vest as a result of the breach of the condition,
one concludes that the answer is NO. Here, one cannot eliminate all
possibilities for remote vesting. Very simply, it is possible for B to main-
tain Blackacre exclusively for residential use for over twenty-one years.
Thereafter, it is possible that B will violate the condition. In this in-
stance, B's fee simple will be divested and C's executory interest will then
vest in C or C's successors more than twenty-one years after the period
of the rule has begun. Having gone through all four steps without estab-
lishing a positive answer to the critical test, one can properly conclude
that C's interest is invalid because it violates the common law rule
against perpetuities.441
2. -Assume that A creates a testamentary trust that has Blackacre
as its subject matter. This tract of land contains a gravel pit which, if
operated at its current rate, should remain active for no more than four
years after the time of A's death. The terms of the trust provide: "The
trustees shall conduct the gravel pit operation until the gravel is ex-
hausted; thereafter, both Blackacre and the accumulated gravel shall be
sold and the proceeds divided per capita among my (A's) descendants
then living." 442 Assume also that the only descendants who survive A
are his two children A-1 and A-2, both of whom are past age sixty.
Finally, assume that A has left the residue of his estate to his wife, W,
absolutely. Is there a violation of the common law rule against
perpetuities?
441 As a result of this perpetutes violation, B's interest becomes a fee simple absolute. There
are, however. circumstances in which a court might find otherwise. Suppose the limitation in IV
1-1 had been changed .o that it read: "To B in fee simple so long as Blackacre is used exclusively
fir residential purposes; if and when Blackacre is not used exclusively for residential purposes, then
to C in tee simple absolute." Just as in illustration IV B-l, the contingent executory interest given to
C siolatcs the rule against perpetuities Despite this violation, some courts might maintain the re-
sitictioi upon land use and divest B's interest whenever the condition is breached. The difference in
result arises because of the presence of language of special limitation in this example. Historically,
this language ("%o long as Blackacre ix used") has been decisive. It is phraseology that, without
more. i', enough to produce a determinable interest, one that ends automatically upon breach of the
Londition and, tliereby, causes the subject matter to revert to the transferor even in the absence of
languagc that fully elaborates this result. In this example, then, C's interest fails, but the language of
spccial limitation does not. It is enough to raise the possibility of reverter in A which becomes
pose,,csoiry upon actual breach of the condition. Because possibilities of reverters have been ex-
emnpted from the common law, rule against perpetuities, A retains an interest that maintains the
condition and supplants the interest of B whenever the restriction upon land use is violated. For
further dis(cu,sion a'. to the effect of the failure of an executory interest because of a perpetuities
srolation, see L. SIMIS & S. S%1I H. supra note 22, § 825.
442 S,, In rc Wood, [189413 Ch 381.
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Once again, because the trust is testamentary, under Step One the pe-
riod of the rule commences at A's death. Under Step Two A, one ob-
serves that the gift to A's descendants is subject to three possible
conditions which make it contingent. To begin with, there are the obvi-
ous requirements pertaining to the descendants themselves: they must be
born before and be alive at the time the gravel pit operation ends. Addi-
tionally, a court might conclude that the administrative requirement it-
self presents a condition. In all likelihood, the gravel pit operation will
terminate within four years; yet, if conducted differently, it may never
end. Perhaps this is virtually impossible; nevertheless, courts have been
known to make these assumptions and unexpectedly classify certain
kinds of interests as contingent.443 If the interest created in A's descend-
ants is viewed as contingent for this reason, there will, of course, be a
perpetuities violation.4' This violation would obtain even if the gift had
been made to a named individual but without any requirement of survi-
vorship.4 5 In the illustration under consideration, however, for pur-
443. Courts sometimes find that conditioning a gift upon probate of a testator's estate presents
not only an uncertainty as to when the event will occur but also an uncertainty and, therefore, a
contingency as to whether it will occur. See, e.g., Johnson v. Preston, 226 III. 447, 454-58, 80 N.E.
1001, 1003-04 (1907).
444. The perpetuities violation arises because the condition pertaining to the exhaustion of the
gravel pit operation is unlimited in terms of time and because the survivorship requirement is im-
posed upon a group of recipients who may consist exclusively of descendants not born by the time of
A's death. Under Step Three A, the takers themselves will not serve as testing lives because they are
not restricted to lives in being. Step Three B does not provide any testing lives because there is no
other taker. Under Step Three C, the trustees are persons "otherwise mentioned"; nevertheless, one
cannot apply the critical test to the trustees because that position is not restricted to lives in being at
A's death. Additionally, under Step Three D, the parents of the takers of the interest will not qualify
as testing lives because the takers consist of a group that is not defined in terms of one generation
and, therefore, it is impossible to determine exactly who the takers are and whether their parents are
lives in being or lives already ended. Finally, in applying the critical test under Step Four, one
immediately discovers that the answer is NO because the gravel pit operation may continue forever,
or at least for a period of time that exceeds twenty-one years after A's death.
445. For example, consider this change in the original illustration: "That the trustees shall con-
duct the gravel pit operation until the gravel is exhausted; thereafter, both Blackacre and the accu-
mulated gravel shall be sold and the proceeds shall then be distributed to C absolutely." If one views
the end of the gravel pit operation as an event that may never occur, C's interest is contingent and it
results in a perpetuities violation. Indeed, C's interest violates the common law rule for essentially
the same reasons C's interest caused a perpetuities violation in illustration IV B-1. C's interest is
transmissible at death; it is contingent only upon exhaustion of the gravel, and this event is unlimited
in time. Accordingly, C has a contingent interest that may vest in his successors, generations after
C's death and the deaths of everyone else alive when the trust was created at the death of A.
More specifically, under Step Three A, C qualifies as a testing life; nevertheless, after applying the
critical test, one discovers that C's life will not validate his own interest. C may die shortly after the
death of A and his interest will then pass to his successor, for example, C-1. It is then possible for
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
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poses of further analysis, the potential administrative contingency will be
ignored. Indeed, it will be assumed that the gravel operation must end at
some time; however, no assumption will be made as to when such opera-
tion will in fact cease.446 Now then, because this is a class gift, the inter-
ests of all class members will be deemed contingent until the last
potential member may join the class, if at all, by being born and surviving
termination of the gravel pit operation. Finally, looking to Steps Two B
and Two C, one must conclude that there are multiple conditions that
appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1) the
implied requirement of birth is subsumed by the survivorship require-
ment, one can proceed directly to a consideration of the subsuming con-
dition under Step Three A.
Under Step Three A, the takers themselves, A's descendants, cannot
qualify as testing lives in being. The descriptive language does not limit
the group to lives in being at A's death. Because the trust defers distribu-
tion, neither does the rule of convenience restrict the group in this man-
ner.4 47 Finally, even though A's children, given their age, are not apt to
have descendants born after A's death, one must presume otherwise. Ac-
cordingly, there is a physical possibility of expansion or reconstitution.
448
Next, under Step Three B, there are no other takers designated within
this provision.
Under Step Three C, absent a saving clause or some other directly
related provision, A and the trustees are the only persons "otherwise
the gravel pit operation to end many years later, perhaps as many as forty years. Consequently,
C-I'% interest may vest more than twenty-one years after the death of C. Step Three B cannot be
used to validate because there is no other taker. Under Step Three C, the trustees are persons
"otherwise mentioned": nevertheless. they do not qualify as testing lives because their position is not
restricted to lives in being at A's death. C's parents will not qualify as testing lives under Step Three
D because the critical test has already been applied to C under Step Three A. Finally, under Step
Four no validation can be made because it is possible for the gravel pit operation to continue more
than txsenty-one years beyond the death of A.
If, however, a condition requiring survivorship of the time of possession by C had been added to
C'% interest, there would be no perpetuities violation. In this variation, a valid proof could be made
under Step Three A. C's life would validate his own interest because it would then be possible to
conclude that C' interest must vest, if at all, within C's lifetime. If C survives the end of the gravel
pit operation, his interest will %est. However, if C dies before then, his interest must fail.
446 After making the assumption that the gravel pit operation must end at some time, one
should observe that the uncertainty involved is very much like a life estate followed by a remainder.
In both situations, there is certainty about whether possession will occur, but there is uncertainty
about ws hen it will arise.
447 For a discussion of the "rule of convenience," see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying
44S For a discussion of the presumption of fertility, see supra note 370.
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mentioned" within this provision." 9 As previously indicated, in the case
of a testamentary disposition a testator should not be used to test.4 0 Of
necessity, he is not in being, and the gross period of time used in Step
Four is tantamount to an application of the critical test to such estate
owner. Accordingly, one must dismiss a testator as a testing life just as
one must, for each of the steps within Step Three, eliminate as testing
lives those who predecease the point in time when the period of the rule
begins. One might say that the trustees, if individually named, are al-
ways people "otherwise mentioned" within the provision. Invariably,
however, one readily dismisses them from further consideration because
they cannot satisfy the remaining requirements for a testing life in being
under Step Three C. Ordinarily, such trustees will not qualify as a group
restricted to lives in being because a court will replace a trustee who
resigns or dies, and eventually it may do so with someone born after
creation of the trust.451 Nevertheless, the provisions of a trust sometimes
make its duration referable to the lives of specifically named or described
individual trustees. In such a case, these trustees will appear in an ex-
press statement that directly connects them to the gift. If so, they will
become testing lives not simply because they hold the position of trustees,
but because they are "separately mentioned" beyond their position as
trustees or because as a group they are necessarily restricted to lives in
being. In this illustration, even if the trustees are individually named, no
language restricts them to lives in being or mentions them further by
connecting them personally to the conditions of the gift or the duration
449. A has left the residue of his estate to his wife, W. She is "otherwise mentioned" in his will,
but not in a provision that is directly related or connected to the one that disposes of Blackacre and
the gravel pit. Consequently, W does not qualify as a testing life under Step Three C. Nevertheless,
there is no harm in applying the critical test to W, or for that matter, to any other person actually in
being at A's death. All that is lost is the time it takes to do so. If someone does not qualify as a
testing life under any of the parts of Step Three, although one might test with him, such person will
not supply a valid proof. For example, applying the critical test to W, one must conclude that the
answer is NO. One cannot say that the interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of W's
death. W could die shortly after A, while the gravel operation might continue for the next thirty
years and then, upon its conclusion, the interest would finally vest in A's living descendants. In this
situation, the contingency would be fulfilled more than twenty-one years beyond tile death of W;
consequently, as a testing life, W fails to validate.
450. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
451. A court of equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee. Absent a provision that
governs the selection of a successor trustee, a court will use its discretion in appointing one. InI
making its selection, a court is not precluded from appointing a person born after the time in which
the trust was created. See G. BOGERT, supra note 285, §§ 29, 32.
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of the trust.4 -2
Proceeding next to Step Three D, because the takers themselves are
not restricted to lives in being, one can begin a consideration of their
parents. Nevertheless, because the takers-the descendants-can be
multigenerational, and because others may be born while existing de-
scendants die, it is impossible to determine who the descendants are and,
therefore, impossible to identify their parents. Consequently, one must
conclude that the parents who provide the necessary descriptive relation-
ship are not restricted to lives in being and to lives already ended because
the parents are capable of physical expansion or reconstitution.
Accordingly, one can now move to the critical test contained in Step
Four: Must all of A's descendants join the class, if at all, by being (born
and) alive when the gravel pit operation ceases within twenty-one years
of A's death? Taking into account the possible times in which the de-
scendants' interest might vest upon termination of the gravel pit opera-
tion, one concludes that the answer is NO. Here, one cannot eliminate
all possibilities for remote vesting. However likely it may be that the
gravel operation will terminate within four years, it is possible that it
may not. If it may last more than four years because it is operated differ-
ently, there is no certainty that the pit will be exhausted within twenty-
one years.453 However remote this hypothesis may be, it is possible and,
452 One can, of course, apply the critical test to any trustee who is individually named. Once
again, there is no harm in doing so. All that is lost is the extra time and effort it takes to conduct the
test. Se supra note 449. Unless the trustees are impliedly or expressly restricted to lives in being or
unless individual trustees are additionally mentioned, invariably in a manner that connects them to
the trust's duration, application of the critical test is doomed to fail in finding a validating life among
the trustees. For example, assume that T-1 is the trustee selected by A under the terms of his will,
but that nothing else in A's will links the life of the trust to that of T-1. Must the interest of A's
descendants vest, if at all, by their being (born and) alive when the gravel pit operation ceases within
twenty -one years of T-l's death" The answer is, of course, NO. Assuming that after A's death a
court appoints T-1 trustee, it is possible for T-1 to die-and for a successor trustee then to be
appointed-and for the gravel operation to continue for an additional thirty years. Accordingly, it
then becomes possible for the interest to vest in A's living descendants more than twenty-one years
beyond the death of T-1. The same would be true for any other individually named trustee. If,
however, the duration of the trust had been expressly limited to the survivor of named trustees or if
its duration had been limited impliedly and similarly by restricting selection of successor trustees to
lives in being, then a valid proof could be made using the survivor of these trustees or successor
trustees
453 Some courts might uphold this gift of principal to A's surviving descendants by assuming
that A meant the gift to occur when the gravel pit was exhausted or should have been exhausted.
More specifically, they assume that thts is an event that must happen within a reasonable time-
herein, at least within twenty-one years of A's death. With this assumption, one can, of course,
make a valid proof under Step Four. For a discussion of how courts have dealt with and sometimes
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therefore must be taken into account in applying the critical test. Having
gone through all four steps without establishing a positive answer to the
critical test, one can now properly conclude that the gift to A's descend-
ants is invalid because it violates the common law rule against
perpetuities.
3. -Assume that A makes a testamentary devise of Blackacre: "To B
for life, remainder in fee simple absolute to the first of C's children to be
married." Further, assume that B and C survive A and that C has had
no children by the time of A's death. Finally, assume that the common
law rule of destructibility with respect to contingent remainders still ob-
tains in this jurisdiction.454 Is there a violation of the common law rule
against perpetuities?
Under Step One, because this transfer derives from A's will, the period
of the rule must begin at A's death. Under Step Two A, B's interest is
vested and not subject to the common law rule. However, the remainder
given to one of C's children is contingent and, therefore, subject to the
rule. It is contingent because of three precedent requirements to posses-
sion: such child of C must be born and marry; additionally, that child
must be the first child to marry. Consequently, looking to Steps Two B
and Two C, one must conclude that there are multiple conditions that
appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, because under Step Two C (1) the
requirements of birth and marriage are subsumed by the first to marry
requirement, one can proceed directly to a consideration of the sub-
suming condition under Step Three A.
Proceeding then to Step Three A, one should conclude that the taker
himself-the potential child of C who will be the first to marry-does not
qualify as a testing life. C has no children at A's death, and no descrip-
overcome perpetuities problems regarding related kinds of contingencies, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.23 (A. Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE
TRANSFERS) § 1.4 reporter's note 14 (1983). Additionally, in addressing this kind of perpetuities
problem, some state legislatures avoid a violation by presuming that the adminstrative contingency
cannot occur beyond the period allowed by the rule. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 30, para. 194(c)(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) provides:
(c) In determining whether an interest violates the rule against perpetuities:
(I) it shall be presumed (A) that the interest was intended to be valid, (B) in the case of
an interest conditioned upon the probate of a will, the appointment of an executor, admin-
istrator or trustee, the completion of the administration of an estate, the payment of debts,
the sale or distribution of property, the determination of federal or state tax liabilities or
the happening of any administrative contingency, that the contingency must occur, if at
all, within the period of the rule against perpetuities....
454. For a discussion of the rule of destructibility and of its application today in tile United
States, see supra notes 154-55.
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tive language, rule of construction or physical impossibility precludes a
gift of the remainder to a child of C born after the time of A's death.455
Nevertheless, under Step Three B, as an other taker B does qualify as a
testing life in being. The descriptive language refers to a specific individ-
ual who cannot be afterborn. Accordingly, one must apply the critical
test to B. Ordinarily, in an abbreviated version of the test, one might ask:
Will the interest vest, if at all, in a child of C who (is born, married and
also) becomes the first to marry within twenty-one years of B's death?
After taking into account the possible times in which C might have a
child who becomes the first to marry, one concludes that the answer to
this formulation of the critical test would be NO. With this test, one-
cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. At the very least, it
is possible for B to die and for C to continue living for another twenty-
one years. Then, it becomes possible for C to have his first child who
could not then marry until more than twenty-one years beyond B's
death.4"'
Nevertheless, a different result should be reached. The full statement
of the critical test requires one to account for possibilities in light of ap-
plicable rules of construction and principles of law. One should ask in-
stead: Looking at all possibilities for vesting in light of facts known when
the period of the rule begins and in light of applicable rules of construc-
tion and principles of law, including those possibilities that are most re-
mote, must the interest vest, if at all, in a child of C who (is born,
married and also) becomes the first to marry within twenty-one years of
B's death? The answer to this correct formulation of the critical test is
YES. One must account for the common law rule of destructibility in
calculating the times in which C might have a child who satisfies the
requirements of the contingent remainder.457 The remainder created in
the potential child of C consists of realty which is not placed in trust;
455. One should reach the same conclusion even if C had children by the time of A's death.
assuming none had married. No descriptive language or rule of construction restricts the remainder-
men to a life in being at A's death, nor is there a physical impossibility for a child of C to be born
after the death of A. Consequently, C's children could not qualify as testing lives in being. If,
however, at the death of A, C has a living child who is married, there would be no need to test at all.
Absent any other conditions, such child would have a vested remainder at the outset and, accord-
ingly, the common law rule would then be inapplicable.
456 There arc, of course, other scenarios that warrant and explain the answer NO. After the
death of A, even if C were to have a child during B's lifetime, such child might not marry until more
than t1renty-one years after B's death.
457 For an illustration of the common law rule of destructibility operating to avert a perpetu-
me violation, see Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1916).
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therefore, it is destructible.458 Under this rule, the remainder must vest,
or else be destroyed, by the time all supportive freehold estates end. In
this instance, the remainder must vest in a child of C-by becoming the
first to be married-by the time of B's death. If it does not vest at or
before B's death, then it is destroyed, not because of a perpetuities viola-
tion but because of an independent rule of destructibility. Accordingly,
after accounting for this independent rule that limits the opportunity for
contingent interests to vest, one can say that the remainder must vest or
fail at B's death. Unless all conditions are satisfied by the time of B's
death, the remainder to C's child must fail. It cannot vest beyond B's
death. B, therefore, becomes a validating life in being, and the remain-
der satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities.
4. -Assume that A makes a testamentary devise of Blackacre: "To B
in fee simple; however, if Blackacre is ever used for a purpose other than
residential, then and in that case to C in fee simple absolute." Further,
assume that both B and C survive A and that at A's death the land is
being used exclusively for residential purposes. Unlike all previous illus-
trations, assume that the interest held by the transferor, A, before his
death is one of limited duration-that is, something less than a fee sim-
ple. More specifically, assume that A held a life estate measured by the
life of the survivor of A and his children.459 Finally, assume that A is
survived by two children, A-1 and A-2, who were also alive when A
originally received his life estate. Is there a violation of the common law
rule against perpetuities? The interests created in this limitation appear
to be identical to those created in a previous illustration.460 In that illus-
tration, C's contingent executory interest caused a perpetuities violation.
Except for the difference in the interest held originally by A, one might
reach the same result.
Under Step One, the period of the rule begins at A's death, and for the
first time one must answer NO to the question of whether the transferor's
interest is some kind of inheritable estate or one that is not certain to
end.46 ' Because A had a life estateper autre vie, for the first time in these
illustrations, one must now proceed to the question raised by Step One
458. If the subject matter had been personalty or if it had been placed in trust, the remainder
would have been indestructible. See supra note 454.
459. Some jurisdictions limit the lives that govern the duration of a life estate to existing lives.
See supra note 235.
460. See supra illustration IV B-I.
461. For a discussion of Step One A and the circumstances in which one must apply it, see supra
notes 220-23, 227-37 and accompanying text.
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A: Will the duration of the interest held by A, the transferor, at the time
of his death terminate with absolute certainty within twenty-one years or
within twenty-one years of the deaths of lives in being or lives already
ended at A's death-when the period of the rule begins-because the
duration of A's interest is restricted to such period of time by express
language, by rules of construction, or by physical impossibility as to the
group of lives used to measure A's interest?
If the remaining duration of the interest held by A is for an express
period of years that exceeds twenty-one,462 then the answer to this ques-
tion must be NO, and one can then proceed directly to Steps Two, Three
and Four. Herein, however, this is not true, and so the answer to the
basic question is YES. The interest held by A at his death was measured
by the survivor of the life of A and his children. A-1 and A-2 survive A
and the life estate that A had and could transfer will continue until the
survivor of them dies. Whether A-1 or A-2 was alive when A received
his life estate is irrelevant.463 It is, however, relevant whether they are
born by A's death. Herein, A cannot have children after his death-the
time in which the period of the rule begins. Thus, the duration of his life
estate is restricted to lives ip being at his death because it is physically
impossible for the group of lives that measure the interest to contain peo-
ple born after A's death. Accordingly, the interest held by A will in fact
end by the deaths of specific lives in being at A's death. Because A's
interest must end within the period allowed by the rule, so must the in-
terests he creates in B and C. Consequently, the contingent interest of C
satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities because the lives of A's
children validate his interest.
5. -Assume that A devises Blackacre: "To B forever, but if B dies
without issue, then to C absolutely." '464 Also assume that both B and C
survive A and that B currently has no descendants. Finally, assume that
the relevant jurisdiction has no statute that affects or abrogates the fee
462 Professor Fetters believes that the period in gross allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities is 'twenty-one years plus an additional period in gross of less than five months to ac-
count for the minimum human gestation period." Fetters, supra note 364.
463 However, although the fact that A-I and A-2 were alive when A received his life estate is
irrelevant to application of the rule against perpetuities, it may not be irrelevant to whether their
lives properly could have been used to measure the life estate in the first place. See supra note 458.
404. Assume that the jurisdiction which governs this testamentary disposition has abolished the
common law requirement that necessitated the phrase "and heirs" for the creation of a fee simple.
Furthermore, assume that in this jurisdiction all created interests are presumptively a fee simple
unless there is specific language that clearly indicates a lesser estate.
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tail.46 5 Is there a violation of the common law rule against perpetuities?
This is a devise and so, under Step One, the period of the rule begins at
A's death. Under Step Two A, whether or not C has a contingent inter-
est depends upon the nature of the interest A has given to B. The phrase
"die without issue" is extremely ambiguous, and courts have construed it
in more than one way.4 66 Some might still give it an "indefinite failure of
issue" construction so that it would read just the same as if it had said:
"To B forever, but whenever B's line of descent expires, then to C abso-
lutely. '467  In short, under this construction the condition is ongoing.
The interest created originally in B ceases once B dies without surviving
descendants, or thereafter whenever his descendants die without surviv-
ing descendants. If an "indefinite failure of issue" construction is
adopted, courts would then view B as having a fee tail and not a fee
simple.468 Because the language introducing the interest of C contains no
condition other than that which describes the termination of B's inter-
est-language which simply paraphrases the circumstances upon which
B's fee tail naturally comes to an end-these same courts would find C's
interest to be a vested remainder.469 Therefore, because the interests of B
and C would be vested, neither would be subject to the common law
rule.470
465. There is in fact no jurisdiction that fully supports this assumption. However, several juris-
dictions recognize the common law fee tail when created by deed. In each instance, the donee in tail
has the power during his lifetime to bar the entail and any expectant reversion, remainder or execu-
tory interest as well. These states, nevertheless, are the exception. Nearly all jurisdictions in the
United States abrogate the fee tail by statute. Over half of these states do so by giving the donee in
tail a fee simple. Others convert the donee in tail's interest into a life estate, while leaving the fee
simple to those who would next take at common law. These remaindermen ordinarily would be the
issue of the donee in tail. Finally, there are jurisdictions that essentially leave the estate tail to the
donee in tail for his lifetime, but, thereafter, give to the issue of the donee in tail a fee simple. See C.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 154, at 37-39.
466. For a discussion of these various constructions, see L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 22,
§§ 521-51.
467. See L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 22. §§ 522-28.
468. See id., § 522.
469. Absent some express condition beyond the circumstances required for a fee tail to come to
an end, courts have found that a remainder which is then to become possessory in an ascertained
person is classified as vested. See id., § 142. It is unclear why such a remainder is classified in this
manner. Perhaps, it is because the assumption is made that one's line of descent must always come
to an end. It may last indefinitely, and so there is uncertainty about when it will end. Yet, once one
assumes that it must end, there is no uncertainty about whether the remainder will become posses-
sory. And for an interest to be characterized as contingent, there must be uncertainty about whether
possession will occur and not simply when.
470. If, however, the subject matter had been personal property, in which case B's interest could
not have been a fee tail, then C's interest would have been contingent and, therefore, it would have
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Most courts, however, would today give "die without issue" a "definite
failure of issue" construction, so that it would read just the same as if it
had said: "To B forever, but at B's death, if B does not have issue who
survive him, then to C absolutely."4 7 ' In short, they would view the
condition as operating at one point in time-B's death. If B is not sur-
vived by issue, then C or his successors assume possession. However, if
B is survived by issue, then B's interest becomes absolute and passes to
B's successors.472 Consequently, B has a vested fee simple subject to
complete divestment, while C has a contingent executory interest in fee
simple that must satisfy the rule.
Before proceeding further, one should observe that the express condi-
tion involves only B and his issue: B must himself die without surviving
issue. There is no added prerequisite that C or anyone else in particular
must be alive at B's death before C's interest can vest. If C predeceases B
and thereafter B dies without surviving issue, B's fee simple will be
divested in favor of the successors to C's interest-for example, the bene-
ficiaries under C's will.
It is possible, under Steps Two B and Two C, to view the requirement
as creating multiple conditions appearing alternatively. There is the im-
plied condition that C will take if B dies without ever having had issue.
This implied derivative of the express condition must, however, be dis-
missed for purposes of testing as directed under Step Two D. Then there
violated the common law rule against perpetuities. See id., § 523. For further discussion of why a
perpetuities violation arises, see infra notes 474-81 and accompanying text.
471 See id., §§ 522, 525-27.
472. There are, of course, other interpetations courts have given to the phrase "die without
issue " Generally, before deciding whether the language should be given an "indefinite failure of
issue" or "definite failure of issue" construction, courts must decide when the determination of death
without issue must be made. Stated differently, is the construction substitutional or successive? Con-
sider, for example, this devise by A: "To B for life, remainder to C in fee simple; however, if C dies
without issue, then to D in fee simple " Three interpretations are possible. First, C's death without
issue refers only to C's death during A's lifetime. Second, C's death without issue refers only to C's
death during the lifetime of either A or B. These constructions are viewed as substitutional. Finally,
it is possible to conclude that C's death without issue refers to his death at anytime, even after the
deaths of A and B. In this instance, C may assume possession after the deaths of A and B and D may
do so as well upon C's subsequent death without issue. With this construction, their claims to
possession are successive and not merely substitutional. See id., §§ 521, 533-42. Whether the con-
struction made is substitutional or successive, courts must also decide whether or not the issue must
survive their named procreator. Queried differently, for D to take in the foregoing illustration, must
C die without ever having had issue or without leaving issue surviving him? See id., §§ 521-43. In
the foregoing example, if a court gives "die without issue" a substitutional construction or interprets
it to mean die without ever having had issue, there would be no perpetuities violation. See hifra note
481.
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is the express condition itself. Looking to Steps Two B and Two C, one
must conclude that it consists of multiple conditions that appear cumula-
tively. Nevertheless, the implied condition that issue be born is sub-
sumed by the condition that issue must predecease B. Accordingly,
pursuant to Step Two C (1), one can proceed directly to a consideration
of the subsuming condition under Step Three A.
Under Step Three A the taker himself, C, qualifies as a testing life in
being. C is ascertained and by the descriptive language the executory
interest is created in a specific individual who is alive when A executes
his will. Accordingly, one must ask: Will C's interest vest in C or his
successors, if at all, by B dying (having had issue and by B dying) with-
out surviving issue within twenty-one years of C's death? After taking
into account the possible times in which B might die without surviving
issue, one concludes that the answer is NO. Here, one cannot eliminate
all possibilities for remote vesting. It is possible for C to die immediately
and for B to continue living more than twenty-one years thereafter. Ac-
cordingly, it becomes possible for B to then die without issue surviving
him and, thereby, for C's interest to vest in C's successors more than
twenty-one years beyond C's death.47 3
Under Step Three B, B-an other taker within the same provision-
also qualifies as a testing life. B is ascertained and, by the descriptive
language, the possessory fee simple is created in a specific individual who
is alive when A executes his will and when he dies. Accordingly, one
must ask: Will C's interest vest in C or his successors, if at all, by B
dying (having had issue and by B dying) without surviving issue within
twenty-one years of B's death? Taking all possibilities for vesting into
account, one concludes that the answer, of course, is YES. The only time
for determination of whether B personally has or has not been survived
by issue is likewise at B's death and, therefore, the only time in which C's
interest will vest, if at all, is at B's death. As a result, with a definite
473. One should observe that C would become a validating life in being if the limitation had
read: "To B forever, but if B dies without issue, then, if C is alive, to C absolutely." Applying the
critical test, one asks: Will C's interest vest in C (or in his successors if he makes a lifetime transfer),
if at all, by C surviving B's death without surviving issue within twenty-one years of C's death?
Quite obviously, the answer is YES. Indeed, the question itself provides its own answer. Because C
must himself survive B's death without surviving issue in order for his interest to vest, C's interest
must vest, if at all, within his own lifetime. If C dies before then, his interest fails. If, however, he
does not, then his interest vests in him personally or in the successors to his interest. Accordingly,
one can make a valid proof with C himself, the taker of the interest in question.
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failure of issue construction, B becomes a validating life in being and C's
interest satisfies the common law rule against perpetuities.
One should observe that if A's will had made this gift a bequest of
personal property instead of a devise of realty, the result would be ex-
actly the same-with the same analysis and for the same reasons-if a
court adopts the "definite failure of issue" construction. Suppose, how-
ever, that in this situation, the prevailing construction is one of "indefi-
nite failure of issue." Is there a perpetuities violation?474 Because a fee
tail estate cannot exist when the subject matter is personal property,475 a
court could not find that C had a vested remainder. Instead, with this
"indefinite failure of issue" construction, B would have the counterpart
of a fee simple that is defeasible whenever B's line of descent expires.476
Under Step Two A, B's interest would be subject to divestment in favor
of C, or C's successors, who would have a contingent executory interest
in fee simple absolute. Once again, C's interest is contingent only upon
expiration of B's line of descent. There is no requirement that C, or any-
one else, survive that point in time. Accordingly, C has a contingent
interest which is transmissible at C's death.477 In this instance, expira-
tion of B's line of descent is viewed as an uncertainty-an uncertainty
about whether such event will occur and not simply when it will oc-
cur.4 7 9 Accordingly, C's interest must be classified as contingent and,
474 Se , e-g_, the classic case of Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324 (1787).
475 See L. Si.Es & A. SMITH, supra note 22, § 359.
476. Although the fee tail estate is not recognized when the subject matter is personal property,
other possessory estates attributable to real property are acknowledged and so are most kinds of
future interests. Sec id.. §§ 359-71.
477 Once again, courts are prone to find a requirement of survivorship even when it is unex-
pressed, and are more inclined to do this for interests which are otherwise contingent. See supra note
240 In this example, then, if a court were to impute a condition requiring C to survive the expira-
tion of B's line of descent, there would be no perpetuities violation. No violation would arise because
C's contingent interest must vest, if at all, within C's own lifetime. Regardless of how long it takes
for B'% line of descent to terminate, C's interest cannot vest unless C is still alive. Accordingly, one
can make a valid proof with C himself, the taker of the interest in question. See supra note 473.
478 If one could assume that B's line of descent must come to an end (namely, that it is an event
certain to occur), then the only uncertainty for C. or his successors, would be when possession will
occur, not whether it will happen. Nevertheless, when the subject matter is personal property, this
limited assumption is not made. Accordingly, there is an uncertainty about whether and when pos-
session will occur If, however. one could make such an assumption, the interest of C would then be
vicwcd as vested and not contingent and there would, of course, be no perpetuities violation. For
examplc, consider this devise by A: "To B for life, then to C for life, then to C's children for the life
of the s uvsivor of them, remainder to D in fee simple absolute." D's interest is characterized as
vested ,ibsolutely. To be sure, we cannot compute precisely the time in which D's interest will
hccome possessory, indeed, we do not know whether it will even be within his own lifetime. Never-
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therefore, subject to the common law rule.
Once again, it is possible under Steps Two B and Two C to view the
requirement as creating multiple conditions appearing alternatively.
There is the implied condition that C will take if B dies without ever
having had issue. This implied derivative of the express condition must,
however, be dismissed for purposes of testing as directed under Step Two
D. Then there is the express condition itself. Looking to Steps Two B
and Two C, one must conclude that it consists of multiple conditions that
appear cumulatively. Nevertheless, the implied condition that issue be
born is subsumed by the condition that this line of issue must expire-
must come to an end. Accordingly, pursuant to Step Two C (1), one can
proceed directly to a consideration of the subsuming condition under
Step Three A.
Under Step Three A, the taker himself, C, qualifies as a testing life in
being for the same reason as before. Therefore, one must ask: Will C's
interest vest in C or his successors, if at all, by (B having had issue and
by) B's line of descent dying out and coming to an end within twenty-one
years of C's death? Taking into account the possible times in which B's
line of descent might come to an end, one concludes that the answer is
NO. Here, one cannot eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. It is
possible for C to die immediately and for his interest to pass to a succes-
sor, and it is possible for B to continue living more than twenty-one years
thereafter. Accordingly, it then becomes possible for B to die without
any surviving issue (in which case his line of descent ends) and for C's
interest then to vest in C's successors more than twenty-one years be-
yond the death of C himself.
Under Step Three B, as an other taker within the same provision, B
qualifies as a testing life in being for the same reason as before. There-
fore, one must ask: Will C's interest vest in C or his successors, if at all,
by (B having had issue and by) B's line of descent dying out and coming
to an end within twenty-one years of B's death? Taking into account the
possible times in which B's line of descent might come to an end, one
concludes that the answer is NO. Again, one cannot eliminate all pos-
sibilities for vesting. It is possible for B to have a child and then for B to
die. It is subsequently possible for that child to live more than twenty-
one years thereafter and then to die without surviving descendants. Ac-
theless. we do know with absolute certainty that it will become possessory in C or his successors at
some point in the future. This should be enough to establish the existence of a vested interest in C.
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cordingly, it becomes possible for C's interest to vest, in C or C's succes-
sors, more than twenty-one years after the death of B.
Proceeding to Step Three C, B is mentioned first as an other taker, and
then B is separately mentioned as part of the phrase that sets out the
condition of divestment. Nevertheless, B is not differently mentioned in
the condition; accordingly, there is no need to apply the critical test ex-
actly the same as before under Step Three B. Also, under Step Three C,
B's issue is otherwise mentioned within the condition of divestment.479
However, the limitation allows for afterborn issue to affect the duration
of B's defeasible interest. Neither the descriptive language nor rules of
construction preclude inclusion of afterborn descendants to define and
measure the condition of defeasance.48 ° Further, because B is alive, pre-
sumptively he still can have issue born thereafter; indeed, there is no
physical impossibility that precludes inclusion of afterborn issue to define
the line of descent that must die out and end before C's interest can vest.
Obviously, then, because B has no issue at A's death, his potential de-
scendants cannot qualify as testing lives in being. One must reach this
same conclusion even if B had children or other descendants living at the
death of A. Nothing in the language, or anything else, limits B's line of
471) Occasionally, language is used that appears to refer to a group of people but courts will
construe it instead as language that describes the nature of an interest created under the provision.
More specifically, there are circumstances in which a court will view language as words of limitation
instead of words of purchase. In such instance, one must disregard that group in conducting this
methodology. For example, consider this devise by A: "To B and his heirs; however, if the land is
cer used for a purpose other than residential, then to C and his heirs." Neither the heirs of B or C
take by purchase, nor is this language intended to refer to a group of people as such. In both
instances,. courts would view the reference to "heirs" as words of limitation, indicating the creation
o a fec simple in B and C. Accordingly, the heirs of B and C must be dismissed in conducting the
methodology under each of the parts of Step Three.
490 AnN restriction upon B's line of descent to those alive at A's death would seem to be incon-
Nistent xith the presumed indefinite failure of issue construction. By definition, this construction
fi\es the duration of B's interest to the expiration of his line of descent, whenever that may occur.
Also, by definition his line ofdescent cannot be restricted to any group of people. Nevertheless, if it
could be confined to B's descendants alive at A's death, there would be no perpetuities violation. B
has no descendants alive at the death of A. Therefore, his interest must end at his death. C's interest
is certain to become possessory, consequently. if it is to be given effect at all, it will not be viewed as
contingent. Accordingly, it is not subject to the common law rule against perpetuities. In all
probability. however, a court would conclude that A has given B an absolute interest and that C has
icceived nothing Initially. A has created the equivalent of a fee simple in B, and courts are reluctant
to recognize any gift over that -epudiates the fee simple first given to B. Such interest must have a
potentially infinite duration In this instance. however. if the gift to C is to be given effect. it will
ncccssarly become possessory at B's death. Accordingly, the gift over to C repudiates the potential
for inliite durtation needed for the creation of a fee simple. Because of this. courts are inclined to
rceognicz the fec in B and ignore the interest given to C.
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descent to those alive at A's death. Nor would there be any physical
impossibility for B or any of his descendants to have issue born thereaf-
ter. In short, the group itself is not restricted at A's death to lives in
being and to lives already ended. Consequently, absent the mention of
other people or groups within a saving clause or some other directly re-
lated provision, one must proceed to Step Three D. Here, because the
taker himself, C, has already been tested under Step Three A and because
his life has failed to validate, an examination of the parents of C is
unnecessary.
Therefore, one must proceed to the critical test of Step Four: Will C's
interest vest in C or his successors, if at all, by (B having had issue and
by) B's line of descent dying out and coming to an end within twenty-one
years of the time the period of the rule begins at A's death? Taking into
account the possible times in which B's line of descent might come to an
end, one concludes that the answer, of course, is NO. Here, one cannot
eliminate all possibilities for remote vesting. It is possible for B to live
for more than twenty-one years beyond the death of A and then for B's
line of descent to end because he dies without surviving issue. Accord-
ingly, it would then be possible for C's interest to vest at B's death in C
or his successors more than twenty-one years beyond the death of A.
Having gone through all four steps without establishing a positive answer
to the critical test, one can now conclude, given a bequest of personal
property and an indefinite failure of issue construction,4 1 that the con-
481. Beyond the definite and indefinite failure of issue constructions, courts have given the
phrase "die without issue" other interpretations. See supra note 472. For example, some courts find
that such language provides a substitute gift to C only if B dies without issue before the death of A,
the testator in this illustration. With this construction, there would, of course, be no perpetuities
violation. At A's death, there would be an absolute interest in either B or C. If B survives A, lie
would receive an absolute interest and C would acquire no interest whatsoever. If, however, B dies
without issue before the time of A's death, his interest would fail while the interest of C would vest
absolutely.
Quite differently, some courts find that "die without issue" is to be construed the same as if it had
read "die without having had issue." With this construction, the substitute gift to C arises only if B
never has any children at all, without regard to whether they survive him. Once B has a child, his
interest becomes absolute while C's interest is extinguished. Under this interpretation, there is no
perpetuities violation because a valid proof now can be made under Step Three B using B as the
testing life. In applying the critical test, one asks: Must C's interest vest in C or his successors, if at
all. by B dying without ever having had a child within twenty-one years of B's death? The answer is
YES. If B is going to have a child, it must be during his life or within a period ofgestation following
his death. Consequently, the very latest one must wait for C's interest to vest or fail is until B's death
or within a period of gestation thereafter. Because C's interest can vest no later, it satisfies the
requirements of the common law rule against perpetuities.
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tingent executory interest is invalid because it violates the common law
rule against perpetuities.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding sections of this article have developed the need for un-
derstanding and applying the common law rule against perpetuities with
respect to the interpretation of interests already created or designed.
These sections also demonstrate the need for a new way of solving these
kinds of perpetuities problems, and they present and illustrate a method-
ology which attempts to do just that. Once again, although this method-
ology cannot obviate the complexities of relevant principles of future
interest law, it does attempt to systematize the process of solution itself
by presenting, step by step, the potential lives by which one might test
and ultimately validate an interest. To be sure, the full process can be
cumbersome; nevertheless, this is inevitable with any methodology that
leads one mechanically to a specific result-one that can be reached
without having to master the rationale that underlies the problem-solving
technique. After all, the purpose of this article is to present a methodol-
ogy that produces correct solutions without having to develop full com-
prehension of the rule and the problem-solving process itself.
Despite the methodology's apparent length, the novice should find it
relatively easy to follow and, above all else, reassuring. More extensive
experience with the rule itself and with this methodology should not pro-
duce tedium and impatience. Repeated tlise of the methodology likely
will reveal its underlying rationale and, thereby, afford a greater facility
for application of the rule.482 With experience, one will bypass Steps
Three A and B whenever he sees that a particular interest can vest no
later than the death of a person in being otherwise mentioned in the pro-
482 For myself, I understand and apply the common law rule by isolating causal or relevant
livcs and then applying the critical test to them. I attempt to explain the process in this manner,
much the same as Professor Dukeminier. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 130, 1868-80. (I must
confess, however, I do not always see eye-to-eye with Professor Dukeminier on the identity of causal
lives in specific limitations.) Even with repeated explanations and illustrations, most students do not
"catch on"; at the very least, they are terribly uneasy about their ability to solve perpetuities
problems. The methodology developed in Part Three, and applied in Part Four, is nothing more
than an effort to identify, collect and categorize all conceivable sources of relevant lives that might
affect vesting and then to determine whether they validate the contingent interest. It is also hoped
that repeated use of the methodology will reveal the logic inherent in the process and the search for
lives that affect vesting. It is also hoped that in time one will no longer proceed step-by-step, but
instead one will know through a principle of relevancy which lives can possibly validate, and if they
cannot one will know that the interest is invalid.
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vision.483 With experience, one might proceed directly to Step Four
whenever he observes a condition that is limited in terms of a gross pe-
riod of years from the time such interest takes effect.484 And with experi-
ence, one might even dispense with Steps Three and Four and proceed
directly to a conclusion of invalidity whenever he observes a condition
that is unrestricted in terms of time and is imposed with respect to inter-
ests that are not limited to existing lives or to twenty-one years from the
time of creation.485 But until that experience has been acquired and such
understanding and mastery of the rule has been earned, strict adherence
to each of the steps of this methodology should facilitate correct solu-
tions and, in the end, reasonably assure creation of interests that carry
483. Consider, once again, this testamentary trust created by A: "Income to B for life; thereaf-
ter, principal to such of B-l's children who attain age twenty-one." Assume that both B and B-I
survive A and that B-1 is childless at A's death. With experience, one will observe immediately that
no potential child of B-1 (an existing person "otherwise mentioned" in the instrument) can, by being
born and attaining age twenty-one, satisfy the conditions attached to the gift of principal more than
twenty-one years beyond the death of B-1. With experience, one observes instantly that, with these
conditions, B-1 is a validating life in being. With experience, one fixes immediately upon B-I,
someone who would be discovered under Step Three C of the methodology, and in doing this, one
will know that, having already discovered a validating life, there is no need to use Steps Three A and
B. For a step-by-step solution to the perpetuities problem presented by this illustration, see supra
illustration IV A-3.
484. Consider, once again, this testamentary trust created by A in which income is accumulated
and added to principal for twenty-one years and, thereafter, it leaves: "The principal to B's descend-
ants, per capita, living twenty-one years after my (A's) death." Assume that B and his only descend-
ants, his two children B-1 and B-2, survive A. With experience, one will observe immediately that
no descendant of B (whether alive at A's death or born thereafter) can, by being born and surviving
the time for distribution, satisfy the conditions attached to the gift of principal more than twenty-one
years beyond the death of A. With experience, one fixes instantly upon the flat twenty-one years
allowed by the common law rule, something to be discovered under Step Four of the methodology,
and in doing this one will know that, having already made a valid proof, there is no need to use Step
Three at all. For a step-by-step solution to the perpetuities problem presented by this illustration,
see supra illustration IV A-5.
485. Consider, once again, this lifetime transfer by deed of Blackacre by A: "To B in fee simple;
however, if Blackacre is ever used for a purpose other than residential, then and in that case to C in
fee simple absolute." With experience, one observes that vesting of C's executory interest depends
upon a breach of the land use restriction only; it does not depend upon the fulfillment of any other
condition. More specifically, the vesting of C's interest is not in any way circumscribed by the life of
either B or C. With experience, one immediately addresses the time limits within a condition and
notes that in this example compliance with or breach of the condition upon land use is not tied to
anyone's life-or, for that matter, to any period of time at all. See supra notes 273-75. Having
made these observations, with experience one should immediately know that there is no way in
which a valid proof can be made under either Step Three or Step'Four of the methodology. Accord-
ingly, one will know that C's interest violates the common law rule against perpetuities without
having to proceed formally through Steps Three and Four. For a step-by-step solution to the perpe-
tuities problem presented by this illustration, see supra illustration IV B-I.
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out an estate owner's design without violation of the common law rule
against perpetuities.486
486. After this methodology was developed, other systems for solving perpertuities problems
were published before the publication of this article. See F. SCHWARTZ, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
THE RULTE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1988); Finan and Leyerle, The Perp Rule Program: Computer-
izing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1988).
In their article, Professors Finan and Leyerle attempt to explain why the common law rule against
perpetuities is so difficult to master, and then they explain why a computer program is needed to
cope with its complexities. Finan and Leyerle have developed such a program, and in their article,
they offer a careful explanation of how it operates. Quite obviously, there must be similarities be-
tween the methodology elaborated in this article and their computer program and explanation. Both
focus upon a series of questions. Although this methodology does not incorporate these questions
into a computer program, it is something that could easily be accomplished. In both instances, these
questions are designed to lead one to the critical test: Must the interest vest, if at all, within twenty-
one years of the death of a life in being or within twenty-one years of the time the period of the rule
commences. To reach a correct solution, both require active analysis by the user in answering these
questions; that is, neither provides a formula which, after simple factual input, mechanically and
automatically solves the perpetuities problem.
Additionally, just as this article maintains that experience with this methodology should lead to
real understanding of the common law rule (see supra notes 482-85 and accompanying text). Finan
and Leyerle observe:
There is also a phenomenon known as "trained intuition," and a computer program can
aid a student in training his intuition in such a manner that his threshold is expanded and
the Rule becomes understandable. Perp Rule is such a program, guiding students through
the legal reasoning involved with the Rule and providing a model of the reasoning process.
Experience with this program suggests that students who spend as little as two hours at
the computer terminal using Perp Rule get what some students have described as the "aha-
ness" ("Aha, I see it") or "eureka" effect.... [O]nce the eureka effect has been exper-
ienced, students are no longer intimidated by the Rule and can read cases with the same
confidence they feel in other areas
Finan and Leyerle, supra note 486, at 322, 335.
Beyond the foregoing similarities, these two methodologies differ in important ways. The most
significant difference, and a critical one to be sure, involves selection of testing lives in being. Finan
and Leyerle begin their search for a validating life with the taker of the interest in question. If that
life fails to uphold the interest, their program then asks the user to provide other lives for testing,
lives they refer to as Provisional Measuring Lives (PML's). Ultimately, the selection of alternative
PML's must be initiated by the user. Nevertheless, their program presents a "help screen" to assist
in making the selection. Their article does offer a general principle for selection, one based upon
"connection" to the contingent interest. Given the authority they cite in support of this principle,
their idea of connection may be as broad as Professor Waggoner's (see supra notes 76-117 and ac-
companying text). Their program. however, goes beyond a general principle. It tells the user that
the instrument itself may provide some help and that one should also consider selecting the holders
of preceding interests or the ancestors of the taker of the interest. See Finan and Leyerle, supra note
486, at 324-25, 327.
This methodology, however, is far more specific in its search for a potential validating life in being.
In time, students understand and accept the quirks of the common law rule, but they do not master
the selection of testing lives in being. They may hear and even comprehend a principle of causation
or connection, yet they seldom apply it with confidence and without frustration. Thus, the real
purpose of this methodology is to overcome the problem of selection. More specifically, it deter-
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mines and assembles for the user exactly which lives in being must be tested and under what circum-
stances. Consequently, it offers direct and exhaustive guidance in the search for testing lives in
being. It formulates a precise pool of testing lives from which a validating life in being must be
found, if one exists at all. And most important, when one exhausts the list of lives within this pool,
one knows that the search for a validating life has failed and that the testing of all lives in being has
come to an end.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/2
